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No Spitting.
No Summary Judgments.
-Sign in the office of a district court in the former Fifth Circuit.
I. Introduction
Word has it that the United States Courts of Appeals are tough on
summary judgments. The district court's sign reflects the perception
that, in practice, the reviewing court turns a strict eye on grants of
summary judgment-perhaps more so in the former Fifth Circuit than
in other circuits, though the verbal formulations are similar, tracking
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 It also suggests that standards of
review--catch phrases meant to guide the appellate court in approach-
ing both the issues and parties before it and the trial court's earlier
procedure or result-really affect subsequent courts, trial and appel-
late, in doing their job.
The trial court's sardonic sign at least illustrates two tines of a
fork that must be kept in mind when the concept of "standards of re-
view" is approached. First, practice counts more than words. Standards
are not self-actualizing; for example, what is a "material fact?" And
the formulations do not say much until the appeals court, in discussion
and practice, gives them life.
Second, words may control or frame the practice. The ubiquitous
standard, either in basic form or as defined and refined, is presented as
a meaningful guidepost to frame the arguments to the appellate court
and that court's analytical response. Even if the catch phrases have no
real internal meaning, in many cases it is clear that the issue-framing
or assignment of power behind the words is the turning point of the
decision. 2 That many panels take the scope of review seriously is illus-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The courts must find that no material facts are left for
trial resolution. See infra note 286.
2. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 143-45 (debate over "some evidence"
rule).
[Vol. 9
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trated by conclusions like the one tagged on a recent case: "This case
does not present a model of proof of the statutory employer defense.
Our review is, however, strictly circumscribed by the posture of this
appeal. We cannot find plain error on this record." 3
The importance of the review posture is also implicit in the num-
ber of cases in this article which had to be resolved by the full en banc
court before the standard was settled. Additionally, the Supreme Court
has seen fit recently to step into the picture to preserve the "buckler
and shield ' 4 of the clearly erroneous rule against perceived evasion by
the former en banc Fifth Circuit.5 Even that decision was not without
strong disagreement.6
Even where review authority controls, however, it is not clear how
much of the structuring is really found inside the standard of review
phrases.7 Sometimes the intricacies are nonsensical; how can a jury in a
criminal case convict on insufficient evidence (the normal review) with-
out doing a miscarriage of justice (the test where counsel had not
moved for acquittal)?8 Of course the tests may turn out to be a practi-
cal fiction-shorthand which ultimately does not control the appellate
decision-making process. Just when it is "obvious" that the standard
determines outcome, the next panel may routinely recite the proper
3. Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715 F.2d 983, 989 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra
notes 272-79.
4. Horton v. United States Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1961).
5. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)(discussed infra notes 90-93
and accompanying text). Of course in some situations limited review is a constitutional
restriction. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (discussed infra note 136).
6. See Swint, 456 U.S. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The case also illustrates
the confusion that at times exists in this area, the court noting that the former Fifth
Circuit opinion spoke of the inappplicability of the clearly erroneous rule while simulta-
neously applying language associated with the test. See id. at 290.
7. See generally Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982). For
example, the "substantial evidence" test for review of facts in formal administrative
actions has been likened to the core of a seedless grape. See also W. GELLHORN, C.
BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 269 (7th ed. 1979) and infra note 135.
8. Cf. infra note 187 and accompanying text (review of civil verdict absent di-
rected verdict motion). Judge Anderson made a similar observation in United States v.
Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc)(concurring opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S.
356 (1983), noting: "To say that the evidence is sufficient if a 'reasonable trier of fact
could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt' is not substan-
tively different from saying that the 'evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.'" Id. (citations omitted). The majority nevertheless rejected
the "hypothesis of innocence" formulation for ordinary review of criminal convictions.
See id. at 548-49.
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language but apparently decide the case in its own way.
The problem is of course not unusual in a common law system,
where judges are always human in applying and interpreting legal
rules. Yet while it is easy to say the "guideposts" are meaningless post-
hoc rationalizations, most courts present them as restricting or freeing
their reviewing scope at least in a general way. Similarly, witness our
surprise when we realize that John Hinckley's jury actually followed its
prescribed guiding formulation in finding that the government had not
met its federal sanity burden.9
In addition to the problem of finding the true meaning and value
of the standard of review notion, two further problems quickly appear.
First, the courts in general, and the Eleventh Circuit at times, have not
always been uniform in their recitation and application of the specific
tests."0 Second, even with an established standard, the term of the stan-
dard usually defies definition. One senses the circular difficulties a court
had in explaining "abuse of discretion": "In a legal sense, discretion is
abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered."' 1
Further definition and discussion often adds nothing and is no
more helpful than the term itself. "Clearly erroneous," for example, is
probably clear enough (or as clear as such a non-mathematical concept
allows) without the reams of garnishing and explanation courts have
offered . 2 Yet the bonus definition, as law, cannot be ignored by subse-
quent courts, practicing attorneys, or exploring scholars..
Perhaps all the standards and elaboration could be reduced to
three or four such standards-no deference, some deference, high def-
erence, scepticism. Or as Professor Rosenberg has classified, "[a]ll ap-
pellate Gaul, the trial judge would say, is divided into three parts: re-
view of facts, review of law, and review of discretion."' 3 Despite the
9. See Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HARv. L.S. BULL. 15, 16-17
(1982). But the Supreme Court has recited deference of "great weight" to an agency's
interpretive ruling while, finding itself in disagreement with that view, rejecting it. E.g.,
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The "great weight" becomes less deferen-
tial with the blurry qualification: "great weight to any reasonable construction .... .
Id. at 626 (emphasis added). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 7:10, 7:11 (2d ed. 1979).
10. See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text.
11. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 672, 169 P.2d 453 (1946).
12. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
13. Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173
(1978).
262 [Vol. 9
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room for simplification in this area, however, it must be noted that the
tests also often define what materials the reviewing court looks to, in
addition to the scope of its review. In practice the standards appear to
have some real value: to guide the process, to tip the balance to one
side, to direct the court to common points of departure which are al-
ready deemed relevant. At least the standards are useful to organize an
argument or holding, or to give a common language of appellate scope.
Standards may even assign or reflect the power distribution between
reviewing and "lower" court.
Whatever the actual value or use of standards of review, most
cases on appeal set out the test appropriate for the particular issue. The
smart attorney and the careful court is likely to cite or discuss the stan-
dard and its application to the issues at hand.14 Standards, whatever
their substance, have strategic value in appellate practice because they
"indicate the decibel level at which the appellate advocate must play to
catch the judicial ear." 15 For example, counsel for appellant in a recent
case challenged the trial court's finding as clearly erroneous-an ambi-
tious effort-apparently adopting that test in light of the Supreme
Court's strict application in Pullman-Standard v. Swint.16 The attorney
need not have conceded that deferential standard, however, since a
strong argument was available that the finding at issue was a "mixed"
question of law and fact, possibly subject to stricter review even under
Swint.17 By sliding over the standard of review issue, counsel could
have lost the chance to have the appellate court stir more freely in the
trial court's soup. Even a topic as routine as the proper standard, then,
may turn out to be a vital issue on appeal.
This article is offered as a guidebook to the standards used to re-
view various decisions based on particular situations at trial in civil and
habeas cases. The article reviews the several standards, their meanings,
their applications, and their differences. Although this guide empha-
sizes Eleventh Circuit and former Fifth Circuit cases and language,
many of the general tests and analyses are standard fare among all the
circuits. Former Fifth Circuit precedent is particularly telling for the
Eleventh Circuit, for which former Fifth Circuit precedent rules until
14. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REv.
869, 872 (1983)("Start the brief by stating briefly the applicable standard of review.").
15. Id. at 873.
16. 456 U.S. at 273.
17. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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an Eleventh Circuit en banc court overrules.'" Lawyer or court may
wish to follow the categories to find the proper tests--cases often in-
volve several-or doctrinal debate. The cited standard may sound com-
mon but have a twist, in language or practice, which distinguishes it
from a similar situation.' 9 This summary, then, may serve as a helpful
reference: where the review issue is not crucial or complex, it can be
addressed and passed; where it counts, this guidebook may present a
first step and point to a meaningful direction.
This article, however, is meant to be more than a completed peg-
and-hole set or a purely practical list. Cases are often conflicting, un-
clear, or skimpy on the rules and their bases. The historical develop-
ment and intent of the standards is neglected. Other authorities are
lacking, as substantive articles discuss and promote legal issues as if
they were decided in an appellate vacuum, little attention given to the
decision-making context of the issues or the assignment of power and
roles among courts. These areas demand beginning analysis and
questioning.
This guidebook, then, may also serve as a starting point for further
inquiry, by court and commentator, into the propriety of various tests
in theory and application. Courts may wish to shore up inconsistencies.
Scholars may begin to ask what these standards mean and how they
affect the judicial process on appeal or, in turn, at trial. Standards of
review, like chemical catalysts, must act on something, and usually that
something is more important in the final analysis. Nevertheless, the
guideposts are useful in practice, and also raise substantial questions
about the legal system in general. The article is presented to lawyer,
court, and scholar alike as a helpful Eleventh Circuit guide and
springboard.
18. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)(en
banc)(the Eleventh Circuit specifically adopting Fifth Circuit precedent prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1981).
19. Factors commonly affecting the appropriate standard include: objections and
waivers, presumptions and burdens, appellant versus appellee, fact versus law, criminal
versus civil, and judge versus jury. This article attempts to categorize along these and
other lines.
Similarly, the article compares other circuits' tests and rules in some divergent or
illustrative situations. Although the general principles often apply nationally, specific
applications sometimes differ among and within the circuits, and conflicts exist beyond
the general statements of the broadly applicable standard. See generally S. CHILDRESS
& M. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW (forthcoming 1986).
264 [Vol. 9
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II. Civil Appeals
A. Findings in a Bench Trial
1. Findings of Fact
a. Development of the Clearly Erroneous Rule
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
uneasy dichotomy existed between the standard applied in reviewing
equity findings and the one reserved for those actions based in law but
for which, as permitted by Congress since 1865, a jury had been
waived. In nonjury legal actions the judge was seen as both judge and
jury, and his findings of fact were considered as conclusive as a jury
verdict, which had long been strictly protected by the seventh amend-
ment. Equity review, on the other hand, was traditionally
broader--only a self-imposed restraint-though more restrictive than
that used in admiralty. Equity in fact applied three tests, varying the
strength of "presumptively correct" where the evidence to be reviewed
was oral, undisputed documentary, or disputed documentary.20
The merger of law and equity in 1934 further complicated this
divergence. Although it was accepted that law and equity would then
require the same standard, the profession hotly debated whether that
test should be imported from former legal practice or from "the" stan-
dard used in equity practice. In the end the broader equity test pre-
vailed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though a draft stating it
explicitly--"the same effect as heretofore given to findings in suits in
equity" 2 -was rejected in an effort to avoid the uncertainty surround-
ing prior equity practice. In addition, the Advisory Committee at-
tempted to bring uniformity to the equity test by stating that the new
rule would be "applicable in all classes of findings," regardless of the
documentary or testimonial nature of the fact found.22
20. See Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 411-
13 (1981); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Errone-
ous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 69-72 & nn.10-11 (1977).
21. Note, supra note 20, at 72-75 & n.22. The Advisory Committee made clear,
however, that the equity test was the chosen one. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
22. Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
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b. Rule 52 and Applicability
The result was the now-famous clearly erroneous rule formulated
for equity and law courts in Rule 52.23 Rule 52(a) requires the trial
court to separate and spell out its fact findings and conclusions of law.
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ... "-
This rule applies to review of standard civil cases and equity ac-
tions, as well as to admiralty cases,25 and to habeas corpus appeals.26
The rule on its face applies to findings made by a judge aided by an
advisory jury as though there were no jury.27 "The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court. 28 Similarly, fact findings of a bankruptcy judge,
affirmed by the district court, are to be credited unless clearly errone-
ous. 29 Rule 52(a) by its own terms does not require the district court to
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). One brief filed with the Fifth Circuit demonstrated
sarcasm about, or ignorance of, the ubiquitous nature of the rule. It argued that the
"findings below are, to coin a phrase, clearly erroneous."
24. Id.
25. See 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 52.03[11] &
nn.3, 26 (2d ed. 1977). Admiralty review was traditionally de novo, but the Supreme
Court extended "clear error" review in 1954. See McAllister v. United States, 348
U.S. 19 (1954). In 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were made generally
applicable to admiralty. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Note, supra note 20, at 70 n.11.
26. See infra notes 124-26, 372-78, and accompanying text.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A 1946 amendment clarified the rule's applicability, as
originally intended, to the advisory jury situation.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2)(in nonjury actions the
district court, before further hearing, shall accept master's findings unless clearly erro-
neous); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 523 F.2d 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1975)(distinguishing spe-
cific reference under Rule 53(c) from other Rule 53 situations). Review is less clear,
however, for findings of a magistrate referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Findings
under §§ 636(b)(1) and 636(b)(3) may be subject to "de novo determination." See
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). But recently a court has declined such
free review in a case referred under § 636(b)(2). See Miss. River Grain Elevator, Inc.
v. Bartlett & Co., 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677
F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B)(en banc)(failure to file objections in a § 636(b)(1)
proceeding does not waive right to appeal district court's conclusions of law, but there
is no de novo review of an issue covered in the report, and adopted facts are not re-
versed absent plain error or manifest injustice).
29. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). See Northern Pipe-line Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 n.5 (1982). The court's plan or provi-
sions, however, have been reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" test. See In re Brad-
ley, 705 F.2d 1409, 1411 (5th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy referral situation is, of
course, in a state of flux, both with the institution of a new system under the Bank-
266 [Vol. 9
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state its findings and conclusions on decisions under Rules 12 or 56.
But the court dismissing plaintiff's case on the merits under Rule 41(b)
is subject to Rule 52(a).10
c. Definition
i. Gypsum: "Mistake"
Soon after Rule 52(a) was adopted, the Supreme Court in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. defined "clear error," offering this
formulation: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted."'" The language of this definition has become standard fare in sub-
sequent Supreme Court opinions. 2 Most of the Eleventh Circuit prece-
dent which defines "clearly erroneous" follows the Gypsum formula in
applying Rule 52(a).33 And Gypsum's "mistake" definition has itself
been "defined": "Where the evidence would support a conclusion either
way, a choice by the trial judge between two permissible views of the
weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous . . . ." Review is
made, at any rate, by considering the evidence as a whole.35
ruptey Code and the adjustments made to maintain the constitutionality of the refer-
rals in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncement.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Denial of a Rule 41(b) motion has the effect of carry-
ing it with the case and entering judgment on the merits at the close of the evidence.
See Rigel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
infra note 306.
31. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In Gypsum the Court, on direct appeal, rejected
the trial court's findings. Id. at 396.
32. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19
(1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); McAllister v. United States,
348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954).
33. E.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Citibank Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.
1984); United States ex reL G.E. Supply Co. v. Wiring, Inc., 646 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th
Cir. 1981); Ferrero v. United States, 603 F.2d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1979); Hague v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1978); Chaney v. City of Galveston,
368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. Chaney, 368 F.2d at 776.
35. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395 ("entire evidence"). Although the Supreme Court
would appear to have settled this issue, the Seventh Circuit once erroneously indicated
that the reviewing court looks to the evidence most favorable to the findings. See Uni-
royal v. Mumford, 454 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1972).
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ii. Sanders v. Leech: "Truth and Right"
The standard, unfortunately, is not so clearly and consistently con-
strued in many former Fifth Circuit opinions.38 One line of cases con-
tinues to use a pre-Gypsum three-pronged test, reversing where: (1)
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the court "misap-
prehended" effect of the evidence; or (3) although there is evidence
which if credible would be substantial, the "force and effect of the tes-
timony as a whole convinces that the finding is so against the great
preponderance of the credible testimony that it does not reflect or re-
present the truth and right of the case."'37 The circuit formulated this
test prior to Gypsum in Sanders v. Leech, which held that the review-
ing court may reverse in the three situations above, but warned that "it
is not for the appellate court to substitute its judgment on disputed
issues of fact for that of the trial court where there is substantial credi-
ble evidence to support the finding." ' Of course the Sanders test, espe-
cially in its "truth and right" incarnation, is not wholly inconsistent
with the Gypsum approach. (The warning to appellate courts not to
substitute their own judgments is prevalent in both lines of cases, for
example.) In fact, some cases cite both Gypsum and Sanders as prece-
dent without discussing possible differences.39 Others seem to allow the
appeals court a choice, as an "either/or. 4 °
Nevertheless, opinions which cite both tests tend to blur rather
than reconcile. Some interpret Sanders' "truth and right" test as re-
stating Gypsum's "mistake" test.4' One case says that Gypsum man-
36. Divergent definition is an observation or criticism separate from any inconsis-
tency in applying the standard. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 100-132. Cf.
Note, supra note 20, at 68 (controversy is not over whether findings are in fact clearly
erroneous but over the language of the rule, especially where credibility is involved).
37. Western Cottonoil Co. v. Hodges, 218 F.2d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1954)(citing
Sanders v. Leech, 158 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1946)).
38. 158 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1946).
39. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 940 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, -U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 97 (1984); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481,
484, 488 (5th Cir. 1969)(damages plainly out of measure so as to be clearly
erroneous).
40. E.g., Blum v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 418 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir.
1969)(findings supported by substantial credible evidence), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1040
(1970); Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Products Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th
Cir.)("in other words ... truth and right"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Arm-
strong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
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II. Civil Appeals
A. Findings in a Bench Trial
1. Findings of Fact
a. Development of the Clearly Erroneous Rule
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
uneasy dichotomy existed between the standard applied in reviewing
equity findings and the one reserved for those actions based in law but
for which, as permitted by Congress since 1865, a jury had been
waived. In nonjury legal actions the judge was seen as both judge and
jury, and his findings of fact were considered as conclusive as a jury
verdict, which had long been strictly protected by the seventh amend-
ment. Equity review, on the other hand, was traditionally
broader-only a self-imposed restraint-though more restrictive than
that used in admiralty. Equity in fact applied three tests, varying the
strength of "presumptively correct" where the evidence to be reviewed
was oral, undisputed documentary, or disputed documentary.20
The merger of law and equity in 1934 further complicated this
divergence. Although it was accepted that law and equity would then
require the same standard, the profession hotly debated whether that
test should be imported from former legal practice or from "the" stan-
dard used in equity practice. In the end the broader equity test pre-
vailed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though a draft stating it
explicitly-"the same effect as heretofore given to findings in suits in
equity" 2 -- was rejected in an effort to avoid the uncertainty surround-
ing prior equity practice. In addition, the Advisory Committee at-
tempted to bring uniformity to the equity test by stating that the new
rule would be "applicable in all classes of findings," regardless of the
documentary or testimonial nature of the fact found.22
20. See Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 411-
13 (1981); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Errone-
ous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 69-72 & nn.10-11 (1977).
21. Note, supra note 20, at 72-75 & n.22. The Advisory Committee made clear,
however, that the equity test was the chosen one. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
22. Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
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b. Rule 52 and Applicability
The result was the now-famous clearly erroneous rule formulated
for equity and law courts in Rule 52.23 Rule 52(a) requires the trial
court to separate and spell out its fact findings and conclusions of law.
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. ... "I',
This rule applies to review of standard civil cases and equity ac-
tions, as well as to admiralty cases,25 and to habeas corpus appeals.26
The rule on its face applies to findings made by a judge aided by an
advisory jury as though there were no jury.27 "The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court."' 28 Similarly, fact findings of a bankruptcy judge,
affirmed by the district court, are to be credited unless clearly errone-
ous.29 Rule 52(a) by its own terms does not require the district court to
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). One brief filed with the Fifth Circuit demonstrated
sarcasm about, or ignorance of, the ubiquitous nature of the rule. It argued that the
"findings below are, to coin a phrase, clearly erroneous."
24. Id.
25. See 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 52.03[l] &
nn.3, 26 (2d ed. 1977). Admiralty review was traditionally de novo, but the Supreme
Court extended "clear error" review in 1954. See McAllister v. United States, 348
U.S. 19 (1954). In 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were made generally
applicable to admiralty. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Note, supra note 20, at 70 n.1 1.
26. See infra notes 124-26, 372-78, and accompanying text.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A 1946 amendment clarified the rule's applicability, as
originally intended, to the advisory jury situation.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2)(in nonjury actions the
district court, before further hearing, shall accept master's findings unless clearly erro-
neous); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 523 F.2d 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1975)(distinguishing spe-
cific reference under Rule 53(c) from other Rule 53 situations). Review is less clear,
however, for findings of a magistrate referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Findings
under §§ 636(b)(1) and 636(b)(3) may be subject to "de novo determination." See
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). But recently a court has declined such
free review in a case referred under § 636(b)(2). See Miss. River Grain Elevator, Inc.
v. Bartlett & Co., 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677
F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B)(en banc)(failure to file objections in a § 636(b)(1)
proceeding does not waive right to appeal district court's conclusions of law, but there
is no de novo review of an issue covered in the report, and adopted facts are not re-
versed absent plain error or manifest injustice).
29. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). See Northern Pipe-line Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 n.5 (1982). The court's plan or provi-
sions, however, have been reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" test. See In re Brad-
ley, 705 F.2d 1409, 1411 (5th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy referral situation is, of
course, in a state of flux, both with the institution of a new system under the Bank-
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ward expanded review-either in practical application or through ma-
nipulation of the test(s). Broader review of fact findings is criticized for
increasing appeals, undermining confidence in the judicial system, and
demoralizing district judges. 51 This charged "circumvention" of Rule
52 is seen as especially marked where the issue of demeanor evidence
or inferences is involved.
e. Demeanor and Documentary Evidence
The district judge is often recognized as having a superior position
from which to judge the facts. Thus, "credibility choices and the reso-
lution of conflicting testimony are within the province of the court sit-
ting without a jury, subject only to the clearly erroneous rule of Rule
52(a). 52 The rule recognizes this deference: "Findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses."5 3 The implication is that the appellate court must apply the
standard especially carefully when reviewing demeanor testimony.54
This warning has been termed a stronger burden55 or a "special
reluctance."56
Despite the original intent that the clearly erroneous rule be ap-
plied to all types of evidence57 and the plain language of the "due re-
gard" caution, many courts have reversed the logic, allowing "clear er-
ror" to be more readily found for documentary evidence, undisputed
testimony, and depositions. In those situations, early Fifth Circuit
panels held that the rule did not apply at all 58 or that "the burden is
51. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 409-11, 418, 426-29; Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-81 (1957). But see Note,
supra note 20, at 80-81, 84-85 (more recently trend is toward stricter and more uni-
form application, especially by Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit). See also
supra note 36 (inconsistency in applying Rule 52).
52. Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
54. See Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394, 396.
55. See Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee note of 1955, quoted in J. MOORE &
J. LUCAS, supra note 25, 1 52.01[07] (unadopted amendment to Rule 52).
57. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
58. See Frazier v. Alabama Motor Club, Inc., 349 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir.
1965). Other cases at the same time strictly applied the rule. See, e.g., Welch, 345 F.2d
at 943-44.
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lighter, much lighter," to show clear error.59 Today the standard
formula in the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits holds that, though the rule
still applies where credibility is not involved, "the burden of establish-
ing clear error is not so heavy, and the clearly erroneous rule is some-
what ameliorated ... .
The policy behind somewhat freer review in such situations, echo-
ing the three-part standard formerly used in equity, is clear: the ap-
peals court considers itself to sit in a vantage point as good as the trial
court's. While the Supreme Court over the years has in practice and
definition applied Rule 52(a) across-the-board, it has occasionally used
dicta which support those declining to give up the demeanor distinction
of old equity, noting that the rationale behind the rule is of less mo-
ment where the evidence is mostly documentary.6 1 Additionally, recent
Court dicta seem to endorse fully the Eleventh Circuit's intermediate
approach. 2
Extended review has, however, been strongly criticized for flip-
flopping the intent of Rule 52(a) and usurping the trial court's func-
tion." The approaches taken among and within the circuits are not al-
ways consistent,6 4 and the Eighth Circuit has recently held that it is not
59. Galena Oaks, 218 F.2d at 219. See also Pennsylvania T. & M. Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Crapet, 199 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1952).
60. Seaboard Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1349
(11 th Cir. 1982). See also Onaway Transportation Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d
197, 200 (5th Cir. 1983); Hague v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir.
1978)("somewhat lessened"); Burston v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 990 (1975); Sicula Oceanica, S.A. v. Wilmar Marine Eng. & Sales Corp.,
413 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1969)("not as heavy").
61. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1966).
62. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, - U.S. -, 104 S.
Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984). But in 1985 the Court reiterated strict application of the rule,
even in paper cases. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 71, 74
(1985).
63. See, e.g., Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural
Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1950)("by a process almost inveterate
in legal thinking, a negative was soon deduced as the opposite of the affirmations; and
now the definitely erroneous gloss is being stated in place of the rule itself"). See gener-
ally Wright, supra note 51; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact
Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506 (1963). Even
where the reviewing court is as competent, its function may not be to reinterpret a
"cold" record. Note, supra note 20, at 90.
64. See Note, supra note 20, at 79-85. Presently the Supreme Court and most
circuits endorse application of the rule regardless of the class of evidence. Id. at 79-80
& n.56. See generally Anderson, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 74.
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bound at all by findings based on paper evidence. 65 Nevertheless,
Professors Wright and Miller have noted a "marked trend" toward
strict application of the rule to all fact findings.66 The Eleventh and
Fifth Circuit test has become relatively settled, 7 allowing a middle-
ground approach in which the class of evidence may be considered, but
the clearly erroneous rule still applies.
f. Verbatim Adoption
A special problem is presented when the district court's findings
are directly adopted from a brief or submission of one party, since the
reviewing court cannot see the discerning factors or be assured that the
trial court has faced the conflicts inherent in adjudication. While the
former Fifth Circuit "has consistently expressed its disapproval of the
practice," 68 it nonetheless applies Rule 52(a) to such findings, with a
qualification similar to that used for documentary evidence. The court
"can take into account the District Court's lack of personal attention to
factual findings in applying the clearly erroneous rule.'"69 Then the "ap-
pellate court can feel slightly more confident in concluding that impor-
tant evidence has been overlooked or inadequately considered .... ,,70
65. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977), reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
66. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587, at
748-49 (1971).
67. Note, supra note 20, at 84-85. The circuit's position has been repeatedly in-
voked despite the Supreme Court's generally broad reading of the clear error rule ex-
pressed recently in Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). The flexible review given nondemeanor
evidence, however, is put forth as a variation on, not an abrogation of, Rule 52, so that
it is apparently distinguished from the discredited "ultimate facts" exception. See infra
text accompanying notes 87-93. Pre-Swint cases do not always carefully distinguish the
two situations, leaving it unclear whether the freer review was based on paper evidence
or on inferences which the appellate court was entitled to draw. See, e.g., Galena Oaks,
218 F.2d at 219. Now, however, the court apparently sees its demeanor variation as
permissible and separate from the prior review given inferences.
68. Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C&P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir.
1975).
69. Amstar v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980). See also Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1979); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Jahre, 472 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 314 n.1 (5th Cir.
1977)(quoting Louis Dreyfus & Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 738 (5th
Cir. 1962)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). For a thorough discussion of the
problems and permissible uses of mechanical adoptions, see Ramey Construction Co. v.
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Other circuits, including the First and Ninth, turn an even more
critical appellate eye.7 1 But the Supreme Court's early observations are
consistent with the present Eleventh Circuit approach: "The findings
leave much to be desired in light of the function of the trial court. But
they are nonetheless the findings of the District Court. And they must
stand or fall depending on whether they are supported by evidence. We
think they are."'7 2 The courts may be more willing to accept (or other-
wise to reject) adopted findings in cases involving highly technical
facts. 73 On the other hand, future courts may be more reluctant to ac-
cept findings adopted by a special master; cases often emphasize the
special burdens on district judges, adoption thwarts the purpose of a
special reference, and the appellate court may flinch at facing two
levels of verbatim adoption.
g. No Findings and Faulty Findings
Where the district court has failed to make Rule 52 findings, the
Supreme Court has noted that
the usual rule is that there should be a remand for further proceed-
ings to permit the trial court to make the missing find-
ings. . . .Likewise,where findings are infirm because of an errone-
ous view of the law, a remand is the proper course unless the
record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.74
In the Eleventh Circuit a similar rule has been applied to inade-
quate or conclusory findings which do not reveal the trial court's ana-
lytical process. In such a case, remand for more specific findings is rou-
tine, but "[this failure is merely a hindrance and not a fatal error,"
since the appellate court can make the factual collation, in the interest
Apache Tribe, 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980).
71. See, e.g., In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008-10 (Ist Cir.
1970)("maximum doubt"). Cf. Heterochemical Corp. v. United States Rubber Co.,
368 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1966)(calling it a "practical and wise custom").
72. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944). See
also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4 (1964).
73. See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d at 1009-10 (such as patent appeals).
74. Swint, 456 U.S. at 291-92 (1982). Cf. Mason v. Balkcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th
Cir. 1976)(harmless error for failure to find facts specially). See generally 5A J.
MOORE & J. LuCAS, supra note 25, § 52.06[2] (1982), cited in Swint, 456 U.S. at 292
n.22. For fact findings based on legal error, see infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
See also Swint, 456 U.S. at 298-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of judicial economy, where the record fully establishes the pertinent
facts.7 5 Chief Judge Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit has observed that
"[c]ourts of appeals, at least those in the federal system, are properly
capable of making findings of fact in a broad range of circumstances,
and in practice they actually do so. '"76 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's recent reminder that remand to the fact-finding body is the
normally appropriate procedure may check the circuit's use or develop-
ment of fact-finding economies.
2. 'Conclusions of Law
a. Errors: Law or Fact?
Errors of law are not insulated by the clearly erroneous rule and
are freely reviewable. 7 Such a statement is not very helpful since the
threshold question, whether the finding is factual or a legal conclusion,
depends on the case law on that issue and, at times, the facts of the
case. 7 8 The cases offer little general guidance into the fact-law distinc-
tion beyond specific determinations in individual situations. Justice
Brennan offers that fact questions are those for which resolution is
"based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's expe-
75. Continental Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir.)(quoting Whitley v.
Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
Even after Swint, the circuit has found appellate fact-finding to be proper and neces-
sary in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Scott v. Wainwright, 698 F.2d 427, 429
(11 th Cir. 1983). See also Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment, 699 F.2d 760, 766
n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -. U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 482 (1983); United States v. Ga.
Power Co., 695 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. Godbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts-An Available and Appropriate
Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 365(1982). Chief Judge Godbold surveys the appellate
fact-finding function, including receiving new evidence, and discusses its propriety,
economies, and limits.
77. E.g., Swint, 456 U.S. at 287; Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394; United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968). Appellate courts are foremost, of course,
law courts. For example, the question whether specific conduct is constitutionally pro-
tected is ultimately an issue of law. See generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193
n.3 (1972).
For the principles underlying the "rule of law" controlling in any case, especially
panel stare decisis, see infra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
78. See generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 25, % 52.03[1] n.26. See
infra text accompanying notes 98-132 for various law, fact, and "mixed" categoriza-
tions used in the former Fifth Circuit and in the Eleventh Circuit.
1985]
21
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
rience with the mainsprings of human conduct. . . ."9 Judge Friendly
has observed, "what a court can determine better than a jury [is] per-
haps about the only satisfactory criterion for distinguishing 'law' from
'fact.' "80
b. State Law and Foreign Law
Federal courts defer, of course, to interpretations of state law by
state courts, especially the state's highest court. Where no controlling
precedent exists, the court is to decide the case as it believes the state
courts would."' Although review of a district court's construction of law
is normally an unbounded job of the appellate court, some courts note
their deference to an interpretation made by a district judge exper-
ienced in the law of the state in which he or she sits.82 Rule 44.1 pro-
vides for the use of foreign law in the district courts, allowing them to
consider broad sources in determining it. "The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law."8 3
79. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289. See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965); NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d
Cir. 1961). See infra note 292.
80. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 431 (2d Cir. 1974).
81. See Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).. Thus, federal courts are not bound by intermediate state
court rulings if they are convinced that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise. See Comm'r v. Bosch's Estate, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The latest and most
authoritative expression of state law applicable to the facts of the case controls. See
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). See also Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483, 488
(2d Cir. 1971)(proper to refer to "majority rule" when applicable state law is
uncertain).
The Supreme Court has approved certification for determination of state law
where the state so provides. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389 (1974). The
procedure "helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 391.
82. E.g., Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960)(district court's
"permissible" construction of state law in diveristy cases is to be accepted even though
the reviewing court disagrees). Cf. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.
1980)(district judge not overruled on question of state law unless "clearly wrong").
83. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1. The Advisory Notes specifically recognize that the final
sentence makes inapplicable the clearly erroneous rule.
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c. Findings Based on Faulty Law
Findings of fact based on an erroneous view of the law or an incor-
rect legal standard are not binding on the appellate court. 84 Although
this rule has been standard in the circuit, it was not always clear
whether the courts were "freely reviewing" such findings or whether
the findings were, because of the mistake of law, "clearly erroneous."
An early case implied the latter-that the rule is another facet of Rule
52.85 But most cases, especially recently, find that in such a situation
Rule 52 insulation no longer applies. 8
d. Inferences and "Ultimate Facts"
Although the cases were by no means uniform, the former Fifth
Circuit traditionally considered itself as free to reject findings of "ulti-
mate fact" or inference as where the error was one of law.87 Where the
district court's error goes to the heart of the legal issue, it was ar-gued,
the finding, though ostensibly one of fact, should not be protecteu. This
doctrine was first adopted and defined by the court in Galena Oaks
Corporation v. Scofield: "Insofar. . .as the so-called 'ultimate fact' is
simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the
interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary [or 'subsidi-
ary'] facts, it is 'subject to review free of the restraining impact of the
so-called 'clearly erroneous' rule."88 One court has observed that the
84. See, e.g., Swint, 456 U.S. at 287; Franks, 414 F.2d at 684; United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968). Remand is the usual course for further
fact-finding under the corrected legal test. Swim, 456 U.S. at 291-93. See supra notes
74-76 and accompanying text.
85. See Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1966).
86. See, e.g., Lincoln, 697 F.2d at 939-40 (if taints findings); Manning v. M/V
Sea Road, 417 F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
628 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1980)("no deference"), vacated on other grounds, 451
U.S. 902 (1981).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1075
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982); Danner v. United States Civil Ser-
vice Comm'n, 635 F.2d 427, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1981); American Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 421 F.2d 442, 451 (5th Cir.)(ultimate issue inherently one of law), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 819 (1970); Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 330 (5th
Cir. 1959).
88. 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954)(quoting Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d
592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953)). Broad factual inferences were regarded as "ultimate facts"
and thus treated as a question of law. Inferences were also often involved in the less
stringent review given documentary evidence but were more likely to be analyzed, espe-
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doctrine may be "understood best as an abortive attempt to resolve the
law/fact dilemma by making that elusive distinction less determina-
tive."89 But even within the circuit the effort was criticized. One court
cautioned that while "subjecting inferences or ultimate facts to a
broader review is not novel," the clear error rule "is not to be
discarded."90
The doctrine is "abortive" because "[t]he Supreme Court has lev-
elled it."9' In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, the Court, noting that Rule
52 "does not divide facts into categories,' 92 rejected the former Fifth
Circuit doctrine and its distinction between subsidiary and ultimate
facts. Today the doctrine is no longer viable, though its concepts and
result may continue to affect or survive in related areas.93
cially recently, as falling within the ultimate fact doctrine. See supra note 67.
To say that such inferences are "legal" does not, of course, resolve the conceptual
blending. Compare Bullock, 266 F.2d at 330 (appears to distinguish inference from
ultimate fact), with American Nat'l Bank, 421 F.2d at 451 (no distinction offered).
One discussion of the nature of an inference may prove lasting:
Insofar as any weighing of inferences from given facts is permissible, the
task of the court is not to weigh these against each other but rather to cull
the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing
each against the abstract standard of reasonableness, casting aside those
which do not meet it and focusing solely on those which do. If a frog be
found in the party punch bowl, the presence of a mischievous guest-but
not the occurrence of spontaneous generation-may reasonably be
inferred.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100,
102 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. Byram v. United States, 705 F.2d 1418, 1423 (5th Cir. 1983)(footnote omit-
ted)(tracing the doctrine from Galena Oaks through Swint). It may also be noted that
over the years the doctrine has often been invoked in discrimination cases. See Lincoln,
697 F.2d at 940.
90. United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 1976)(citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
91. Byram, 705 F.2d at 1422.
92. 456 U.S. at 287. Swint held that the trial court's finding of no discriminatory
intent in a section 703(h) case was a fact reversible only if clearly erroneous. See gen-
erally Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1983).
93. See supra note 88. It is not clear after Swint, for example, whether some
inferences will be distinguished from ultimate fact and treated as issues of law. The
debate may, for now, be subsumed under the "mixed question" issue, especially since
some cases characterized inferences as mixed questions. But a recent Fifth Circuit
opinion, citing Swint, found "neither the facts found by the district court nor the infer-
ences drawn by it to be clearly erroneous." Cormier v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 702 F.2d
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e. Mixed Law-Fact Findings
The Swint Court reserved the question whether its ruling affected
"mixed" questions of law and fact "of the kind that in some cases may
allow an appellate court to review the facts to see if these facts satisfy
some legal concept of discriminatory intent."'9 4 It may be argued, of
course, that a trial court has committed legal error if its findings do not
satisfy a legal standard. In the Eleventh Circuit, review of mixed ques-
tions generally is broad, "allowing us to substitute our own judgment
for that of the lower court."95 Mixed questions of fact and law are not,
as a general matter, reviewable under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard."9' Some courts have held, however, that while Rule 52 is nor-
mally not applicable to mixed questions, it would be applied in the pre-
567, 568 (5th Cir. 1983). Where the disputed finding is a purely legal conclusion
drawn from the facts, however, the issue is one of law and is freely reviewed, even
under Swint. See infra note 96.
94. 456 U.S. at 289. The Court added:
We need not, therefore, address the much-mooted issue of the appli-
cability of the Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and
fact-i.e., questions in which the historical facts are admitted or estab-
lished, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts
satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. There is sub-
stantial authority in the circuits on both sides of this question.
Id. at 289 n.19. See Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 396. See also infra text accompanying note
125.
It is not always so easy to distinguish between mixed questions and ultimate facts,
and many cases applied them interchangeably. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d
1346, 1352 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). See also Swint, 456
U.S. at 286 n.16. Swint limited its notion of "ultimate fact" to those decisive to a trial
issue, unmixed with law. The definitions Swint provides may help subsequent courts
make the distinction, however, and it is likely that the cases equating them will not be
used. But even the' courts recognizing a line may find drawing it to be a troublesome
task. See Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 279 (5th Cir. 1982)("Serbonian bog").
95. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 394 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981)(citing Baker v. Met-
calfe, 633 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 974 (1981)), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1011 (1982). See Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 482 n.13 (5th Cir.
1983)("greater mixed law-fact scope of review"); Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 597
(5th Cir. 1972)("court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the undisputed facts
failed to constitute ineffective assistance").
96. Washington, 655 F.2d at 1352-53. Accord Barrientos v. United States, 668
F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1981). See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2589, at
753 (1971). But see Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1976)(clear error test applies to some mixed questions); Pennsylvania Cas. Co. v. Mc-
Coy, 167 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1948).
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sent case since fact questions predominated. 7
f. Law, Fact, or Mixed?
Whether the substantive issue in a particular case is termed a
question of fact, law, or a mixture of fact and law is often a difficult
but linchpin issue under Rule 52(a). That initial determination seems
to be in the hands of the appellate court, since it will often ignore the
characterization used by the trial court. 8 At times, however, the circuit
has expressed its willingness to consider the trial court's classification
of its findings as one factor-though not a determinative one-to use in
the appellate court's initial characterization task.99 The Supreme Court
in Swint recognized the "vexing nature of the distinction[s]' '100 and
noted that Rule 52 does not draw the line between law and fact. In
some areas, however, the circuit has fixed the line, and often in the
process has joined or created a conflict among the circuits.' 0' In others,
reference to comparable situations-or the compelling facts of the case
at hand-may offer guidance for future decisions.
i. Trademarks and Patents
In trademark law, the issue of likelihood of confusion is a question
of fact, subject to Rule 52(a).' °2 Likewise, the classification of a trade-
mark term (as generic, descriptive, etc.) is a fact. 03 A recent court
held that a district court's finding of no profits in the area of trademark
infringement was not clearly erroneous.' Patent validity is a question
of law, as is the test of obviousness, but the factual underpinnings of
97. See Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978); Backar v.
Western States Producing Co., 547 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1977).
98. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944); East v.
Romine, 518 F.2d 332, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1975); Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 329
F.2d 11, 23 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. O'Connell v.
Manning, 381 U.S. 277 (1965).
99. E.g., Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. 456 U.S. at 288. See supra notes 77-80, 89 and accompanying text.
101. The "fixed" lines may, of course, be adjusted as Swint makes its impact,
though many tests cited below were decided or reaffirmed after Swint.
102. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). It is characterized as law, fact, and mixed in other cir-
cuits. See id. at 257-58.
103. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 719 F.2d 380 (11 th Cir. 1983).
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such findings are entitled to clear error review.105 Although infringe-
ment and equivalence are facts, construction of a patent is a legal is-
sue.'06 Few patent appeals remain for the regular circuits, 107 but the
doctrine may be useful for illustration and related application.
ii. Contracts and Business Situations
A recent case applied Rule 52 to a finding regarding what the
contracting parties did not intend. 08 Contract interpretation, on the
other hand, is a question of law, 109 as is the preliminary question of
whether an ambiguity exists."' Treated as fact questions are agency
status,"' bailment relationship," 2 and breach of warranty. 1 3
105. See Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 78 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978).
106. See Continental Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 830 (1981). Cases such as Cole hold, however, that equivalence-normally a
fact-is a legal issue, or perhaps a mixed question, where patent construction is in-
volved. See Weidman Metal Masters Co. v. Glass Master Corp., 623 F.2d 1024, 1030
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981).
107. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng'g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th
Cir. 1982). Appeal would now be had to the recently created Federal Circuit in the
District of Columbia.
108. See Paragon Resources, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 695 F.2d 991
(5th Cir. 1983). See also infra text accompanying note 115. Another recent case, how-
ever, noted: "The determination of the parties' intentions, as revealed solely by the
contract, is but another form of contract interpretation, and therefore constitutes a
question of law. Only when the contract is ambiguous does determination of the par-
ties' intent involve a question of fact." City of Austin v. Decker Coal Co., 701 F.2d
420, 426 n.18 (5th Cir. 1983)(citation omitted).
Whether a contract was formed, it may be argued, is a legal conclusion based on
factual findings, including the parties' intent.
109. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 701 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir.
1983)("clearly erroneous standard does not apply"); City of Austin, 701 F.2d at 425.
110. City of Austin, 701 F.2d at 425-26. See also Freeman v. Continental Gin
Co., 381 F.2d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 1967)(summary judgment context).
111. Strachan, 701 F.2d at 487. But the existence of a fiduciary duty has been
termed, in a summary judgment setting, a legal question. See Lewis v. Knutson, 699
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983). Similarly, the materiality question in federal fraud cases is a
mixed fact-law inquiry, as found in the summary judgment context, TSC Industries,
Inc. v., Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976), though the Ninth Circuit still ap-
plies Rule 52 on review.
112. T.N.T. Marine Servs. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d
585 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Martin v. Xarin Real Estate, Inc., 703 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
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iii. Discrimination and Intent Cases
Swint made clear that in that case discriminatory purpose under
Title VII is a pure question of fact. l a4 Indeed, "[t]reating issues of in-
tent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace." ' 1 5 The
Court noted that it has treated as fact purposeful school segregation,
gift motive (and ultimately whether a gift was made) under the tax
code, and intent in antitrust." 6 Additionally, a finding of "no retalia-
tion" is likewise a "final fact.""17 In the Eleventh Circuit, even a find-
ing that the plaintiff has not made out his primafacie case of discrimi-
nation is reviewed only for clear error."'
The doctrine of constructive discharge, used in discrimination and
labor cases, poses a more difficult inquiry. Pre-Swint Title VII cases
treated the issue inconsistently. One court "appl[ied] the facts as found
by the district court to the law of constructive discharge" in holding
that "[a]s a matter of law the facts involved here do not constitute
constructive discharge."" a9 Another case, however, applied the clear er-
ror rule.'20
Since Swint, the Fifth Circuit has noted the standard-of-review in-
consistency and discussed the applicability of Rule 52. It may be ar-
gued, of course, that constructive discharge fits into the Supreme
Court's reserved definition of "mixed" questions. In Junior v. Texaco,
Inc., the new Fifth Circuit found it unncessary in that case to resolve
the issue and expressly reserved the inquiry.' 2' It is now probable, how-
114. 456 U.S. at 286-89. See also Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1012
(11th Cir. 1984); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. 456 U.S. at 288.
116. See id. Following these observations, the new Fifth Circuit has ruled that
the holding purpose of a taxpayer is a fact, and the issue is not less so simply because
the taxpayer's state of mind is not controlling. Byram, 705 F.2d at 1418.
117. McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983).
118. Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 101 (11 th Cir. 1982), criti-
cized in Calleros, supra note 92, at 437.
119. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1980). Framed
in this way, the inquiry sounds much like the definition of mixed questions the Swint
Court used to distinguish ultimate fact. See supra notes 92-93. See also Calcote v.
Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1978)("conclusion of law").
120. See Meyer v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981).
Although categorization of the issue has varied, the substantive legal definition of "con-
structive discharge" in the Eleventh Circuit is consistently stated. E.g., Bourque, 617
F.2d at 65.
121. 688 F.2d 377, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1982). The new Fifth Circuit concluded that
the finding of no discharge was neither legal error nor clear error. Accord Shawgo, 701
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ever, that constructive discharge is either a fact or fact-law.
iv. Tort and Admiralty
Findings of negligence vel non have been categorized as fact ques-
tions in cases involving admiralty'22 and federal 2 3 law. Likewise, the
court's apportionment of fault is subject to the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. 1 24 Causation, even including the "legal" concept of proximate
cause, is treated as fact. 24.1
v. Employee Status
The final conclusion that one is an "employee" (or "employer")
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.) is a legal determina-
tion. One court's statement of this characterization may shed light on
the newer definitions of "mixed" questions and reveal how the circuit
will generally analyze ultimate "legal" determinations under Swint:
We review the district court's determination as being one of
mixed law and fact. As to the trial court's underlying factual find-
ings and factual inferences deduced therefrom, we are bound by
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, as to the legal conclusion reached by
the district court based upon this factual data, i.e., here that these
welders are employees rather than independent contractors, we
may review this as an issue of law. 125
F.2d at 470.
122. E.g., Verrett v. McDonough Marine Service, 705 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir.
1983)(negligence and contributory negligence); Inland Oil & Trans. Co. v. Ark-White
Towing Co., 696 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1983).
123. See Brooks v. United States, 695 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. SEC v.
Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 1976). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431 (1964)(causation is a question of fact to be decided at trial (§ 14(a)
securities case)); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954).
124. Harbor Tug and Barge v. Belcher Towing, 733 F.2d 823 (11th Cir. 1984).
Cf. Verrett, 705 F.2d at 1443 (citing Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co., 672 F.2d 556 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
124.1 Proximate cause in admiralty law is generally treated as fact, Consolidated
Grain & Barge Co. v. Marcona Conveyor Corp., 716 F.2d 1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1983);
Cheek v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 697 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1983), as is seaman status
under the Jones Act, at least in the summary judgment context. See Holland v. Allied
Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977).
125. Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1983)(ci-
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Judge Higginbotham has expressed his concern with this
approach:
Our efforts to justify appellate review by attempting to sepa-
rate intertwined subsidiary facts and ultimate legal conclusions in-
evitably cast surrealistic shadows. The exercise can, and occasion-
ally does, do little more than serve as a covering cape for the
exercise of the trial court function by an appellate court.1 2
Although the F.L.S.A. "employee" or "employer" determinations
are often held to be ultimately a legal issue (following an analysis mix-
ing law and fact), some cases rule to the contrary, holding the statutory
"employer" issue to be one of fact, and, therefore, subject to Rule
52.21 7 A more recent panel, however, has noted the circuit's inconsis-
tent treatment and determined that the most precise labeling makes the
"employer" conclusion legal while basing it on underlying findings of
fact, such as indicia of control.128 This court follows "the substantial
line of authority" in terming it ultimately a legal question.129 It may be
argued, however, that the apparently smaller line of precedent (holding
the question to be fact) is more consistent with the spirit of Swint.
tation omitted). Accord Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 471
(11th Cir. 1982). See Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 104 S. Ct. 160 (1983).
126. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 199 (Higgenbotham, J., concurring). It may be ar-
gued, however, that most legal issues are shaded by case facts, leaving the appellate
court with little reviewing authority if legal conclusions are practically finalized at trial.
Moreover, the analysis of "mixed" questions offered by the Castillo majority seems at
least compatible with the Supreme Court's definition of a mixed question as one in
which "the issue is whether the [established historical] facts satisfy the statutory stan-
dard." Swint, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
127. E.g., Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th
Cir. 1968).
128. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 187 n.12. This panel writes that the confusion
originated from the Supreme Court's characterization of the issue as "essentially a
question of fact" in another context, but reconciles that language with Castillo's mixed
fact-law analysis. See supra text accompanying note 125.
129. Id. It may be noted, however, that while Castillo cites several cases charac-
terizing the employer issue as one of law excluded from Rule 52 and discusses three
contrary cases, in Castillo itself the issue does not arise in ,the Rule 52 context. See
infra note 163.
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vi. Adequate Criminal Representation: Habeas
The adequacy of representation issue over the years has not been
consistently classified in habeas appeals to the former Fifth Circuit, the
cases finding the question to be fact, law, and fact-law. In Washington
v. Watkins, the Fifth Circuit discussed the various interpretations and
concluded that the issue is a mixed question, allowing the appeals court
an independent determination of the final legal conclusion of effective-
ness.130 The specific finding that a lawyer's choice was or was not stra-
tegic, on the other hand, is a fact to be accepted unless clearly errone-
ous.131 The substantive test of constitutional adequacy of counsel has
also consistently been in controversy. 132
130. 655 F.2d 1346, 1351-54 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
Accord Strickland v. Washington, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Armstead v.
Maggio, 720 F.2d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1983). Watkins discusses generally the various
characterizations given to other findings in the habeas setting, including constitutional-
ity of identification procedures and sufficienty of the evidence. See 655 F.2d at 1353
n.9. Cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)(presumption of correctness for state
court written findings of fact).
Also in the criminal context, some cases apply a clearly erroneous rule to fact
findings in criminal hearings. E.g., United States v. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th
Cir. 1979)(whether writing is "statement" under Jencks Act); United States v. Wat-
son, 591 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1979)(voluntariness of confession). These cases are
not clear as to how this standard found its way into the criminal law. E.g., United
States v. Vasilios, 598 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1979)(credibility calls at suppression
hearing subject to "normal" clear error standard). Cf. United States v. Hayes, 589
F.2d 811, 822-23 (5th Cir.)(citing both "clearly arbitrary" and "clear error" tests for
competence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
131. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1257 n. 24 (5th Cir. 1982)(en
banc)(Unit B), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. ., 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The
reasonableness of that strategic choice, as based on certain assumptions, is also a fact
question. Id. at 1256 n.23. See also Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 135 ("basic"
or "historical" facts underlying conclusion of effectiveness are subject to Rule 52).
132. Within the Eleventh Circuit, the issue of effectiveness-and such subissues
as the duty to investigate and the prejudice determination-have more than once war-
ranted en banc consideration. See generally Comment, A Coherent Approach to Inef-
fective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 71 CALIM L. REv. 1516 (1983).
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B. Findings in a Jury Trial
1. The Verdict
a. Requirement of Evidentiary Basis: General Review Principles
Although the Founding Fathers granted the Supreme Court "ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact," '133 that power was
checked by the seventh amendment: "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law. 134 Jury facts are, in reality, re-
examined. A jury verdict cannot stand without an evidentiary basis.
Whether that basis is adequate to support the verdict has historically
been determined by a "substantial evidence" measure.135 In the Elev-
enth Circuit, the requirement of substantial evidence is in turn tested
by a "reasonable conflict" or "reasonable juror" standard.13 6
The issue usually is presented on an appeal as review of the dis-
trict judge's decision on a motion for judgment n.o.v., or of the grant-
ing of a directed verdict where the issue is not submitted to the jury. 3 7
In the directed verdict situation, review is judged as well by the test of
reasonableness, in this case framed in terms of a requirement that a
fact issue be submitted if reasonable men could differ on the conclu-
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The courts of appeal are given similar authority.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1982).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Juries were seen as the citizen's protection from
an autocractic and centralized chancery court. See Clark & Stone, Review of Findings
of Fact, 4 U. CHi. L. REV. 190, 192 (1937).
135. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)(jury fact-
finding to be accepted unless no substantial evidence supports); Comfort Trane Air
Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th Cir. 1979).
A "substantial evidence" standard is also used to review most jury verdicts in
criminal cases. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.)(en banc),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488-91 (1951)(fact-findings in formal administrative actions). This is defined, in
both contexts, by a test of reasonableness. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also supra note 44 and accompanyiny text.
136. E.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir.
1967)(judge erred in not directing verdict or granting j.n.o.v.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
913 (1968). The court appears to frame the reasonableness test as an application of the
substantial evidence requirement, and no suggestion is made that two different tests are
actually involved.
137. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Thus the same standard used to
review the verdict is applied to certain decisions by the trial judge concerning the rea-
sonableness of the verdict or a potential verdict, despite the procedural techniques used.
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sions to be reached from the evidence presented. 138 A frequently-quoted
passage from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Falgoust"'3 sum-
marizes the court's general approach to a verdict:
We have said that if there were no evidentiary basis for the
jury's verdict, it cannot be permitted to stand, and that the stan-
dard for reviewing a jury verdict is whether the state of the proof is
such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclu-
sion the jury expressed in its verdict. The jury is, of course, the
traditional finder of facts, and its verdict must stand unless appel-
lant can show that there is no substantial evidence to support it,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees,
and clothing it with all reasonable inferences to be deduced
therefrom. 140
The verdict is affirmed "where there is reasonable basis in the record"
such that the "conclusion could, with reason, be reached on the
evidence."' 41
b. Boeing: Rejection of "Scintilla" Rule
A verdict requires an evidentiary basis. But is the converse true?
Must the verdict stand if there is some basis, and how much evidence is
"substantial"? A conflict developed within the circuit over whether, in
applying the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court is to accept a
verdict if some evidence supports it. The conflict is alternatively framed
by the question whether the appellate court looks to one side of the
facts only. On this question the circuits have disagreed, and the Su-
preme Court has not said "yes" or "no" recently on the issue. But in
1969 the en bane Fifth Circuit, in Boeing Company v. Shipman,142 re-
jected the "complete absence of probative facts" standard formerly ap-
plied to general civil appeals.143 The court articulated the proper test:
138. See, e.g., Helene Curtis, 385 F.2d at 850.
139. 386 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1967)(affirming judge's denial of a directed verdict,
j.n.o.v., and new trial).
140. Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
141. Id. Some cases add that the test means whether reasonable jurors could,
under any theory submitted to them, have resolved the dispute as they did.
142. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969)(en banc). The decision affirmed the trial
court's denial of directed verdict and j.n.o.v.
143. Id. at 370-73. Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 869,
874 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967), specifically overruled by Boeing, had
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[T]he Court should consider all of the evidence-not just that
evidence which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light and
with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed
to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that
reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of
the motions [for d.v. or j.n.o.v.] is proper. On the other hand, if
there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evi-
dence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded
men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted
to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a
question for the jury.144
The court summed up, "[t]here must be a conflict in substantial evi-
dence to create a jury question."' 45
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on the entire record,
the trial court considers the record intact and must take the record as
presented to the jury.146 The court may not grant a directed verdict of
j.n.o.v. by ignoring admitted evidence and then gauging the jury's per-
formance under the fiction that the erroneous evidence was not before
it, or by entering judgment on a record altered by the elimination of
incompetent evidence. 147
c. The F.E.L.A. and Jones Act Cases
Although the Boeing standard of considering all evidence applies
held that the Supreme Court's F.E.L.A. standard applied generally. See infra note 148.
See also Helene Curtis, 385 F.2d at 850-51 (weighing all the evidence is a "trap").
144. Boeing, 411 F.2d at 374 (footnote omitted). This means that the appeal
"should not be decided by which side has the better of the case" or by the "complete
absence" standard. Id. at 374-75.
The Boeing sufficiency test, though federal and arguably substantive, is to be ap-
plied in diversity cases. Id. at 368 (noting split in circuits).
145. Id. at 375. Constitutional and institutional arguments in favor of the re-
jected "some evidence" test may be found in Planters and Judge Rives' dissent in
Boeing.
146. Midcontinent Broadcast Co. v. North Central Air, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358
(8th Cir. 1973), cited in Sumitomo Bank of California v. Product Promotions, 717 F.2d
215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. See Sumitomo Bank, 717 F.2d at 218. This methodology may, however, be
acceptable when applied to a new trial motion. See id. (citing Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940)). See also infra note 343 and accompanying text.
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to most claims, the old "complete-absence" rule is still used to review
Federal Employees Liability Act 48 and Jones Act'49 verdicts. Less evi-
dence is necessary to support a finding in such cases, it is explained,
since a less demanding proof-of-causation standard, requiring only
"slight negligence," is applied.150 Findings on an unseaworthiness
claim, on the other hand, are reviewed under the Boeing standard.1 5'
In Jones Act cases, the stricter review standard imported from
F.E.L.A. cases is usually applied where the defendant employer has
asked for a directed verdict. 52 It is uncertain, however, whether the
underlying policies equally support the strict test where the seaman has
moved for a directed verdict, and the "reasonable man" litmus may
provide the appropriate standard for reviewing evidence sufficiency in
the latter case. 53 The court has noted this reciprocity problem but nor-
mally has found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict and policy
dilemma.15 4
d. Applications Since Boeing. Inferences and Credibility
Many cases cite both Boeing and Liberty Mutual in setting forth
the proper test. Apparently Boeing does not supersede the guiding lan-
guage in Liberty Mutual, so long as the latter's general rules are read
in light of the appellate discretion allowed in Boeing.55 It is clear in
148. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 F.2d 645 (1946). See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U.S. 53, 57 (1949); Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir.
1980); Boeing, 411 F.2d at 370.
149. Allen, 623 F.2d at 359-60. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc.,
352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957); Gaspard v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
150. See Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983)(on
rehearing).
151. Id. at 1025-26 (noting the difficulty of mixing Jones Act and unseaworthi-
ness claims). See Allen, 623 F.2d at 359-60.
152. See Allen, 623 F.2d at 360. But see Campbell v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 581
F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1978).
153. See, e.g., Robin v. Wilson Bros. Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
But the court has consistently used the F.E.L.A. test when reviewing the evidence sup-
porting a finding of the seaman's contributory negligence. See id. at 98 n.2.
154. See, e.g., id. at 98 & n.2; Allen, 623 F.2d at 360.
155. Cases also cite similar general language in Blount Brothers Corp. v. Reli-
ance Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.)(trial court erred in directing verdict), cert. de-
nied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967), though that case allowed no appellate reweighing of the
entire record. See id. at 739.
For application of the sufficiency test in combination with burden of proof and
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application, however, that the Boeing rule is firmly accepted in the cir-
cuit. 156 In applying the Boeing standard, some courts have indicated
that the type of evidence pointing to the questioned conclusion may be
considered in determining whether the evidence is "substantial." "Un-
supported, self-serving testimony is not substantial evidence sufficient
to create a jury question."' 57
This application must be read in light of Boeing's caution that "it
is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not
the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine
the credibility of witnesses. '158 The jury's authority has been inter-
preted to mean that inferences and ultimate facts are for the jury, sub-
ject to reversal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the resulting
findings . 59 Nevertheless, "[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that inferences
...cannot stand in the face of uncontradicted and substantial evi-
dence to the contrary."'1 0
e. Law and Fact
In the sufficiency situation, as in a bench trial, facts are submitted
to the fact-finder, but law is freely reviewed. 16 Inferences a jury draws
are reviewed within the standard sufficiency test and not judged under
a separate set of review rules. More basically, the law between "law"
persuasion issues, see Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371, 380 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968). For example, the party with the burden of persua-
sion may have to show "overwhelming" evidence to overturn a verdict against her. See
Allen, 623 F.2d 355, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, this standard may be said
to be an application of, rather than an exception to, the usual Boeing test.
156. See e.g., McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir.
1979)(some evidence of manual's defect not enough to preclude a directed verdict). See
also Jefcoat v. Singer Housing Co., 619 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980)(reversing grant
of j.n.o.v.).
157. Comfort Trane Air Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th
Cir. 1979)(citation omitted). But "[a] verdict based on irrelevant evidence cannot
stand." Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 728 (5th Cir. 1983).
158. Boeing, 411 F.2d at 375. Accord Liberty Mutual, 386 F.2d at 253.
159. See Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1978)(discussed in summary judgment context, citing Boeing and Liberty Mutual).
160. Scott Medical Supply Co. v. Bedsole Surgical Supplies, Inc., 488 F.2d 934,
937 (5th Cir. 1974)(citation omitted). See also Comfort Trane, 592 F.2d at 1382-83.
These cases do not suggest that they are in conflict with the leeway Boeing gives to the
jury to judge credibility and inferences.
161. See supra note 77. See generally supra notes 77-132 and accompanying
text. See also infra notes 286-305 and accompanying text (summary judgment).
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and "fact" is of a different character than that found in the Rule 52(a)
context. When a judge's finding is reviewed, initial characterization of
the finding as one of fact or law is in essence mere shorthand for the
general standards-of-review inquiry: Does the clear error rule apply?
When the proper standard is chosen, the case must still be ana-
lyzed-through the standard-of-review prism-and the evaluative deci-
sion follows.
In the jury situation, on the other hand, "law or fact?" is the deci-
sion and not really a standard-of-review set-up. Procedurally, review
deals with the relation between judge and jury: Did the judge properly
take the issue away from the jury? The answer to this question is sub-
stantive, since the judge has committed legal error if he or she was
wrong in not submitting it.16 2 In determining whether the judge so
erred, the substantive law, rather than general standards-of-review lan-
guage, controls. Thus, unlike in the usual standard-of-review situation,
"law or fact?" is more a substantive inquiry, and no follow-up applica-
tion is necessary. Whether the court legally erred in taking an issue
from the jury is often phrased in evidentiary terms: Does the evidence
establish a certain issue "as a matter of law"? And that question is in
turn answered by reference to the substantive law and the facts of the
case sub judice1 13
162. The judge may, of course, be challenged for wrongly deciding to submit an
issue to a jury, though some courts seem less willing to consider it reversible error. See
Control Components, Inv. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1022 (1980). See also Continental Conveyors & Equipment Co. v. Prather
Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 709 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1983)(although patent construction
normally a legal question, court properly allowed jury to consider claim's meaning in
judging infringement); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th
Cir.)("if an issue presents a mixed question of fact and law, it may be submitted if the
jury is instructed as to the legal standard to be applied"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976). Cf. Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1982) (criticizing the court
for directly submitting validity issue to jury).
163. See Contintental Conveyor, 709 F.2d at 405 (distinquishing Rule 52 review
of a bench trial from submission-to-jury issue); United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970)(directed verdict review is "a
pure question of law"). The fact-law dilemma thus may appear in two forms in jury
situations. First, is the issue properly one of fact which the jury should have consid-
ered? Second, are fact-findings incorrect as a matter of law? The inquiry depends on
the substantive law and facts, as framed by the directed verdict or j.n.o.v. context, and
the various law/fact characterizations established in the substantive law are beyond the
scope of a standards-of-review article.
Some cases indicate that the classifications made under Rule 52 may be used in
the parallel inquiry under j.n.o.v. review. E.g., Castillo, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983)
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2. Fact Findings and Damages
a. Findings by Jury
The Boeing standard also applies to specific jury findings, such as
those made on written interrogatories under Rule 59.1 One court, for
example, applied both Boeing and Liberty Mutual in upholding jury
findings of fair market value. 165
b. Special Verdicts: Inconsistencies
The court may, under Rule 49(a), submit the case to the jury in
the form of specific fact questions accompanied by appropriate legal
instructions. A fact issue not submitted is, absent request or objection,
considered submitted to the judge.166 The jury's written findings are
protected by constitutional and procedural guidons. Where the findings
are apparently inconsistent, "[t]he Seventh Amendment requires that if
there is a view of the case which makes the jury's answers consistent,
the [trial] court must adopt that view and enter judgment
accordingly. 16 7
(court erred in submitting FLSA employee status to jury since status is a legal question
and was established as a matter of law). Castillo adds the broad and very arguable
statement that the "plaintiff's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial does not
change the standard of review to be applied by this court." Id. at 187 (footnote omit-
ted). In context, however, the court was not applying a standard of review but instead
adopted the Rule 52 standard in deciding the purely legal and substantive issue
presented in that case. See Continental Conveyor, 709 F.2d at 405-06. Judge Higgin-
botham expressed some seventh amendment concern with the Castillo analysis. See
supra text accompanying note 126.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) governs special verdicts; Rule 49(b) allows the general
verdict with interrogatories.
165. Sammons v. United States, 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 945 (1971). See also Liberty Mutual, 386 F.2d at 253.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a); Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 704
F.2d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1983).
167. Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1973). The test the trial
court uses to reconcile ostensible conflicts "is whether the answers may fairly be said to
represent a logical and probable decision on the relevant issues as submitted." Id.
The Fourth Circuit has found reversible error in a district judge's decision to re-
turn the case to the jury although the first answers given were not legally inconsistent.
See McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912
(1979).
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c. Damages
Whether evidence supports a jury's assessment of damages-as
well as the figure chosen-should also be reviewed by a test of reasona-
bleness. The upper limit has been defined as the "maximum which the
jury could reasonably find." 16 8 Other guiding phrases abound and ei-
ther coexist with or interpret a reasonableness test. A recent case stated
that the appeals court "will not reverse the jury's verdict unless the
award is so large that it shows passion or prejudice or shocks the judi-
cial conscience." 169 Especially where subjective evaluations are made,
the award must be "grossly excessive. 17 0
A damages award may be challenged as erroneous as a matter of
law (for example, the award was based on faulty legal apportionment
principles, or on damages legally unavailable). 7 1 But the damages
challenge usually arises in the context of reviewing the trial judge's
initial discretionary response to the jury's finding. The cases have not,
however, clearly separated the legal sufficiency question from this new
trial (or conditional new trial) situation.17 2
However the test is framed, it is apparent that the jury's choice in
practice is given real deference. "[E]xamination of the Fifth Circuit
cases in this field reveals only rare instances in which the court felt
168. See Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., 512 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1974)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Accord Bonura v. Sea
Land Serv., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Perricone v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 704 F.2d 1376, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983)("when approved by the trial judge, such
awards will be overturned only when contrary to right reason or for a clear abuse of
discretion."). See generally Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1975).
169. See Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197, 207 (5th Cir.
1983).
170. See id. at 206-07 (judge did not abuse discretion since the verdict was not
gross excess). Pope adds that the verdict is taken as is-before trebling-in determin-
ing its excessiveness vel non. Id.
171. See, e.g., id. at 203-04.
172. See generally infra notes 331-40 and accompanying text. The cases do not
clearly separate the various procedural paths in which the damages issue arises (except
perhaps where the court reviews a judge's reduction of the jury award, infra note 323)
or the precedent and catch phrases called on to set up the appellate determination.
Thus, the principles outlined in this section may be found in the new trial context. E.g.,
supra note 170. But they may also inform generally the reasonableness review for ex-
cessiveness. Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit could clarify these distinctions, or at least
settle on an ungarnished reasonableness test, avoiding the proliferation of further defi-
nition and the bleeding of theoretically different review situations.
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bound to set aside a jury award for its exessiveness.'' A point of de-
parture from this general observation may occur when the trial judge
has, within his discretion, reduced an award.7 The appeals court, de-
spite seventh amendment concerns, has given the judge leeway, finding
abuse "only when it appears that the jury's original verdict was clearly
within the universe of possible awards which are supported by the evi-
dence."'17 5 But the jury's award, at any rate, "is not to be disturbed
unless it is entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained. 17 6
3. Directed Verdict and J.N.O.V.
a. Rule 50 and Review Principles
Rule 50 sets forth the procedural rules governing motions for di-
rected verdicts and judgment non obstante veredicto.'7 7 Although the
rule does not on its face require the judge, as does Rule 52, to make
findings, the motion must state its grounds,7 8 and the court must, in
making the conditional decision on new trial included in Rule 50, spec-
ify the decisional reasons. 7 9 The trial court uses the same standard in
passing on a motion for directed verdict or j.n.o.v. as does the appellate
court in reviewing the judge's decision on the motion. 180 This standard
173. Perricone, 630 F.2d at 319 (reversing damages).
174. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
175. Bonura, 505 F.2d at 670 (emphasis in original).
176. Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(d.v.) and 50(b)(j.n.o.v.).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). See generally O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
293 F.2d 1, 5-10 (3d Cir. 1961). This requirement, settling an early conflict in the
cases, may in practice inform the appellate court, even where a judge does not spell out
his or her grounds in an opinion or judgment.
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c).
180. E.g., Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 972 (5th Cir. 1979).
The same standard applies whether the motion is for directed verdict or j.n.o.v., and
whether the judge grants or denies the motion. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970). It may be argued
that application of the directed verdict test may be slightly different when defendant
brings the motion at the close of all evidence rather than plaintiff's case, since the
moving party once the evidence is in, having the burden of proof, should show that her
opponent's proof is insufficient as a matter of law and that her own evidence suffices
and cannot be discarded by the jury. See generally Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas,
393 F.2d 371, 380 (5th Cir.)(discussing sufficiency and burden of proof), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 961 (1968).
294 [Vol. 9
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss2/4
Eleventh Circuit Standards of Review
is, of course, the general test for sufficiency of a jury's verdict and find-
ings outlined in Boeing Company v. Shipman.181
b. Directed Verdict as Prerequisite
A motion for j.n.o.v. cannot be made unless an earlier proper di-
rected verdict motion was made (and renewed, if necessary). The ear-
lier motion "is a prerequisite, virtually jurisdictional."" 2 Although this
rule is followed strictly, the courts at times will stretch the notion of
what constitutes a motion under the rule.183 Occasionally the trial court
will grant j.n.o.v. even though no directed verdict motion has been
made. In such a situation the Fifth Circuit has recently indicated it will
review the case as where the sufficiency is challenged on appeal after
no j.n.o.v. motion at all had been filed, i.e., asking whether "any" evi-
dence supports, or plain error taints, the jury's finding.18 4 The Eleventh
Circuit, applying former Fifth authority, may follow suit.
c. Review After No Motion: "Plain Error"
Failure to move for directed verdict, or to renew the motion by
moving for j.n.o.v., is said to preclude review of a jury verdict. "It is
well settled that in the absence of a motion . . . made at trial this
Court cannot examine the evidence for sufficiency. 11' 5 Nevertheless,
the language of "plain error" has slipped into the case law.18s Thus,
181. See generally supra notes 142-80 and accompanying text. The trial court
must consider the record as presented to the jury. See supra notes 146-47 and accom-
panying text. See infra notes 324-325 for comparison of these motions with the new
trial on appeal.
182. Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 704 F.2d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir.
1983). See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b); Rawls v. Daughters of Charity, 491 F.2d 141 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
183. See,e.g., Roberts v. Price, 398 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1968). See also FED. R.
Civ. P. 46 (general rule that formal exceptions are unnecessary).
184. See Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1380.
185. Delchamps, Inc. v. Borkin, 429 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1970). See Dunn v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds,
645 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981); Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 463 F.2d
12,15 (5th Cir. 1972)("short answer" is that no motion for a directed verdict equals no
review for sufficiency). The cases are sometimes lenient in defining a sufficient motion
under this rule. See Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.
1978)(considering partial preservation by new trial motion). See also Quinn v. South-
west Wood Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1979).
186. See, e.g., Dunn, 639 F.2d at 1175; Urti v. Transport Comm'l Corp., 479
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although "we may not question the sufficiency of whatever evidence we
do find," the court may reverse if "plain error has been committed
which, if not noticed, would result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice. 18 7
Applications of the plain error exception is an inquiry standing in
contrast to the normal Boeing standard: the court affirms if there is
"any evidence supporting the jury's finding." 188 One court, for example,
reversed on a determination of "no evidence" in reviewing a directed
verdict motion not renewed by j.n.o.v. motion. 8
C. Trial Judge: Supervision and Discretion
1. Evidence and Trial
a. Evidentiary Rulings: "Abuse of Discretion"?
Evidentiary matters are said to be committed to the "discretion"
of the trial court. On appeal in the various circuits this means that
evidentiary calls, in general, are reviewed only for "abuse of discre-
tion." As one recent court observed, sounding almost tired: "Time and
again we have stated that the admission of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the district court. Absent proof of abuse an appellate court
will not disturb a district court's evidentiary rulings. 190
F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally Coughlin, 571 F.2d at 297.
187. Little v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 426 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1970).
188. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715
F.2d 983, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1983). The cases are not always clear whether the "any
evidence" rule is the application of a "plain error" exception, or "plain error" is an
alternative ground for relief, even where some evidence exists. But the cases do not
indicate a conflict in interpretation, much less an outcome-determinative one, possibly
because the rule echoes the pre-Boeing "scintilla" test.
189. Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
190. Jon-T Chems., Inc. v. Freeport Chem. Co., 704 F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.
1983)(citations omitted). See Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327 (1Ith
Cir. 1983). See also infra note 197 and accompanying text (applicability of evidence
rules in bench trials). Sometimes the test for evidence is phrased as "clear abuse" or
"manifest error." See Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th
Cir. 1979). One case stated that rulings must be affirmed unless they affect a substan-
tial right of the complaining party, though the language is probably an application of
harmless error doctrine rather than evidentiary scope of review. See Whitehurst v.
Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979); FED. R. EvID. 103(a). See also infra note
197. The cases do not, at any rate, appear in practice to distinguish "abuse" from
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The cases do not go on to define such "abuse" though obviously
substantial deference is involved. As Professor Rosenberg observes, dis-
cretion is a pervasive yet elusive concept.19' The standard is, at any
rate, broadly applied in many evidence situations.1 92 The notion of "dis-
cretion" in reality has two dimensions: the broad manner with which a
judge can deal with the matter below, and the limited review afforded
such decisions.1 93 Many evidentiary rulings involve both sides of this
coin, so that tethered review follows from situations where the trial
judge was in the position to exercise discretion. Many cases set out the
standard-of-review in this format, first noting that the judge has discre-
tion, then adding that review is thus limited.
In the evidentiary context, however, the "abuse" test is often used
even where the judge has not specifically used true discretion. Although
the "abuse of discretion" standard is, on its face, the appropriate test
by which to review a judge's application of an evidence rule to trial
facts, it does not necessarily follow that all evidence rulings should be
given "abuse" deference, especially where the challenged ruling is sim-
ply the legal analysis of the applicability or construction of a given
rule, The latter decisions are, analytically, conclusions of law rather
than exercises of discretion. Nevertheless, many cases state the "abuse"
test as one of general review of evidentiary calls.'94 Conversely, many
"clear abuse," though the latter might be said to apply to those rulings which necessa-
rily involve true discretion at trial. See infra notes 193, 261 and accompanying text.
In criminal cases, too, determinations on admissibility are said to reside generally
within the district court's discretion. E.g., United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192,
204 (5th Cir. 1976). More generally, the criminal area is usually not presented as
having a separate set of evidence rules. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973); infra note 199. Administrative law, on the other hand, may in practice follow
its own star. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 348, at 997-1000 (3d ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. However, in some contexts
the agency must follow the federal fules. E.g., NLRB v. Gulf States United Tel. Co.,
694 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982)(Board bound "so far as practicable" by regulation).
191. Rosenberg, supra note 13. "What are the standards or factors that lead to a
finding that there has been an abuse of discretion? The decided cases are not especially
informative." Id. at 180.
192. See, e.g., Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir.
1980); King v. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979); Gaspard v. Diamond M
Drilling Co., 593 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1979); Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1972).
193. See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 175.
194. E.g., Jon-T Chems., 704 F.2d at 1417. This approach may be used because
of the difficulty, in close cases, of determining where discretion ends and legal analysis
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cases do not rely on the "abuse" test or refer to the judge's discretion,
but-apparently following the principle that errors of law are freely
corrected-simply decide whether or not the evidence was admissible;
if not, and prejudice resulted, the reviewing court will reverse.19 5
Applicability of the "abuse" standard is especially clear-and per-
shaps deference is stronger-where the evidentiary ruling is based on a
rule explicitly giving discretion to the court or where an evidentiary call
is intimately bound with the trial facts. A prejudice determination
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, for example, necessarily involves
true discretion. "This is a question of legal relevance, a matter on
which the trial judge has wide discretion, and which the appellate court
wil not reverse unless the trial judge has clearly abused his discre-
tion." 196 Nevertheless, the courts do not state that the "abuse" stan-
dard should be limited to such situations.
Whether an evidentiary call is challenged as abuse or simple error,
the appellate court must, under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a), fur-
ther inquire whether "a substantial right of the party is affected," since
nonprejudicial, "harmless" erorrs are not reversed.197 On the other
begins, though the cases do not reveal a conscious choice.
195. See, e.g., Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1981)("matter of law" that hearsay admitted erroneously); Reyes v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally 10 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
supra note 25, §§ 609.13, 609.14. It may be, of course, that no practical difference
results, since erroneously admitted evidence is likely to constitute an abuse. Neverthe-
less, traditionally a lax abuse standard defines how hard the appeals court looks for
error, and in the final analysis, legal error may be more easily excused under review
only for abuse.
196. Wright v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 580 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir.
1978). See Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Marcona Conveyor Corp., 716 F.2d
1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1983). But the discretion is not unbounded; further, a distinction
may be made for the appellate court in deciding whether Rule 403 is legally applicable
or the legal requirements of any such application. See United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc)(Rule 404(b)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979);
Bailey, 455 F.2d at 392 (Rule 407).
197. FED. R. EvID. 103(a) provides that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is af-
fected" and the error is properly preserved. Any such harmless error must be distin-
guished from the same-named analysis used to review constitutional error. See gener-
ally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970). Cf. Haddad v. Lockheed
Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1457-59 (9th Cir. 1983)(distinction drawn on criminal/civil
lines more appropriate than "constitutional"/"nonconstitutional" dichotomy); infra
notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
Although the evidence rules apply to trial by jury or judge, their application may
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hand, alleged errors not properly preserved by timely objection or offer
of proor 198 may be tested for "plain error" under Rule 103(d). 99
A safe summary, then, concludes that "abuse of discretion" is the
general standard to be applied on review of most evidentiary decisions,
except perhaps those evidence rules which do not appear to commit to
the trial court's discretion. 0° Next, reference to a case which applies
the test to the specific rule in question would be helpful, as would the
facts sub judice which might establish such abuse.201 Finally, the re-
viewing court must examine an otherwise reversible decision for
"prejudice to a substantial right of the party contesting the admission,
coupled with timely objection. 20 2
Although the cases do not clearly distinguish between evidence
rulings which are generally affirmed absent abuse and those situations
be relaxed somewhat in a bench trial. This view is said to have its strongest impact
where appellate courts review for prejudice. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 190, § 60, at 153-54. See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 96, at 645 (4th ed.
1983); Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950).
198. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(specific objection requirement to party attacking
admission) and 103(a)(2)(offer of proof where exclusion is challenged). Cf. FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(d)(3).
199. FED. R. EvID. 103(d) provides: "Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court." See United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976). The
Advisory Committee's Notes observe that in practice plain error is more likely to arise
where evidence is admitted than excluded.
Since Rule 103(d) neither proscribes nor prescribes "plain error" review, resort to
the case law is necessary to establish such a rule in the circuit. Although the exception
is often applied in criminal cases, such as United States v. Abravaya, 616 F.2d 250,
251-52 (5th Cir. 1980), and is patterned after FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(d), it is less clear
how-and how much-the rule will be applied in civil actions. MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE states that the plain error rule is "much less common in civil cases than in
criminal cases, perhaps in part because liberty and life are not involved as a motive to
apply the doctrine.. . ." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 190, § 52, at 134
(footnote omitted), though the Notes of the Advisory Committee are to the contrary.
See generally Wangerin, "Plain Error" and "Fundamental Fairness," 29 DE PAUL L.
REV. 753 (1980).
200. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(language of "shall") and 803(24) (discretionary
federal hearsay exception, implying that other exceptions are not discretionary).
201. The appellate lawyer might, of course, wish to argue (and find cases to sup-
port) that a certain evidentiary call is in effect a question of law, for example, how
"regular practice" in the business records rule, FED. R. EVID. 803(6), should be inter-
preted. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 705, 210 (5th Cir. 1983).
202. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV.
869, 873 (1983)(footnotes omitted).
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where it is more appropriate, at least tacitly, to review admissibility vel
non as a matter of law, it might be argued that a distinction should be
drawn where the ruling "is based on facts or circumstances that are
critical to decision and that the record imperfectly conveys."20 3 The
line might be called true discretion. The circuit may, of course, find the
line undesirable and prefer an "either/or" course where, as presently, it
appears that an unspoken line is drawn from intuition or appellate
facts. Nevertheless, "[t]o tame the concept [of discretion] requires no
less than to force ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld, and to
say so in a manner that provides assurance for today's case and some
guidance for tomorrow's."20 4
b. Comment on the Evidence
Despite the traditional concept of the judge as a passive umpire,
the modern trial judge has maintained the common-law power of sum-
mary and assessment of the evidence. This authority is, of course, sub-
ject to the limitations forced by the jury's function and the requirement
of impartiality. 0 5 Judge's comments which have the effect of prevent-
ing the jury from resolving an issue of fact are error unless the court
could have directed a verdict on that issue.206
c. Supervision of Trial
Most of the district court's decisions by which the trial is super-
vised and conducted, including timing, control, and oversight of argu-
ments, are said to be within the court's discretion.20 7 Affirmance is
203. Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 183 (emphasis omitted).
204. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
205. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933). The judge may
not, for example, state which view of conflicting evidence is more credible. Many states
do not permit the practice of commenting on the evidence. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
197, § 94, at 629. See also id. § 97, at 651.
206. McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 760-62 (5th Cir. 1979);
International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1955). See gen-
erally I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 107[07] (1981). For
review of such comment after faulty objection, see Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical
Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972).
207. See generally Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)("broad su-
pervisory discretion"). For review of jury argument which was not objected to, see
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 286 (5th Cir. 1975). Of course the
circuit may impose requirements on how the discretion is exercised, as by requiring on-
[Vol. 9300
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mandate absent abuse. The standard is broadly applied, for example, to
sequestration of witnesses, 0 ' qualifying experts, 0 9 application of the
pretrial order,21 0 and even the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 11
Also discretionary are dispositions on motions for mistrial212 and inter-
vention, 13 as well as voir dire matters. 1 4 Because of the realities of the
trial situation, the judge's supervisory power is often, in practice, inevi-
tably broad. As one appellate judge has observed:
The trial judge is a potent figure indeed. . . . He can commu-
nicate his attitude in a thousand ways from a cocked eyebrow to a
sideways glance. Those will not be of record. They are not review-
able. Trial judges are disciplined ultimately only by their good
faith and integrity and by an occasional reminder from their appel-
late brethren to be constantly vigilant of their power.2 15
the-record determinations or other factors the trial court "must" consider.
208. McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs. Co., Inc., 700 F.2d 260,
262 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1981).
210. Emmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983)(cit-
ing Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980)). The Emmons court noted that
if "the parties actually litigate without objection issues not raised in the order, there is
little reason to enforce pretrial elimination of the issues." Id. at 1118 (quoting Perfec-
tion-Cobey Co. v. City Tank Corp., 597 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1979)). See also Flan-
nery v. Carroll, 676 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1982). But introduction of evidence on an issue
already in the case does not necessarily show consent to trying a new issue. See Inter-
national Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir.
1977). In something of a twist of analysis, Emmons states that it is not abuse to admit
evidence not in the pretrial order where the opposing party does not object. 701 F.2d at
1118-19.
211. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1288 (1984). The doctrine's condi-
tions are set out in Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 656 F.2d 198, 202 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
212. See Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 1971)(mistrial
on basis of improper argument).
213. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 710 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1983)(denial under
Rule 24(a)(2) reversed as abuse).
214. Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983)("wide
discretion").
215. Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1378-79. Professor Wright once noted that the "fed-
eral judge is a very puissant figure," and adds that "it is wise to leave many details of
procedure to the informed discretion of the judge." C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97,
at 651-52. See also infra text accompanying note 315.
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Nevertheless, the court does not hesitate to reverse if the requisite
abuse is found.216
d. General Supervision and Discretion
District judges are more than just trial judges; their function in-
volves supervision of litigation in the broader sense and other duties of
control and direction over the docket, the district, and parties before
the court. The broad rule of district judges, like the judgments of im-
mediate trial control, are often considered discretionary.
i. Supervisory Applications
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the "abuse of discretion" test to
a wide assortment of supervisory situations, including transfer of an
action2 17 and determination of "excusable neglect" for untimely appel-
late filings. 218 The test is also applied to the court's decision on class
certification, 21 9 as well as its approval of a proposed class settlement220
or consent decree.22' The severence of trials under Rule 42(b) is re-
216. See United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203, 208 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979).
217. See Abshire v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832 .(5th Cir. 1982).
When the successor court reconsiders an order or judgment picked up from the trans-
fer, its decision is within its discretion though, for reasons of comity, the court ought
not overrule the prior judge. Id. See also Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. RR, 635 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1981).
218. See Gann v. Smith, 443 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971)(broad discretion to apply
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)). See also Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,
371 U.S. 215 (1962)(great deference). Cf. Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1983)(excusable neglect for incomplete discovery).
219. See Ezell v. Mobile Housing Bd., 709 F.2d 1376 (1lth Cir. 1983). See also
Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1983)(denial of certification not an
abuse); Sheffield v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 439 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971)(motion to
dismiss class action). See generally Note, Federal Appellate Review of the Grant or
Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 101 (1976)
(appealability).
220. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984). See Reed v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983). Reed surveys the cases and lists the
factors for reviewing the exercise of discretion in this area. See also In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981).
221. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982)(finding
abuse in denial of approval), rev'd en banc, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc). The panel opinion in
Williams also notes that the fact-findings on which the judge's decision is based are
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viewed for abuse,122 as is the consolidation of actions223 and continu-
ances.2 24 Often in a particular area the judge is given discretion, sub-
ject to review for abuse, but the cases tack on some additional cautions.
Rule 41(b), for example, empowers the court to dismiss an action invol-
untarily for failure to prosecute or comply. The discretion, however, is
to be exercised only in extreme cases.225 Likewise, although the court
has broad discretion in controlling discovery,2 6 it must "adhere to the
liberal spirit of the Rules, 227 and "[t]he imposition of unnecessary
limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII
cases."
228
accepted unless clearly erroneous.
222. United States v. 499.472 Acres of Land, 701 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1983)(not-
ing relevant factors). Professor Wright analyzes the problems and factors where issues
are submitted to separate juries. C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97, at 651-52. The
Fifth Circuit recently expressed similar concern over a bifurcation decision:
While we do not doubt the power of a trial court to order a separate
trial on its own motion or, in its discretion, to separately try the damage
issues in a case such as this, the present record nevertheless illustrates the
unfortunate confusion which can occur when the above-quoted admonition
...is not fully heeded.
Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1983)(citing Response of Caro-
lina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976)).
223. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §§ 2382-2386 (1971). FED.
R. Civ. P. 42(a) permits the judge to order joint trial of separate actions. In both
situations discretion is limited too by the requirement that the actions involve a com-
mon issue of law or fact. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97, at 652-53. Professor
Wright also discusses the factors and tests for a judge's joinder of parties (noting fed-
eral discretion), acceptance of voluntary dismissal (broad common law power restricted
somewhat by Rule 41(a)), referral to a master (rule discretionary but requires certain
circumstances, especially in nonjury cases), and disqualification (must be and seem im-
partial). See id. at 651-55.
224. Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 665 (5th Cir. 1983).
225. See Mann v. Merrill Lynch, 488 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1973). But involuntary
dismissal for inadequate proof is reviewed on legal grounds. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 306-10.
226. Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124, 1133 (5th Cir. 1976).
227. Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973). The
Federal Rules in general "are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). See generally Note, Appellate Review of Discov-
ery Orders in the Federal Courts, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 339 (appealability).
228. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1983)(finding
abuse).
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ii. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Much like the review of discovery orders, an award of attorney's
fees is within the judge's discretion,22 but should be awarded in civil
rights cases "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust. ' 230 Similar rules govern costs under Rule 54(d). 23' "[W]hile an
award of costs to a prevailing party is usual, the inclusion of various
items within that award is within the discretion of the trial judge. 232
iii. Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law
Choice of law determinations are not reviewed under the abuse
test, 33 but are subject to de novo appellate review.23 4 Conversely, the
appeals court "may reverse a district court's decision on a motion to
229. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Manges, 702 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1983)(award af-
firmed unless abuse). The abuse standard has been applied in diversity cases, and statu-
tory cases, such as 20 U.S.C. § 3205 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The factors relevant to a
determination are articulated in Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974). But cf. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Louisville Black Police Officers
Org., Inc., 700 F.2d 268, 273 (6th Cir. 1983). It is not yet clear whether Johnson
applies to diversity cases. See Atlantic Richfield, 702 F.2d at 87.
230. Brown v. Miller, 631 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1980)(citing § 1988). See 28
U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982). See also Blum v. Stenson, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1706
(1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
Some statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E)(1982 & Supp.), are more neutral grants of discretion, requiring no spe-
cial presumption of an award. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529 (5th Cir.
1978)(listing relevant factors). It appears that diversity cases are similarly neutral on
the attorneys' fee issue, depending of course on state law. See Atlantic Richfield, 702
F.2d at 87.
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)(1982)("may award").
232. Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1977). See Newman v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1981)(reversing "vacation of costs will
require an abuse of discretion"); In re Nissan Antitrust Litig., 577 F.2d 910, 918 (5th
Cir. 1978)("clear abuse"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). While cost matters are
subject to review for abuse, a finding on necessity is considered factual. See
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 713 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1983).
233. Bailey v. Dolphin Int'l, Inc., 697 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983). See also
Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 920 (1981). Cf Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983)(facts under-
lying finding of no minimum contacts in personal jurisdiction inquiry not clearly
erroneous).
234. Bailey, 697 F.2d at 1274. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
257 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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dismiss based on forum non conveniens only if its action constitutes a
clear abuse of discretion."2 5
iv. Injunctions and Declaratory Actions
The trial court usually has broad discretion in granting or denying
a preliminary injunction, subject to review for abuse. 3 6 (Stays pending
appeal are subject to a similiar analysis.)2 37 Because the application for
relief is in equity, fact findings by which the judge supports his decision
are subject to Rule 52(a) . 38 Although the abuse standard is generally
employed among the circuits, the Second Circuit has developed a line
of broad de novo review when the judge's decision rests on documen-
tary evidence. 39
The equity court, even when fashioning more permanent relief, is
generally acting in a discretionary capacity, subject of course to the
235. Constructora Spilimerg, S.A. v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., 700 F.2d 225, 226
(5th Cir. 1983).
236. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600
F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). The abuse standard has long been applied in such
situations. See United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1936). See generally
Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940)(orders issued under court's
general equitable powers reviewed only for abuse).
The courts, both trial and appellate, consider four factors: likelihood of success on
the merits, irreparable injury, no substantial harm to other parties, and the public in-
terest. E.g., State of Tex. v. Seatrain Int'l, 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975). Findings on
these four factors are mixed fact-law questions. Buchanan v. United States Postal
Serv., 508 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. F.P.C.,
259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(establishing the now-popular four-part formula).
Cf. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983)(the Ninth Circuit organizes
these factors into a "continuum" analysis).
The district court is required to make findings of fact and law. Canal Auth. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974).
237. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435. Although the judge's decision is said to be
reviewable only for abuse, courts will grant a stay of an injunction pending appeal only
sparingly and regard it as "an extraordinary form of reprieve." Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F.
Supp. 604, 605 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The stay is a disfavored remedy because it inter-
rupts the ordinary process of judicial review and postpones relief for the prevailing
party who has been found entitled to an equitable remedy. United States v. State of
Tex., 523 F. Supp. 703, 729 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
238. See American Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Co-op Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408,
411 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. supra note 236 (four factors as mixed questions).
239. See State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 750-
52 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977).
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peculiar requirements of equity jurisdiction.24 The Supreme Court has
stated that "the scope of a district court's equitable power to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equita-
ble remedies."241 The "abuse" deference is often given, for example, to
the judge's remedy in desegregation cases.242 The district court appar-
ently has similar authority when applying its equitable remedy. In re-
viewing a trial judge's decision that one party had not violated his in-
junction, the courts have stated: "We see no basis for substituting our
judgment for that of the district judge in interpreting his own order.1"243
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act permits the district court
to declare the rights of the parties before it.244 In the Eleventh Circuit,
the decision to take a case under the Act is discretionary to the court,
though it may not decline by whim.245 Other circuits permit broader
review, citing the liberal purpose of the statute as circumscribing the
trial court's discretion. 246 Declaratory jurisdiction may, at any rate, be
240. These requirements, including inadequacy of legal remedy, property inter-
est, and lack of equitable defenses, seem subject to legal definition by the reviewing
court, though the district judge, in weighing the facts and fashioning a remedy, is exer-
cising discretion. Cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, -U.S.-, 104 S.
Ct. 2576, 2585 n.8 (1984) (implying review more circumscribed for preliminary injunc-
tions than with permanent relief).
241. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). See
also Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 396 U.S. 1215, 1216 (1969)(Brennan, J., in cham-
bers). While the appeals court is "free to re-assess the district court's conclusions of
law, its findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly erroneous." Ross v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Baylor v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 733 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1984).
242. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 702 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 276 (1984).
243. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Abel Eng'g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th
Cir. 1982)(quoting Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Sloan, 535 F.2d 679, 681 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977)).
In criminal contempt cases, review of the sentencing decision is by the abuse test.
United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 779 (5th Cir. 1975).
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
245. Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans, 657 F.2d 746, 750 (1981). Accord Dug-
gins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1963). A distinction should be made, of course,
between the decision to decide and the decision on the merits of the action.
Similarly, general abstention decisions are also subject to abuse review. See
Midkoff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 789 n.1, 799 (9th Cir. 1983). But once jurisdiction is
found proper, the court normally should not abstain absent exceptional circumstances.
Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1046 (11 th Cir.
1982).
246. E.g., Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 518 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir.
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inappropriate where the issues are speculative or one party is attempt-
ing a game of "procedural fencing." '247
v. Pendent Jurisdiction
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims com-
bines both mandatory (jurisdictional minimum) and discretionary (ap-
propriateness of keeping state claims) elements.248 Even when the dis-
trict judge is acting within her "discretion," however, she ordinarily
"should" dismiss pendent state claims if the federal claims are dis-
missed before trial.249
vi. Leave to Amend
Permission to amend pleadings under Rule 15 presents a subtle
quirk in the judge's usual discretion. Where a party is not entitled to
amendment as of right, he may apply to the court for leave, "and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires."250 But the court's deci-
sion-either granting or denying leave-is committed to its discre-
251 b25onltion, ' reversible only where abuse is found. 52 Factors justifying de-
nial include prejudice to the opponent, undue delay and dilatory
motive, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and the futility
of amendment.253 Denial is also more likely affirmed if denial is made
after summary judgment, although not necessarily affirmed if other re-
1975); Beacon Const. Co. v. Matco Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1973). See FED-
ERAL PROCEDURE § 23:37 (Lawyers Ed. 1982).
247. Hollis, 657 F.2d at 750 (discussing factors). See FEDERAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 246, § 23:9.
248. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966). See generally
Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejec-
tion of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399 (1983).
249. E.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176,
1179-80 (2d Cir. 1974).
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
251. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330
(1971). This discretion is said to be similar to that for supplemental pleadings. See
Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983). Rule 15(d), governing the latter,
makes no particular requirement of liberal amendment.
252. Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
253. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 331; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The court, in fact, requires the trial judge to consider prejudice. See Zenith Radio, 401
U.S. at 331.
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lief motions have been granted.2 54 Normally, however, leave should be
granted, for although review is limited to determining whether the trial
court's decision is an abuse of discretion, the policy of liberal amend-
ment directs that "unless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to
amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to per-
mit denial."2 55 The quirk is that liberal amendment clashes with court
discretion, at least when the judge denies amendment.2 56 While the
"abuse" test is said to apply in either case, in practice "the" test is
applied differently. Where amendment is allowed, affirmance is routine;
a denial also is often affirmed, but the appellate court nearly always
applies and analyzes the relevant factors itself in determining whether
denial was abuse. Some courts, then, find the factors wanting and re-
verse the district court.25
Moreover, it is likely that the judge's discretion will be checked
more in future cases. Application of the abuse standard was developed
under case law which gave no preclusive effect to the judge's discretion-
ary call. The new Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, has recently ruled,
however, that res judicata principles may be applied to claims for
which amendment was denied.258 While the direct impact of this deci-
sion remains to be felt, reviewing courts may be much more reluctant
to affirm, as a matter of course, the judge's discretion where the denied
amendment, in theory freely given, extinguishes a claim forever. 59
vii. "Discretion": A Final Note
The tension inherent in the leave to amend cases-where discre-
254. See, e.g., Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 & n.2 (5th
Cir. 1981); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1967).
255. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598. Denial is also affirmed where no legal basis ex-
ists for the amended claim or defense.
256. An early court cautioned that amendment is not a mechanical absolute, im-
plying that it is nonetheless rarely denied-a liberal policy which may be said to con-
flict with narrow "abuse" review. Freeman, 381 F.2d at 468. The standard, though
consistently cited today, is not necessarily uniformly applied or implied between circuit
panels. Compare Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598-99, with Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc.,
661 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981).
257. E.g., Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 599. Other courts, though affirming, at least
probe the "discretionary" decision. See, e.g., Union Planters, 687 F.2d at 121; Daves v.
Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981).
258. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc).
259. See McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs., Inc., 705 F.2d 776
(5th Cir. 1983)(denial of rehearing en banc).
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tion is the standard but review is often probing, employing established
guidelines-also reveals itself in other discretionary situations, includ-
ing discovery and involuntary dismissal. The court gives a theoretically
free hand to the district judge but immediately creates impediments
and establishes qualifications for exercising the discretion. On appeal
the result is often something of a hybrid "abuse" test where abuse is
more commonly found and less pejoratively implied. 60 It must be
asked, then, whether the circuit in fact employs at least two "abuse of
discretion" standards. Though "the" test is the same, there seems to be
a real distinction, in common sense and review standard, between a
judge's approval of amendment-blessed by Rule 15(a)-and the de-
nial of leave. The court appears to have responded, at least implicitly,
to a perceived difference in these twins and other situations.
Of course, the addition of factors to be considered in exercising
discretion is not necessarily freer review, and the courts often frame the
factors not as the rationale for broader review of abuse but as elements
pointing to an abuse where incorrectly considered. In some situations,
however, the appeals court may be doing more, resulting in a freer ap-
pellate hand. If the court makes a tacit distinction between two or more
"abuse" standards, the dividing line might be seen as "true" discretion,
where real trial authority translates into effectively restricted review. 26a
Such a line might underlie the oft-quoted but unexplained juxtaposition
of review for "abuse" and review for "clear abuse"2 2 (if there is a
difference), though the court does not appear to be consciously pursu-
ing a distinction. In application, for example, the courts do not indicate
that abuse is present but not clear.
In the final analysis, however, the concept of discretion quite natu-
rally fights uniformity, so it should not be surprising that review of
260. The courts state, however, that a finding of abuse of discretion is not a
pejorative label upon the trial judge. E.g., Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting
Corp., 694 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, an ironic consequence of the way
review standards are often phrased is the number of jurors who are labeled "unreasona-
ble" and the relative frequency with which district judges, whose power is solemnly
granted, are said to have "abused" it.
261. See supra notes 180-83. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 189. Professor
Rosenberg discerns at least four levels of discretion in action. See also Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 389 (2d Cir.)(in comparing "the"
abuse test for grants versus denials of SEC injunction, judge notes "scope of review
would appear to be different," but urges abuse to be found "whatever abuse of discre-
tion standard be applied"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
262. See supra note 189.
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discretion is not always consistently applied or even theorized. Never-
theless, the circuit has broadly set out one abuse of discretion inquiry
as the standard for reviewing district courts' trial and supervisory roles.
2. Jury Instructions
a. Form and Content
The form of jury instruction and the method of objection are con-
sidered procedural points. The federal courts look to federal law in
framing instructions at trial and in reviewing charge form on appeal.2 6
Where state law defines the contested right or action, however, state
law of course governs the substance of the charge.26 4 The actual con-
tent of jury instructions presents, then, a question of substantive law
rather than standard of review, and legal errors are freely reversed if
prejudicial. In reviewing the manner of instruction, the federal courts
are not always picky about language and format. As long as the jury is
not misled, prejudiced, or confused, "[a] party is not entitled to have
the jury instructed in the particular language of its choice."26 5 The re-
viewing court considers "the charge as a whole, viewing it in light of
the allegations of the complaint, the evidence, and the arguments of
counsel. 2 66 These principles have also been applied where the appel-
lant complained of the timing of portions of the charge.2 67 Similarly,
the court's choice to submit the case in the form of a special verdict is
said to be within its discretion.268
263. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974). One reflection of the differing federal approach is the power to com-
ment on the evidence. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2555, at 651-52
(1971).
265. Baker & Co., Fla. v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 1347, 1350
(5th Cir. 1978).
266. Smith v. Borg-Warner Corp., 626 F.2d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 1980). "If,
viewed in that light, the jury instructions are comprehensive, balanced, fundamentally
accurate, and not likely to confuse or mislead the jury, the charge will be deemed
adequate." Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
267. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Engineering Industries, Inc., 693 F.2d 1140,
1142 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1982). See generally supra note 166 for review of supplemental
instructions.
268. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 94, at 630-31. See also supra note 165.
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b. The Test: Technical Errors and the Jury's Function
The circuit has indicated that review of jury instructions is not a
search for utopia or an exercise in technicalities. As one court summa-
rized the standard:
A technical imperfection does not occasion reversal when it is part
of a charge that otherwise adequately instructs the jury on the ap-
plicable law. We must determine 'not whether the charge was
faultless in every particular but whether the jury was misled in any
way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to
determine those issues.' If the charge as a whole 'leaves us with
substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been prop-
erly guided in its deliberations' it cannot stand. 6 9
In sum, then, "[i]nstructions are considered adequate if the jury is
given an appropriate understanding of the controlling law and of its
role in the decision-making process .... ,,27o Even where language and
form is placed in the hands of the trial judge, the Eleventh Circuit will
reverse where the charge fails these principles. 271
c. "Plain Error"?
Rule 51 provides: "No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objectio." 172 Since no "plain error" ex-
ception is supplied, as is specifically the case in criminal cases under
269. McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1979)(ci-
tations omitted). See also McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1971).
McCullough, quoting Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1100 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), states one aspect of the test as
requiring that the jury not be misled in any way. Id. at 759. Other courts ask whether
the charge is likely to mislead. See Scheib, 628 F.2d at 511. The possible variation in
the language, however, is not presented as inconsistent in theory or application. See
also Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982)("ineradicable doubt").
270. Farmhand, 693 F.2d at 1142.
271. See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1982).
See also Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1983)(instructions
insufficient, misleading, and confusing); McCullough, 587 F.2d at 759 (contradictory
charge and summation constituted erroneous directed verdict).
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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the federal rules,273 the civil rule literally means no review. Some cir-
cuits, including the Ninth, openly apply Rule 51 strictly. 74 Some old
Fifth Circuit panels appeared to find themselves precluded from review
without suggesting a plain error exception.2 75 Many former Fifth Cir-
cuit cases, however, have indicated such an exception. Most of these
offer the exception in dicta, finding that if there were error it would not
be "plain. 276 Other courts, especially recently, have found that plain
error was present and reversed accordingly. 77 The circuit also appears
willing to consider an objection adequate under a lenient objection rule,
at least where it brings the trial court's attention to the defect.2 78
Moreover, requested instructions are not necessary to preserve error in
failing to instruct on the controlling issues or in giving erroneous or
misleading instructions.279
3. Motions for Judgment or Relief
a. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal
A district court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is told that "a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted
273. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
274. See Bock v. United States, 375 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1967). The Third Cir-
cuit, on the other hand, has increasingly reversed for plain error.
275. E.g., Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1975).
Such cases simply fail to mention a possible exception to the no-review rule.
276. See, e.g., Hoover, Inc. v. McCullough Indus., 380 F.2d 798, 801 (5th Cir.
1967)(no error found; exception by comparison to prejudicial argument cases); Pruett
v. Marshall, 283 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1960). See DeJoris v. United States, 409 F.2d
2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1969). Cf. Rivers v. Angf. A/B Tirfing, 450
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1971)(charge not fundamentally erroneous).
277. See, e.g., Jamison Co., Inc. v. Westvaco Corp., 526 F.2d 922, 932-33, reh'g
denied, 530 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1976); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 523
F.2d 1226, 1237-40 (5th Cir. 1975). Most of these cases also call the error "fundamen-
tal" or a "miscarriage." See also cases cited in Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d
537, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1980)(setting out the standard).
278. See Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1375-76 (5th Cir. 1983). See
also note 251. But see Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715 F.2d 983, 988-89 (5th Cir.
1983).
279. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2556 (1971)("[tlhe court
must instruct the jury properly on the controlling issues of the case even though there
has been no request for an instruction or the instruction requested is defective."). See
generally Pryor, 704 F.2d at 1375-76. Cf. Herman v. Hess Oil, 524 F.2d 767, 771 (3d
Cir. 1975)(invited error).
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unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be allowed
to recover under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
his claim."2 80 The appellate court reviews under the same standard.281
The federal courts generally read the plaintiff's allegations liberally:
"The form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon
which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the
legal theory giving rise to the claim. '28 2 The liberalization of complaint
construction and procedures has led Professor Miller to note the decline
of Rule 12(b)(6), remarking that it was last used "during the McKin-
ley Administration. 283
Rule 12(b)(6) applies where one party challenges the legal claim
presented in a pleading; after pleadings are closed either party may
move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). In either case,
where matters outside the pleadings are considered, the court must use
the standard and procedures for summary judgment under Rule 56,284
though as a practical matter the legal inquiry may be similar since
facts are not material if they carry no legal import.285
b. Summary Judgment
i. "Material Fact": Test and Burdens
Summary judgment is appropriate if the full record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 286 On review the
280. Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 1357,
at 598 (1969)(motion disfavored and rarely granted).
281. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1974); Fontana v. Barham, 708 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1983).
282. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 604. Cf. Daves, 661 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1981); FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). The court in evaluating the motion takes the factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. E.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 235-37. An even
less stringent pleading standard is applied to pro se complaints, for example in § 1983
actions. See Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1983).
283. Quoted in Carter, Panel "Inquires"-Is Bok Wrong?, Harv. L. Record,
Dec. 9, 1983, at 2.
284. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c). See generally infra note 286.
285. See infra note 289. Generally, however, the Rule 12(b)(6) focus in on law
while Rule 56 is on "material" facts; moreover, different procedures and materials are
used. For the requirement of written findings and conclusions, see infra note 296.
286. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Everything in the record, including depositions and
affidavits, is considered, unlike in the pre-trial dismissal situation. See also Underwood
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appellate court applies the same test as the district courts.287
The court may not weigh the evidence or its probative value, nor
may the court resolve any factual issues discerned in the record,2 s8 but
a factual dispute without legal significance is not "material."2 9 Mate-
rial facts are those which may affect the outcome of litigation.' 0 The
moving party carries the burden, an "exacting" one, of demostrating
absence of fact and entitlement to judgment, so that the evidence, and
all inferences therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opponent and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor.2"' Thus,
even where all facts are known or stipulated, summary judgment may
nonetheless be inappropriate:
v. Hunter, 604 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1979)(judge may sua sponte convert motion to
dismiss into summary judgment motion but must then comply strictly with Rule 56).
The plaintiff or the defendant may move for summary judgment as to all or part
of a claim or defense. The motion may be granted in equity. Even where the mecha-
nism is appropriate, the court may in its discretion deny the motion. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 197, § 99, at 663-65, 667, 669. See generally Bruce v. Travelers Ins. Co., 266
F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1959); Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
In diversity cases, the federal Rule 56 standard still controls. Nunez v. Superior
Oil Co., 472 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978). But the legal issues underlying the
action are of course creatures of state law.
287. See, e.g., Thrasher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 637
(11 th Cir. 1984); United States Steel Corp. v. Darby, 516 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1975).
288. E.g., Miles v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195
(5th Cir. 1983). Cf. Robin v. Wilson Brothers Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir.
1983)(court in new trial situation may weigh evidence). Nor may the court consider
inadmissible evidence. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967).
289. See Union Planters Nat'l Leasing Co. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 119 (5th
Cir. 1982)("contested fact must have some legal significance to be material to the reso-
lution of a case"). Thus the court has stated, in language similar to the test for Rule
12(b)(6) motions, that summary judgment normally is granted "only when the moving
party has established his right to judgment with such clarity that the nonmoving party
cannot recover ...under any discernible circumstance." Everhart v. Drake Mgmt.,
Inc., 627 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra note 292.
290. See Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1980).
291. E.g., Thrasher, 734 F.2d at 639; Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v.
Wackenhut Protective Sys., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982); Joplin v. Bias, 631
F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980); Stafford v. United States, 611 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1979). See also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). The motion is
denied where "reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts," Impossible Elec., 669 F.2d at 1031. Cf. O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d
704 (3d Cir. 198 1)(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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There is no litmus that infallibly distinguishes those issues that are
"factual" from those that are "legal" or "mixed." When all those
material facts susceptible of objective determination are known,
there may be inferences or conclusions to be drawn from them.
Many observations that may appear superficially to be factual are
the result of inference, viewpoint, and judgment. At ends of the
spectrum, it may be relatively easy to separate fact and law, but as
we approach the point where facts and the application of legal rule
to them blend, appraising evidentiary facts in terms of their legal
consequences and "applying" law to fact become inseparable
processes. In some instances where facts may assume infinitive va-
riety, legal rules are deliberately stated in a fashion calling for the
application of judgment.2 2
Although the moving party maintains the burden under Rule 56,
when a motion is made and properly supported,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 293
The non-moving party, then, "is required to bring forward 'significant
provative evidence' demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of
fact. ' 294 Additionally, the nonmover cannot present one view of the
purported factual dispute (or legal theory of its materiality) to the trial
292. Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1978). Nunez
cites jury sufficiency cases, including Boeing and Liberty Mutual, in reversing sum-
mary judgment, and notes that inferences and ultimate facts are for the jury, subject to
reversal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the resultant findings. Nunez, 572 F.2d
at 1124 & n.6. In theory, however, the summary judgment inquiry is different from the
j.n.o.v. situation since inferences under Rule 56 are not really left to the jury but are
decided, against the movant, in determining the propriety of summary judgment. See
First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968)(summary
judgment vehicle typically appropriate where only issue is the legal significance to be
ascribed to undisputed record facts).
Rule 56(c) also provides for procedural protections different from those under
Rule 12, including ten day notice before hearing. See infra note 296.
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, "[diefense of a proper summary judgment mo-
tion requires more than a mere denial." Union Planters, 687 F.2d at 119.
294. Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978). See
also Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Bar Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396 (5th Cir. 1976).
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court--only to raise a new tack on appeal.2 95
ii. Trial Court Findings and Appellate Record Review
In addition to the Rule 56 duties imposed on the parties, the dis-
trict court is often said to have its own responsibility to delineate its
basis for granting summary judgment:
"Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on deci-
sions of motions under Rules 12 and 56," [and] their absence here
is not, of itself, fatal. Even so, "the parties are entitled to know the
reasons upon which [summary] judgment[s] . ..are based," if for
no other reason than to secure meaningful appellate review. Al-
though our prior admonitions have been precatory in character, we
have in practice insisted that district courts record-however infor-
mally-their reasons for entering summary judgment, at least
where their underlying holdings would otherwise be ambiguous or
inascertainable. 29 6
In a similar vein, a recent court has noted a conflict in the case
law on the question of whether the appellate court is to make an inde-
pendent review of the record to find a factual dispute which the appel-
lant has not pointed out. "Judges are not ferrets!," the court com-
plained, but searched the record anyway and reversed.297
iii. Appropriateness in Specific Applications
"Summary judgment is, of course, Damoclean and lethal. It can
serve as a quick sword untangling the Gordian knot of litigation. 29 8
295. See, e.g., DeBardeleben v. Cummings, 453 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1972).
The cases do not consistently require such care from the parties. Cf. infra note 279 and
accompanying text. But a party's failure to properly bring facts or legal theories to the
trial court's attention may constitute actual abandonment of the issues. See generally
infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text.
296. Hanson v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 625 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1980)(cita-
tions omitted).
A recent Fifth Circuit case emphasized that these findings must be evaluated
under Rule 56(c), not the clear error rule of Rule 52(a). New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Baum, 707 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1983)(on rehearing).
297. Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Const. Co., 695 F.2d 839,
847 (5th Cir. 1983).
298. Id. at 844. See also Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir.
1940).
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The mechanism is not to be used unless manifestly inappropriate. The
court has indicated that summary judgment is particularly inappropri-
ate as a general matter in certain classes of cases. For example,
"[o]rdinarily, summary disposition of Title VII cases is not favored,
especially on a 'potentially inadequate factual presentation.' "299 Sum-
mary judgment is normally-but not always-inappropriate when the
issues involve negligence or a determination of the reasonableness of
the parties' acts under the circumstances. 300
The Supreme Court has similarly stated: "We believe that sum-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-
tion where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in
the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the
plot." 30 1 Nevertheless, lower courts have expressed their willingness to
affirm summary judgments in appropriate antitrust cases, especially
where tangible and objective issues are involved, though the procedure
is generally to be avoided.30 2 Other cases indicate that summary judg-
ment may not be proper in securities actions prior to completion of
discovery, 30 3 and the procedure may be cautiously applied where the
issue is novel or the case is complex.30 4 Critics blame this hesitance in
complex cases, as with liberality in other procedural vehicles, for clog-
ging the federal courts.30 5
c. Rule 41(b) Dismissal
In bench trials after the plaintiff concludes his case, the defendant
may move for dismissal of the action, "arguing "that upon the facts and
299. Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 669 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)(quot-
ing Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 521 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1971)), quoted in
Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983).
300. See Gross v. Southern Ry. 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Crum v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 471 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1973)(allowing summary judgment); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.)(directed verdict on motive and
good faith), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
301. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
302. See Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 114. See also Sponsler, Fifth Circuit Sympo-
sium: Antitrust Law, 28 Loy. L. REV. 775, 785 (1982).
303. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
304. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Kennedy v.
Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §
2725 (1973).
305. See Carter, supra note 283, at 2.
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the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." ' 6 The court may
defer the motion until the close of the case or, finding the evidence
insufficient, render judgment on the merits and make Rule 52(a) find-
ings.30 7 The trial court is said to weigh the evidence, even on a motion
made only after plaintiff has offered evidence.308
The substantive Rule 41(b) motion is roughly analogous to the di-
rected verdict motion offered at the same time in jury trials. But the
judge passing on a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. motion, to preserve the
jury function, must view the evidence in the light favoring the
nonmover. In nonjury cases under Rule 41(b), however, the judge is
said to be not so limited and may resolve credibility and evidentiary
conficts.309 As one recent court clarified: "Although the court disposed
of the [limitations] issue through the vehicle of a motion for directed
verdict, the issue was actually tried to the court as fact finder, and it
made, in effect, findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon. The
Boeing standard was therefore inapplicable. '310
d. New Trial
i. Discretion and General Applications
Rule 59 permits a trial court to grant a new trial, after motion or
on its own initiative, on any or all issues in a jury or bench trial.311
Common grounds on which such a motion is based include legal error
(e.g., in instructions or evidentiary calls), improper conduct (of judge,
attorney, or juror), new evidence, and verdict contrary to evidence. The
trial court's decision generally is committed to its discretion.312 For ex-
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Defendant can so move at the close of the case,
though then the court must render judgment anyway. See supra note 225 for dismissal
under Rule 41 on grounds other than insufficient evidence.
307. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
308. See Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970)(en banc).
309. C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 96, at 645.
310. Emmons v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 701 F.2d 1122, 1119 (5th
Cir. 1983)(footnote omitted).
311. FED. R. Civ. P. 59. The motion "shall be served not later than 10 days after
the entry of judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d)(court
initiative) and 59(e)(alter or amend). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 66, §§ 2812, 2813 (1973). A 1966 amendment provides that the court may
act on grounds not stated in a motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
312. See generally Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940);
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ample, a motion for new trial based on inflammatory argument or other
improper remarks is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge,313 reversible only for abuse.314 Justification for this defer-
ence echoes that which is given to other exercises of discretion:
The district judge . . was best able to measure the impact of im-
proper argument, the effect of the conduct on the jury, and the
results of his effort to control it. Our review is not only hindsight,
but is based on a written record with no ability to assess the impact
of the statement on the jury or to sense the atmosphere of the
courtroom.3 1 5
The courts may find that the earlier "failure to move for a mistrial is
also significant" in reviewing the propriety of the ultimate new trial
motion, since the party "[b]y doing so, and by acquiescing in the
court's corrective charge, . . . got a chance to see the verdict and then
to seek to overturn it" 31 -an advantage apparently viewed as unfair.
ii. Weight of the Evidence
Where an appeal is made from an order denying or granting a new
trial (the latter reviewed after a second trial) on the basis of legal er-
ror, the appellate court may simply review for such error. The more
Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838
(1975); United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420,
423 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has recently defined the proper factors and procedures the
trial court is to consider in determining a new trial motion for juror bias in civil cases.
See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 815
(1984). The Court in McDonough Power stated that a party seeking a new trial based
on juror prejudice or bias must demonstrate that the juror in question failed to answer
honestly a material question posed on voir dire. In addition, the party must show that a
honest answer would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See id. at
849-50.
313. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982). See Rosenberg, supra
note 13, at 178.
314. Caldadera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983).
315. See id. at 781-82.
316. Id. at 782 (footnote omitted). The courts also appear influenced by a
judge's quick or thorough limiting of prejudice by corrective instruction. See id. at 781-
82. Review generally may narrow to the question whether "the damage done by this
inflammatory argument was irreparable. . ." with the trial judge in the superior posi-
tion from which to evaluate prejudice. Id. at 781.
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difficult cases, however, involve evidence-weighing, necessarily involving
factual inquiry. The trial court's decision on a new trial motion for lack
of evidentiary support again is subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion. 17 In exercising this discretion in granting the motion, how-
ever, the trial court is warned not to merely substitute its view or
doubts about the evidence for those of the jury,3 18 though it is said that
the trial court on a new trial motion has the discretion to consider both
the weight of the evidence 31 9 and the credibility of witnesses. The stan-
dard by which the appellate court checks for abuse is the same as the
one guiding its exercise by the trial court: the trial court may not grant
a new trial unless the verdict is "against the great weight of the evi-
dence, ''s2 and the reviewing court will not affirm such a decision unless
the "great weight" line is broken. 321 Reversals have thus been ordered
where there is "no great weight of the evidence in any direction. 322
Although "[t] he 'great weight of the evidence' standard is not eas-
ily met, '323 or for that matter easily defined, 24 it is clear that the ver-
dict is not as safe under this test as where the verdict is challenged as a
matter of law under a j.n.o.v. motion; "the court has a wide discretion
in setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial even if the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence. '326 This discretion is allowed, even
in the face of the seventh amendment, possibly, because the verdict is
not flatly reversed-the parties instead just get a new jury. The circuit
has even, rarely, reversed trial court findings that a verdict is not
against the weight of the evidence.3 28 Nevertheless, the jury's verdict is
317. See, e.g., Saunders v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 728 F.2d 1367
(11 th Cir. 1984); Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976). See
also McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1971)("manifest abuse"); Weyer-
haeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 ("clear abuse").
318. See Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.
1980).
319. See Robin v. Wilson Brothers Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
320. E.g., Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1979).
321. E.g., Narcisse v. Ill. Cent. Gulf RR Co., 620 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also Weyerhaeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 (against "clear weight" or a miscarriage of jus-
tice). Some cases apply the "great weight" test without first setting it up as the stan-
dard by which the judge's discretion is directed and checked for abuse. E.g., Perricone,
704 F.2d at 1376.
322. Conway, 610 F.2d at 367.
323. Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1982).
324. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 95, at 639 (4th ed. 1983).
325. Abshire v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1982).
326. United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965); Georgia-Pacific
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given deference, especially where the issues are simple, the facts not
strongly disputed, and trial conduct not pernicious. 32 7
Although denial of a new trial motion is likewise said to be subject
to "abuse of discretion" review, it is clear that more deference in prac-
tice is given to the district judge when she agrees with the jury. Where
the "judge denies the motion and leaves undisturbed the jury's determi-
nation, all factors press in the direction of leaving the trial judge's rul-
ing undisturbed .... ,,311 Comity, common sense, and the seventh
amendment, of course, support this extra reluctance, though the dis-
tinction is at odds with the notion that the abuse test is a single or
uniform standard.329 Similarly, the like judgments of two successive ju-
ries is especially guarded; "courts rarely grant a new trial after two
verdicts upon the facts in favor of the same party. '330
iii. Conditional New Trial and Damages
The conditional grant of a new trial motion is governed by similar
language. In such a case the district court or even appellate court indi-
cates that it will order a new trial for damages unless the nonmoving
party will consent to a judicial reduction of damages. 331 In the federal
courts the issue is one of excessive damages-remedied by the condi-
tional remittitur vehicle-since additur, for inadequate damages, is
held to violate the seventh amendment.3 2 The trial judge applying re-
mittitur must actually offer the plaintiff a choice between reduction or
Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Caldarera, 705 F.2d
778 (5th Cir. 1983).
327. Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1381.
328. Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
838 (1975. But see supra note 326 and accompanying text.
329. See generally supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
330. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 628, 631 (1890).
331. See generally Edwards, 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing both ver-
dict and judge's response and ordering new trial). See also Narcisse, 620 F.2d at 546;
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §§ 2815, 2816 (1973); Note, Remittitur
Review: Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated and Unliquidated Damage
Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1976).
332. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., 505
F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the circuits once split on the question whether a
party accepting remittitur may challenge the order on appeal, the Supreme Court now
holds that the order is not subject to appellate review when consented to, even if the
complaining party had given consent under protest. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429
U.S. 648, 649 (1977).
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new trial; otherwise the appeals court must remand for that selec-
tion.333 Use of remittitur is, not surprisingly, reviewed under an "abuse
of discretion" standard. 3 4 The jury's determination, of course, is af-
forded deference, especially where the trial judge approves it.335 "The
jury's award is not to be disturbed unless it is entirely disproportionate
to the injury sustained. 338
The courts are not clear, in setting forth these principles, how the
judge's discretion accords with the traditional deference given jury ver-
dicts. It is, again, likely that "abuse" is found more rarely-or even
reviewed differently (if such is a real analytical distinction)-where the
judge agrees with the jury.337 Similarly, other courts33 8 do not clearly
distinguish among the language accompanying flat orders of new trial,
remittitur, and reversal of a jury's findings on damages. 339 Perhaps all
these situations could be summarized, beyond "abuse" language, as re-
quiring that all courts defer to the reasonable jury and the appellate
court in turn defer to the trial judge, especially where the judge's re-
view affirms the jury's determination. 40
333. Higgins v. Smith Int'l, 716 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1983).
334. See generally Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d
998 (5th Cir. 1982)(summarizing various former Fifth Circuit tests and language used
to determine abuse, finding abuse by any of the standards, and ordering conditional
new trial). Cf. Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1982)(remittitur to stipulated
damages of parties).
Nevertheless, the trial judge may not reduce the award below the maximum rea-
sonable amount. Bonura, 505 F.2d at 669.
335. See Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 783-84 & n.15.
336. See id. at 784. Excessiveness of the verdict is judged from the base award,
e.g., before trebling. See Pope, 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983). New trial on damages
may not be ordered unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
Narcisse, 620 F.2d at 547.
337. See supra notes 328, 334-35 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Pope, 703 F.2d at 208.
339. See supra note 172.
340. Whether the issue of damages is reviewed on its own terms or after initial
trial judge review, it is said that "an examination of the [former] Fifth Circuit cases in
this field reveals only rare instances in which the Court felt bound to set aside a jury
award for its excessiveness." Perricone, 630 F.2d at 319. But where the trial judge
exercises his discretion to reduce an award, abuse is found "only when it appears that
the jury's original verdict was clearly within the universe of possible awards which are
supported by the evidence." Bonura, 505 F.2d at 670 (emphasis in original).
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iv. Discretion versus Law: J.N.O.V. Compared
Despite the blending in some damages cases, the court has distin-
guished generally between the new trial situation and the j.n.o.v. mo-
tion, which often accompanies a new trial motion. As one Fifth Circuit
case summarized, in rejecting the argument that failure to move for a
directed verdict precludes granting a new trial on evidence:
In passing a motion for a directed verdict, or for a judgment n.o.v.,
the court does not exercise discretion, but decides a pure question
of law, that is, whether the evidence, considered in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, affords
substantial support for a verdict in his favor. . . . In passing on a
motion for a new trial, the court may and should exercise a sound
discretion, and its ruling thereon will not be reviewed in an appel-
late court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.34'
This distinction, the court added, "was firmly embedded in the common
law" and recognized by the former Fifth and other circuits.3 42
Some courts also distinguish between j.n.o.v. and new trial in the
context of evidence considered, noting that the trial court in passing on
a new trial motion may retroactively strike erroneously admitted evi-
dence and then gauge the jury's performance as if the evidence were
not before it. This procedure is not allowed in the directed verdict or
j.n.o.v. context.3 41
e. Reopen Judgment
Under Rule 60(b) the district court may, on motion, order relief
from a judgment or order on grounds ranging from mistake or excusa-
341. Weyerhaeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 (footnotes omitted). The trial judge may
grant a new trial if in her opinion the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence
or will cause an injustice, even though substantial evidence prevents granting a j.n.o.v.
Id.
342. Id. at 424 (footnote omitted). For another comparison of new trial motion
with other motions, including directed verdict, involuntary dismissal, and summary
judgment, see 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 25, 50.03. Two cases which, like
many appeals, also involve multiple trial motions are Comfort Trane, 592 F.2d 1373
(5th Cir. 1979), and Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976).
343. See Sumitomo Bank v. Products Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215, 218 (5th
Cir. 1983). See also notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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ble neglect to fraud or general fairness.344 When a legal error is alleged
the judge acts within his discretion.345 The circuit has also allowed dis-
cretion under Rule 60(b) to consider new evidence346 or to reinstate a
dismissed complaint.347
D. Special Principles and Applications
1. Panel Stare Decisis
One application of the general rule of stare decisis, in which prior
decisional law provides the governing "rule of law" in subsequent ap-
peals,3 48 is the Eleventh Circuit principle of "panel stare decisis."
Under this rule, each three-judge panel in the circuit is said to be
"without power to overrule a decision of another panel. That task falls
solely to the full Court sitting en banc.'"3 4' But subsequent panels can
also reject precedent, even en banc precedent, under a superseding Su-
preme Court ruling or statutory change.350
A sticky dilemma is presented by conflicting panel cases, cases
which theoretically should not develop if the panel stare decisis princi-
ple is maintained. In such a situation, later courts are caught in a jam:
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(a) governs clerical errors, Rule 59(e) pro-
vides for alteration or amendment of judgment within ten days, and Rule 52(b) allows
amendment of findings, as is discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes, 1946
Amendment, to Rule 60(b).
345. See Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
346. Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978). The court left the motion to the trial judge's discretion
but reviewed the implicit finding of due diligence supporting it for clear error. Id.
347. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (abuse of
discretion).
348. Cf. Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 720 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir.
1983) (discussing general rule that appellate court must apply decisional law in effect at
the time it renders its subsequent opinion, plus exceptions that allow retroactive legal
application).
A similar principle, the "law of the case" doctrine, makes controlling prior deci-
sions in earlier appeals of the same line of litigation.
349. Ford v. United States, 618 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord Bonner v.
City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981)(en banc); Hernandez v. City
of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907
(1982); Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1976)(controls even where later
panel perceives error in the precedent). This rule controls in the circuit, of course, until
the en banc court rejects it.
350. See, e.g., Davis, 529 F.2d at 441.
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"[W]e cannot pay heed to one line of precedent without disregarding
the other, and we lack the authority to overrule one line at the other's
expense." '351 In response, some judges will choose the "longer estab-
lished and more extensive line of precedent, 352 while others follow a
relatively lonely case "because it is the first of our cases to consider the
problem before us, has never been specifically overruled, and is in our
view better-reasoned. .. .
In the final analysis, the latter factor-which precedent is
right-probably controls over such apparently-malleable rules of
thumb as "first case" or "latest case. '3 54 Such conflicts are, of course,
appropriate fodder for the en banc court, though panels seem to avoid
that drastic course where one line of precedent is overwhelmingly ap-
plied or "correct," such that a conflict is in effect merely a couple of
aberrational cases.
2. Review of Issues Not Raised
The courts have developed the general rule that appellants may
not assert facts or theories on appeal which were not urged before the
district court. In some cases the rule is applied strictly, since "[t]he
time for sorting out theories begins long before the filing of a notice of
appeal. ' 355 The trial court "is not to be trapped" by the appellant's
earlier tactical decision or abandonment.356 The rule may have its
strictest application where the assertion first raised on appeal is factual
or reflects a conscious waiver.357 In some cases, "additional facts would
have been developed in the trial court had the new theory been
presented there; in that case, judicial economy is served and prejudice
351. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1354 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
352. Id. at 1354 (footnote omitted).
353. See United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 702 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir.), rev'd
in part, 719 F.2d 738 (1983)(en banc).
354. See also Castillo, 704 F.2d at 187 n.12 (citing "substantial line of author-
ity" but also independently analyzing value of each position).
355. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bryce Street Apts., Ltd., 703 F.2d 904,
908 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1978); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641
(5th Cir. 1974). But formal exceptions to the trial court's erroneous ruling or order are
not necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. 46.
356. DeBardeleben v. Cummings, 453 F.2d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1972).
357. See id. at 324-26. See also Compass Insurance Co. v. Vanguard Insurance
Co., 649 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1981).
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is avoided by binding the parties to the facts presented and the theories
argued below. '3 58
Despite the strict warnings, however, many cases eventually go on
to decide the new issue. The general rule is not jurisdictional but is
"one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exer-
cised on the facts of the individual cases. '3 59 A common exception is
usually made where the newly raised issue concerns a pure question of
law and a refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of jus-
tice.360 Other factors which make courts more willing to consider virgin
issues include consent by the other party36' and matters for which the
proper resolution is beyond real doubt.362
Similar rules apply in other "waiver" situations. For example, it is
said to be impermissible to raise an issue for the first time in a reply
brief since the appellee then gets no chance to respond.3 3 The appel-
late court need not address issues which should have been raised by
cross-appeal. 364 Of course, it is likely that these "waivers" will them-
selves be waived by an appeals court finding it necessary to address an
issue critical to the litigation or the decisional law. The appeals court
generally has a "duty to apply the correct law. '3 65
358. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976).
359. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), quoted in Nilsen v. City of
Moss Point, 674 F.2d 379, 387 n.13 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d
556 (1983)(en banc). See Thorton v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1981).
360. The language and situation is, of course, reminiscent of "plain error" princi-
ples applied in other settings. See supra text accompanying notes 187, 199, 277. But
here an "injustice" jutifies review at all rather than providing the "standard of review,"
level of deference, or amount of error that need be shown.
361. Nilsen, 674 F.2d at 387 n.13 ("absence of a strong argument from the ap-
pellee"). Another important factor is the full opportunity of each party to address the
issue. Id.
362. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
363. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3974, at 428 (1977). Cf. Weingart v. Allen & O'Hara,
Inc., 654 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981)(rule that appeals court will consider only
errors of which appellant specifically complains is not inflexible).
364. It is often said that no cross-appeal is necessary to urge alternative theories
in support of the lower court's judgment. See French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.
5 (5th Cir. 1982).
365. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir.
1972)(emphasis in original).
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3. Harmless Error
Even where the district court or jury has made an error of law or
fact in the situations discussed throughout this article, the Eleventh
Circuit does not automatically reverse the lower decision. Rule 61 pro-
vides the general principle of "harmless error" applicable in civil
actions:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting
a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying,
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial jus-
tice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties.386
The circuit has framed this test for prejudice as a basic question:
"We must determine whether, assuming the action under review to
have been erroneous, was it really harmful to the complaining
party? 13 17 The courts add as a corollary that if the result below is cor-
rect it must be affirmed, even though the district court relied on a
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. 68 In applying these principles,
then, every "standards of review" issue may also involve the question,
either preliminary or ultimate, of whether any potential error would
effect a substantial unfairness upon the parties. 6
4. Habeas Appeals
Habeas corpus cases on appeal, though involving elements and is-
366. FED. R. Civ. P. 61. See generally supra note 187. Cf. Herman v. Hess Oil,
524 F.2d 767, 771 (3d Cir. 1975)(invited error).
367. Tugwell v. A.F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866, 868 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).
368. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
88 (1943); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937).
369. Some errors are per se reversible, especially where constitutional issues or
judicial prophylactic measures are concerned. E.g., Rovinsky v. McKasle, 722 F.2d
197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1984)(denial of right to public trial warrants reversal even with-
out prejudice). See generally Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980)(en
banc).
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sues of the criminal law, are of course structured as civil appeals, and
the federal district judge acts as a fact finder or hearing-master as he
would in the usual civil proceeding. The court's findings of fact, for
example, are subject to the clear error test of Rule 52(a). 370 The
habeas case in the lower court also often involves referral to a magis-
trate for preliminary consideration. 7'
Habeas appeals from district court review of state court convic-
tions necessarily involve two levels of federal appellate review. In such
a case the federal circuit court generally gives state court decisions and
written findings a "presumption of correctness. '37 2 But the two levels
may clash when the federal district court's fact findings are contrary to
state court findings. Presumably appellate review giving a "presump-
tion of correctness" is about equal to review for "clear error," 373 so that
wherd district court differs from state court the tug of appellate pre-
sumptions is from opposite, but equally strong, directions. If the first
level of deference-to state courts-is to have meaning, it appears that
the "clear error" deference given the district court may have to give
way some. That rationale may, of course, underlie the "glosses" on the
clearly erroneous rule the former Fifth Circut developed for cases built
on documentary evidence, 374 since habeas cases often run through the
federal courts on paper.
The Supreme Court set out in Jackson v. Virginia375 the habeas
standard for sufficiency of evidence. Allowing all reasonable inferences
to be drawn in the government's favor, 76 the appeals court must affirm
if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
370. See supra notes 23, 24, 31-44 and accompanying text. See generally Wat-
kins, 655 F.2d at 1353 n.9 (discussing fact findings and characterizations for such
situations as adequate representation, sufficiency of evidence, identification procedures,
and multiple representation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
371. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
372. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1982), Marshall v. Longberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983);
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). Findings on mixed fact-law questions generally
do not benefit from the presumption. E.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42
(1980)(attorney did not engage in multiple representation). A state's interpretation of
its own law controls. See Skipper v. Wainwright, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
373. The early equity standard of "presumptively correct" was adopted for both
law and equity in the rule 52(a) "clear error" standard. See supra text accompanying
note 20. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, -U.S.-.,
104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984).
374. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
375. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
376. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. '377 It could be argued that Jack-
son intended even less review discretion to the federal courts in state
habeas cases than with the sufficiency test for direct appeals, or at least
that even more deference should be given the states. But the appeals
courts do not generally perceive such a distinction, often applying Jack-
son on direct appeals.378
III. Conclusion
Appellate courts seldom do their magic from an empty hat. The
work of the lower courts-sometimes including state courts-or admin-
istrative agency frequently defines how the appeals judges look at the
litigation and how far they can go in making law. What one court re-
cently admonished is often true: "We take this occasion to repeat: we
do not sit to hear cases de novo. ' '379
But in the final analysis the appeals court's duty is to make a cor-
rect decision. In frequent situations the judges are ultimately given
"plain error" review, which means that at a minimum they can reverse
for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit judge,
regardless of the first-level standard of review, need not preside over a
substantial injustice. In the long run, then, standards of review can be
powerful case-defining and power-assigning tools, but they should not
serve as a Dickens-like limit to the judges' sense of fairness. It has
worked out that in practice the avoidance of a rank injustice is indeed a
legitimate ultimate standard of review. At the same time, regardless of
the substantive standard of review or the transparent nature of the
lower court's error, the appellate court may not reverse unless the ap-
pellant's substantial rights are abridged. 380 Judge Frank once noted the
irony of the deference levels in the standards-of-review notion:
A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because
the jurors are inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative find-
ing is given high respect because the administrative officers are spe-
cialists (guided by experts) in finding a particular class of facts,
but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far less respect be-
cause he is blessed neither with jurors' inexperience nor adminis-
377. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
378. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983).
379. Commercial Standard, 703 F.2d at 908.
380. See Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 110-12 (1879). See also supra notes
366-68 and accompanying text.
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trative officers' expertness.38
Of course, the courts have added to this straightforward observa-
tion with plenty of defining texts and minute categorization of special
situations. But even at a high level, at any rate, it is a wise "wag," as
practicing attorney, who keeps the various standards straight and uses
them-along with any ambiguities and inconsistencies-to frame the
issues in the client's best light. The wise court, too, will sort out the
checkpoints and follow them, keeping in mind the final test in either
direction for substantial fairness. Meanwhile, the profession as a whole,
joined by legal commentators, may remember the ubiquitous nature of
the standards of review and further the inquiry into their value and
fairness, not just in each case, but upon the legal system as a whole.
381. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
810 (1950).
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The Fourth Amendment and Surgical Searches:
Invasion of the Bullet Snatchers
I. Introduction
At 1:30 a.m. on a summer evening, the proprietor of a market,
while locking up his business, sees a man approach with a gun in his
hand. The proprietor draws the gun he carries for protection. Shots are
fired and both men are injured. Ambulances transport the two men to
the hospital where the proprietor identifies his alleged assailant, and,
later, police charge him with several felonies. The state attorney now
wants the bullet which is lodged in the alleged felon's chest as evidence.
Surgery using general anesthesia is required to obtain the bullet. Be-
cause the alleged felon refuses to undergo this surgical search, the state
seeks a court order to compel his compliance.1
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution2 protects
a person from official intrusion into areas in which one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy,$ absent a showing that the intrusion is reasona-
ble.' When the area to be searched is physical property, a dwelling or
some other structure, the searcher demonstrates reasonableness by es-
tablishing probable cause 5 to believe the object sought is in the place
for which a search warrant is to be issued. Once probable cause is
proven, the intrusion is deemed reasonable and the search warrant is
issued.6
1. The facts described are similar to the facts of Winston v. Lee, discussed infra.
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. L. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE passim (1974).
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), stating that the deter-
mination of probable cause shall be decided "by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Id. at 14.
6. L. WADDINGTON, supra note 3, at 9.
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When authorities seek to search an individual, the nature and ex-
tent of this intrusion also must not exceed the bounds of the fourth
amendment's protection of an individual's privacy and dignity. The in-
dividual's privacy interest must be balanced against the state's interest
in obtaining the evidence. 7 However, a physical search of an individ-
ual's body has the potential of being much more intrusive than a prem-
ises search since an individual has a stronger expectation of privacy in
the integrity of his body because of its obvious private nature. Since the
expectation of privacy in the contents of one's body is greater than the
expectation of privacy in, for example, the contents of one's dresser
drawers, a mere showing that the evidence is present in the body is
often, by itself, insufficient to meet the reasonableness requirement of
the fourth amendment. Authorities must demonstrate a more compel-
ling need for the search than the mere fact that the evidence is present
in the person's body and that the state needs it. "The overriding func-
tion of the fourth amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State." s
When the state desires to search the human body, an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the official conduct begins with a determination
of the characteristics of the intrusion;9 more specifically, whether the
intrusion is an exterior or interior bodily intrusion.10 The evidence
sought may be on the body's surface, in body cavities, or actually
lodged inside the body."' Intrusions on the body's surface are exterior
intrusions, and include as examples scrapings of fingernails and skin, 2
and clippings of hair.'3 Exterior intrusions are traditionally considered
reasonable because of the very limited nature of the intrusion. The
state's need for the evidence outweighs the individual's privacy interest.
Interior intrusions are classified as intrusions into the body and include
the pinprick necessary for a blood alcohol test, 4 stomach pumping, 15
7. Elkin v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
8. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
9. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 4.1d) (1978).
10. See generally Eckhardt, Intrusion into the Body, 52 MIL. L. REV. 141
(1971).
11. Id. at 141.
12. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping of dried blood
from under fingernails).
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982) (hair samples from scalp and face).
14. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757.
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and the most interior of intrusions, surgery. 6 This note focuses on the
last of these three intrusions: the surgical search.
States which have considered the question of surgical searches dif-
fer over the reasonableness of the search, and selectively apply different
standards according to their own particular preferences. Because of
the highly invasive nature of surgical searches, a special set of stan-
dards is necessary to determine when such a procedure is a permissible
intrusion and, therefore, a reasonable search for fourth amendment
purposes.
Arguably, the standards utilized to determine the fourth amend-
ment reasonableness of a surgical search, until now, have been necessa-
rily fair and just standards and have provided a flexible, case-by-case
framework for the resolution of this issue. This note, however, advo-
cates the adoption of a bright-line standard, which modern medical
technology requires, to prevent the potential for serious abuse and the
threatened further erosion of the protections afforded an individual by
15. See, e.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
16. See, e.g., Crowder v. United States, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
17. At present, most jurisdictions follow the reasonableness standard set forth in
Schmerber in determining whether a surgical intrusion passes constitutional muster.
These jurisdictions, however, while adopting the general Schmerber approach, may
vary as far as determining the weight to be given to various factors used in balancing
the interests at stake. Some stress location of the evidence in the body as definitive.
Others stress a major/minor surgery distinction. Most jurisdictions take into account
time required for surgery, use of general anesthesia, whether the surgical candidate is
the defendant or a victim/witness, and the presence or absence of consent. See, e.g.,
State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982); State v. Maring, 404 So. 2d 960
(1981); People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978); and
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
In Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974), the Indiana Supreme Court held all surgical intrusions per se unconstitu-
tional under the fourth amendment. While the Supreme Court of Georgia also seemed
to endorse a per se rule, the surgical candidate involved was a witness to the crime and
not the defendant. State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978). Therefore, it
remains unresolved as to whether that court meant to adopt a per se rule in all surgical
intrusion cases, or only in those involving surgical searches of people other than the
defendant.
Also, in Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), affd, Winston v. Lee, 53
U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334), petitioners suggested that the respon-
dent wished the United States Supreme Court to apply a per se rule in that case. See
Brief for Petitioners at 9, Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), af/'d, Winston
v. Lee, No. 83-1334 (U.S. March 20, 1985).
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the fourth amendment. The previously employed case-by-case analysis
should be retained only in those few cases not encompassed by the
bright-line standard. Declaring all surgical searches requiring the use
of general anesthesia as unconstitutional per se is the appropriate
bright-line standard.
II. The Traditional Bounds of Permissible and Impermissible
Bodily Intrusions: Rochin v. California8 and Schmerber v.
California9
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court began to deline-
ate the boundaries of what constituted a reasonable search for constitu-
tional purposes. Rochin v. California and Schmerber v. California be-
came the endpoints for what was and was not permissible official
conduct regarding searches of the human body.
Rochin laid the foundation for what constituted impermissible
conduct. In Rochin, after gaining illegal entry to Rochin's home and
bedroom on information that Rochin was selling drugs, police officers
noticed two capsules on his bedside table.2" Rochin quickly grabbed the
pills and shoved them into his mouth 21 in an effort to prevent the police
from obtaining them as evidence against him. A violent struggle ensued
as the officers attempted to pry open the defendant's mouth to retrieve
the capsules. The attempt failed and Rochin swallowed the pills. The
officers then handcuffed Rochin, rushed him to a hospital, and ordered
a doctor, despite Rochin's resistance, to place a tube down the defen-
dant's throat and pump an emetic solution down the tube into Rochin's
stomach. 2 The emetic caused vomiting. The two capsules retrieved
from the vomitus were tested and found to contain morphine.23
The trial court admitted the capsules into evidence despite
Rochin's objection that the capsules were obtained in such an unortho-
dox manner. The pills were admitted into evidence even though the
unorthodox means of obtaining them was frankly set forth in the testi-
mony.24 The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and the Califor-
18. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
20. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
21. Id.
22. id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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nia Supreme Court, without opinion, denied Rochin's petition for a
hearing.25
The United States Supreme Court reversed Rochin's conviction.
Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court did not base the reversal on
fourth amendment grounds, 6 but on the grounds that the method of
obtaining the capsule from Rochin's stomach violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.27 The Court found that the official
conduct was so egregious as to make Rochin's trial fundamentally un-
fair. "This is conduct which shocks the conscience." 2 This course of
conduct is "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."2 9 The method
utilized was "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitu-
tional differentiation.""0 Rochin established the first standard. Conduct
which shocked the conscience, offended a sense of justice, and which
ran "counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct' "s became unrea-
sonable per se and, therefore, in violation of due process. Rochin repre-
sents conduct impermissible because it violates due process/fundamen-
tal fairness standards. Rochin's prohibition, however, applies only to
the most extreme and outrageous conduct.32
At the other end of the spectrum of reasonableness is Schmerber,
where the United States Supreme Court set the standard for what is
permissible official conduct under the fourth amendment. Schmerber
was involved in an automobile accident. While Schmerber received
25. Id. at 166, 167.
26. The Court did not consider whether this conduct would constitute an unrea-
sonable search under the fourth amendment because this case was decided prior to
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule of Weeks v.
U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914) to the states.
27. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. The Due Process Clause provides: "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.
28. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 175.
32. It is clear that the Rochin Court objected to the entire line of official con-
duct, and did not feel that it was the stomach pumping alone that was particularly
offensive. In fact, subsequent stomach pumping cases have been held to be reasonable
searches. See, e.g., Blefare, 362 F.2d at 870. The court distinguished this case from
Rochin on the fact that the search was a border search, where the state's interest in
obtaining the evidence is very high, and on the fact that the method used to administer
the emetic was not by forced pumping, as in Rochin, but was by a drip method often
used on children. See generally Note, Constitutionality of Stomach Searches, 10
U.S.F.L. REv. 93 (1975).
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treatment in a hospital for injuries sustained in the accident, police of-
ficers directed the attending physician to withdraw a blood sample
from Schmerber.3 3 The doctor withdrew the blood and a chemical anal-
ysis indicated Schmerber was intoxicated. 4 The blood analysis results
were admitted into evidence at trial over Schmerber's objection.35
Schmerber was convicted of driving under the influence and appealed
his non-jury conviction on four grounds. He claimed the introduction
into evidence of the blood alcohol test results: 1) denied him due pro-
cess of law under the fourteenth amendment; 36 2) violated his privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment;37 3) violated his
right to counsel under the sixth amendment;38 and 4) violated his right
33. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (1966).
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id. At trial, defendant's objection was based on the ground that the blood
had been withdrawn in spite of his refusal to consent to the test on the advice of his
counsel. The defendant felt-this non-consensual conduct violated his right to due pro-
cess of law under the fourteenth amendment. The Appellate Department of the Cali-
fornia Superior Court rejected this argument, as did the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
Quoting Justice Warren's dissent in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441
(1957), the Schmerber Court noted that it made no "difference whether one states
unequivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such
condition that he is unable to protest." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759. The defendant in
Breithaupt was unconscious at the time the blood was withdrawn, and argued a due
process violation based on his inability to object to the procedure. The Court rejected
Breithaupt's due process argument on the precedent of Rochin, stating that such with-
drawal of blood did not offend a sense of justice, in that it did not rise to the level of
the objectionable official conduct outlined in the Rochin case. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
In Schmerber, the Court rejected Schmerber's due process argument based on
Breithaupt and Rochin. The Court held the official conduct was simply not offensive
enough to be prohibited on the grounds found violative of due process standards in
Rochin. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760.
36. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
37. Id. The Court held that the defendant's fifth amendment rights had not been
violated since that amendment had never been interpreted broadly enough to cover this
conduct. The fifth amendment privilege extends only to testimonial or communicative
evidence. Since a blood test is not within these categories, fifth amendment rights do
not attach, and the Court rejected this ground for appeal. But cf. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973)(Marshall, J. dissenting) stating that fifth amend-
ment rights should attach beyond testimonial and communicative evidence to protect
the introduction of any evidence that the government needs a defendant's cooperation
to obtain.
38. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66. The argument that the defendant had been
denied a right to counsel was also rejected by the Court. Sixth amendment rights do
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not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment.39
The Court held that the blood test procedure involved in this case
did not constitute an unreasonable fourth amendment search. 40 The
Court characterized the pinprick necessary for a blood test as a minor
intrusion which the Court considered permissible when performed
under stringently limited conditions such as those present in the facts
of that case.41 Although the Court limited the holding to the facts of
the case, Schmerber, nonetheless, sets forth the factors it considers vital
to an analysis of whether a particular intrusion beneath the body's sur-
face is a reasonable search for fourth amendment purposes.
First, the Schmerber majority believes "[t]he interests in human
dignity and privacy which the fourth amendment protects forbid any
such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be ob-
tained. '42 Thus, the threshold determination when authorities seek an
unconsented surgical search is whether there is a clear indication be-
yond mere chance that the evidence sought will be found.43 This clear-
indication standard is another way of expressing the elements of proba-
ble cause. 4 Rather than expressing the traditional elements of probable
cause, the Court used the term "clear indication" because it wanted to
stress that the same facts used to meet probable cause for the arrest
should not automatically support an intrusive search of the body.45 In
Schmerber's case, for example, this clear indication was met based on
the smell of his breath and the general indication of intoxication from
his physical appearance. These facts were not the same facts used to
establish probable cause for his initial arrest. Once this clear indication
not attach until the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) defining the scope of the "critical stage of the prosecution," which
was held as the time when sixth amendment rights attached in United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
The majority held that sixth amendment rights had not attached at the time
Schmerber's blood was taken, since adversarial judicial proceedings had not as yet been
initiated. Therefore, since the defendant "was not entitled to assert the privilege, he has
no greater right because counsel erroneously advised him that he could assert it."
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766.
39. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
40. Id. at 772.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 769-70.
43. Id.
44. Eckhardt, supra note 9, at 150.
45. Id.
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was present, the circumstances of the search should be examined to
determine if it is fourth-amendment reasonable.
The Court outlined the factors it believed determinative of the rea-
sonableness of a search. These factors include: 1) whether the proce-
dure itself is reasonable, considering the extent of the procedure, and
taking into account the effectiveness and widespread use, if any, of the
procedure; 2) whether the performance of the procedure is done in a
reasonable manner; e.g., whether it is done by a physician in a hospital
environment according to accepted medical practices; and 3) whether
there is a virtual absence of risk, trauma, or pain for most persons.46
After setting forth these factors, the Schmerber Court emphasized that
its holding was limited to minor bodily intrusions under these strin-
gently limited conditions and gave no indication that it would permit
"more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
The blood test in Schmerber represents the least-invasive interior bod-
ily intrusion, and the Court's decision sets forth the factors determina-
tive of permissible fourth amendment conduct.48
Therefore, utilizing Rochin's standards for impermissible official
conduct at one end, and Schmerber's standards for permissible official
conduct at the other, one could logically envision these cases on a line
continuum of search behavior.49 At the far right end of the line is
Rochin. At the far left of the line is Schmerber. Somewhere in the
middle of the line is conduct which violates the fourth amendment as
an unreasonable search. All conduct so outrageous, by Rochin stan-
dards, that it is violative of due process, would also be violative of the
fourth amendment. All conduct conforming to Schmerber standards
would not be violative of either due process or the fourth amendment,
because it is considered a minor intrusion justified by necessity and is
therefore reasonable. In the middle of this behavior continuum is con-
46. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
47. Id. at 772.
48. Since Schmerber, blood alcohol tests are generally considered reasonable
searches under the fourth-amendment analysis. Therefore, several states have passed
statutes to provide more protection from bodily intrusions for blood samples. These so-
called implied consent statutes allow the police to take blood only upon the driver's
consent. Refusal to consent, however, will generally result in suspension of one's
driver's license. For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory issues involving
implied consent, exemplified by Florida's implied consent statute, see Dobson, Florida's
New "Drunk Driving" Laws: An Overview of Constitutional and Statutory Problems,
7 NOVA L.J. 179 (1983).
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duct which is more intrusive than that at issue in Schmerber and which
violates the fourth amendment, but yet does not rise to the level of a
Rochin "due process, fundamental fairness violation.
The conduct with which this note is concerned falls in the middle
of this continuum and concerns the most intrusive of bodily searches:
surgical searches. Most surgical searches arise when the state desires to
retrieve bullets from a criminal suspect's body which the state needs to
use as evidence against him.
III. The Bullet Cases
Courts which have considered cases questioning the permissibility
of court-ordered surgical searches for bullets have held such procedures
constitutionally permissible when justified under the circumstances and
when performed in the proper manner. 50 Extending the factors set forth
49.
Schmerber Surgical Searches Rochin
conduct violating neither the
fourth amendment nor due process
WIILE111
conduct violating the fourth
amendment but not violative of
due process
conduct violating the fourth
amendment and due process
50. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974);
United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
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by the foundation cases of Rochin and Schmerber, these courts have
considered three categories of criteria in determining the reasonable-
ness of surgical searches for bullets.
The first inquiry is forthright and usually easy to satisfy: whether
the evidence is relevant and "could have been obtained in no other way,
and whether there was probable cause to believe that the operation
would produce it."51 This consideration, set forth in United States v.
Crowder,52 is similar to the Schmerber requirement that there be a
clear indication the evidence sought will be found. 53 If this threshold
inquiry is not met, the fourth amendment analysis terminates. For if
the evidence is not relevant, or there is no probable cause to believe it
even exists, then the search for it would be unreasonable under the
fourth amendment since the fourth amendment was designed specifi-
cally with the intention of preventing all general searches based on offi-
cial curiosity alone.54
The one problem which may arise in this threshold-inquiry area is
that the bullet may have become unidentifiable due to deterioration
while in contact with bodily fluids. If deterioration occurs, then the bul-
let may not be used as evidence since identification of the caliber and,
thus, the source of the bullet is unreliable.55 Therefore, "[g]iven the
possibility that the bullet will be unidentifiable, it is not certain that
evidence will be found."'56 While the court in Lee v. Winston57 raised
the question, it simply stated that it was satisfied that in that case there
was a clear indication that evidence would be found, but did not elabo-
rate on its reasons for that satisfaction. In most cases, however, this
first inquiry can easily be addressed and resolved. For example, often x-
rays can determine with great accuracy whether the evidence certainly
exists and in what condition it is.
The second important inquiry in surgical-search bullet cases con-
cerns the location of the bullet. Location is not restricted to where the
bullet is located in the body; for example, the head, arm, leg, or chest.
(1977); State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982).
51. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316.
52. Id. at 312.
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
54. See generally L. WADDINGTON, supra note 3.
55. Winston v. Lee, 551 F. Supp. 247, 252 (E.D. Va. 1982). See also Lee, 717
F.2d at 888. An analysis of the length of time necessary for bullet deterioration and its
attendant questions is beyond the scope of this article.
56. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 252 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 247.
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The location inquiry determines how deeply within the area the bullet
rests and how near other structures, for example, nerves, organs, or
blood vessels, the bullet may lie.18 The position of the bullet within the
body often helps the court to categorize the surgery as either major or
minor, based on medical testimony.5 9
The third inquiry, which overlaps somewhat with the major/minor
surgery determination, concerns the procedure necessary to remove the
bullet. The courts elaborate upon the basic guidelines of Schmerber. In
addition to the guideline as to whether the surgery is performed "by a
physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices,' 60 courts consider the time needed to perform the surgery,6'
possible danger to the defendant's life or limb, 2 and the major surgery
versus minor surgery distinction.63 Inquiry includes whether a general
58. See, e.g., Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312 (surgical removal of bullet in defendant's
arm reasonable; from defendant's leg, unreasonable); Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291
S.E.2d at 459 (surgical removal of bullet in defendant Allen's left chest, less than one-
quarter inch below the skin is reasonable; surgical removal of bullet in defendant
Childer's left thoracic "gutter" unreasonable). See also State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d
505 (Mo. App. 1979) (surgery reasonable to obtain bullet four inches below skin since
there were no vital organs in that area). But see Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d
at 879 (surgical removal of bullet from defendant's spinal canal unreasonable); State v.
Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (1977)(surgical removal of bullet from buttocks
reasonable).
59. See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312; Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459;
Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 505; Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d at 879; Over-
street, 551 S.W.2d at 621.
60. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
61. See, e.g., Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459 (15 minutes indicative of
minor intrusion and thus reasonable); Creamer, 229 Ga. at 511, 192 S.E.2d at 350
(reasonable if surgery under local anesthesia and did not exceed 15 minutes).
62. See, e.g., Bowden, 256 Ark. at 822, 510 S.W.2d at 881. There was medical
testimony that fatal risk was involved with surgery. While doctors recommended re-
moval of the bullet for purposes of defendant's health, the court did not sanction re-
moval of the bullet as evidence since the risk of fatality from the procedure would
make the search unreasonable. The court did not address whether the bullet, obtained
by surgery for the defendant's health, could then be obtained from the doctors for use
as evidence at trial. See also Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459, 464. Even
though the court held Allen's surgery to be reasonable and thus ordered it to be per-
formed, the order also provided that if at any time during surgery "danger to the life of
Larry Ford Allen develops such removal procedures shall cease and such steps shall be
taken as may be necessary to protect the health and life of Larry Ford Allen." Id.
63. See, e.g., Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312 (operation minor and therefore reasona-
ble); Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d at 879 (major surgical intrusion into spinal
canal unreasonable).
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anesthesia or a local anesthesia is necessary.64 The three considerations
of certainty the evidence will be found, bullet location, and where the
surgery must be performed, taken together, arguably comprise a total-
ity of the circumstances approach to this fourth amendment analysis.
Using this totality of the circumstances approach on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and balancing all the factors affecting an individual's privacy inter-
ests in his own body, all courts considering surgical searches for bullets
have found these searches reasonable in all cases where the proposed
surgery falls within the "ambit of Schmerber"65 and within the factors
developed by "subsequent bullet-removal cases from other jurisdic-
tions."66 Most courts hold that "[tihe human body is not, of course, a
sanctuary in which evidence may be concealed with impunity. . . . Ap-
propriate procedures to retrieve such evidence are neither 'unreasona-
ble' per se under the fourth amendment, nor violations of 'due process'
procedures guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 67
In fact, only one court holds such surgical searches per se uncon-
stitutional.6 8 The defendant in Adams v. State69 sought to preclude the
surgical removal of bullet fragments from his buttocks. Despite the fact
that the surgery could be accomplished under local anesthesia, the In-
diana Supreme Court held, on the authority of Rochin, that any such
bodily intrusion constitutes a fourth amendment violation per se.7 0 Ar-
guably, however, the Court's reliance on Rochin is misplaced. It was
not the stomach pumping intrusion alone which violated Rochin's
rights, but the totality of the official misconduct. Rochin involved an
illegal entry of the home and an abusive struggle to open Rochin's
mouth in addition to the "forcible extraction of his stomach's
64. See, e.g., Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 247. The district court ordered surgery as
reasonable since it could be accomplished with local anesthesia. While the defendant
was being x-rayed in preparation for surgery, the location of the bullet was determined
to be deeper within the defendant's chest wall, thus necessitating the use of general
anesthesia. When presented with this new evidence, the court in a supplemental opinion
rescinded its order of surgery based on its belief that the changed circumstances neces-
sitating the use of general anesthesia now made the surgery unreasonable under the
fourth amendment. See also Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
65. Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 463.
66. Id.
67. People v. Scott, 21 Cal.3d 284, 293, 578 P.2d 123, 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876,
880 (1978).
68. See Adams, 260 Ind. at 663, 299 N.E.2d at 834. See also supra note 16.
69. Id.
70. Adams, 260 Ind. at 663, 299 N.E.2d at 834.
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contents.""'
An argument suggests 71 the Adams Court's reliance on Rochin
was also misplaced based on the fact that Rochin was a due process
case and not a fourth amendment case.73 However, since both due pro-
cess and fourth amendment analyses are used to measure official con-
duct, it is perfectly proper to invoke the Rochin standard when, as in
Adams, the Court is examining search behavior. The Indiana Supreme
Court is the only court in the nation to adopt a per se rule of unconsti-
tutionality regarding surgical searches. An argument rightly asserts
that, even assuming the Adams holding is valid, "this single case
hardly constitutes a 'line' of authority. '74 Arguably, however, it is not a
line of authority that is needed in order for a per se rule to be a viable
tool in determining the reasonableness of search conduct. What is
needed, instead, is a correct authority. As set forth above, it appears
that reliance on Rochin under the Adams facts is misplaced and that
Adams is not the correct authority that is needed. But this is not, as
petitioners suggest, because Rochin was decided on due process
grounds and Adams is a fourth amendment case, but instead because
the Adams Court misapprehended the reason for the due process viola-
tion. Due process was not violated on the search intrusion alone, but by
the totality of the misconduct engaged in by the Rochin officers. There-
fore, holding the Adams search alone per se violative of due process,
without more, is not a proper conclusion to be drawn from the facts of
Rochin. The holding of Adams appears to be aberrant and not a con-
clusive test of this issue by any means.
It is, therefore, apparent that the analysis presently utilized to de-
termine the fourth-amendment reasonableness of surgical searches for
bullets consists of a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach. In applying this approach, the courts rely on a consideration of
the factors developed by Schmerber and elaborated upon by the subse-
quent bullet removal cases.
IV. Winston v. Lee: The Fourth Amendment's Protective
Door Left Ajar
With improved medical technology, the validity and usefulness of
71. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
72. Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d at 888.
73. Brief for Petitioners at 10-I1, Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
74. Brief for Respondents at 15, Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
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these traditional standards as a means of measuring constitutionally
reasonable conduct for fourth amendment purposes has come into ques-
tion. The most recent surgical search case to be decided by the United
States Supreme Court in the light of the above factors is Winston v.
Lee.75 The Court heard oral argument,7" and recently rendered an
opinion that court ordered surgical removal of the bullet imbedded in
Mr. Lee's chest would violate the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.77 By so holding, the Court
halted the attack on Mr. Lee's fourth amendment protection against an
unreasonable search. However, by failing to adopt a bright-line stan-
dard, the Court, though well intentioned, has left future defendants'
fourth amendment protections vulnerable.
A proprietor of a market shot defendant Lee in the left side of the
chest when he saw Lee approach with a gun in his hand. 78 Lee shot the
proprietor in the leg. The two men were transported separately to the
hospital for treatment, where the proprietor identified Lee as the man
who shot him. 79
Lee was charged with four felony counts and the Commonwealth
attorney for the City of Richmond filed a motion to compel the surgical
removal of the bullet from Lee's chest. Lee refused to undergo the sur-
gery voluntarily.80 Hearings to determine the reasonableness of the pro-
posed court ordered surgery were held in the state circuit court. Based
on testimony that the bullet was 0.5 centimeters below the skin, that
local anesthesia could be used, and that there was little risk of harm or
injury to the defendant, the court found this surgery reasonable, but
stayed the performance of the surgery pending appellate review of the
order.8' Lee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a writ of
prohibition with the Supreme Court of Virginia, which summarily de-
nied the writs.82 After exhausting his state remedies, Lee petitioned the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for
habeas corpus relief. The defendant again raised the issue that compel-
ling this surgery would violate his rights under the fourth amend-
75. 53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334).
76. The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on October 31,
1984.
77. Winston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334).
78. Lee, 717 F.2d at 890.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 890-91.
82. Id. at 891.
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ment.83 After hearing evidence of the shallow bullet location and the
virtual lack of risk to the defendant under local anesthesia, the district
court authorized the surgery to proceed.84
Pre-surgical x-rays, however, indicated the bullet was in a deeper
position in the chest wall than originally believed. The bullet was ap-
proximately 2.5 to 3.0 centimeters below the skin's surface.8 5 With this
new information, Lee petitioned for rehearing due to changed circum-
stances. Medical testimony indicated, in addition to the newly estab-
lished depth of the bullet, that the bullet was imbedded in muscle tis-
sue and that the more extensive surgery necessary to remove the bullet
would require general anesthesia.86 In a supplemental opinion, the dis-
trict court, after reviewing this evidence in the light of Rochin,
Schmerber, and their progeny, rescinded its order of surgery and per-
manently enjoined the procedure.8 7 The court held that this procedure
went "far beyond the prick of a needle in Schmerber, the slight intru-
sion in Crowder, and the minor procedure originally supposed to be
required in this matter." ' The district court did not identify any single
element of the proposed procedure as the linchpin of its determination
that this intrusion would be unreasonable, but said that "the fact that
general anesthesia is involved is very important to the Court's [sic] con-
clusion that the procedure shocks the conscience."89 In emphasizing
that such a procedure as the surgery contemplated here could not be
said to involve "virtually no . . . trauma" 90 by Schmerber standards,
the court stated that it was "appalled at the prospect of government
authorities rendering a person unconscious, cutting him open, and prob-
ing around inside his body for evidence which might, or indeed might
not, aid them in convicting him of a crime."91
The state appealed this reversal to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals9" which affirmed the district court's holding that surgery
would violate Lee's fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
83. Id.
84. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 247.
85. Id. at 259.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 261.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
91. Id. at 261.
92. Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
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searches.93 The Fourth Circuit, stating that "fourth amendment ques-
tions are peculiarly fact-specific," 9 4 indicated that there was a sufficient
body of case law on the specific facts peculiar to bullet removal from
which the court could draw guidance as to a general principle.9 5 The
Fourth Circuit believed that the general principle to be utilized was
that once the state has shown the evidence is relevant and can be ob-
tained in no other way, "the reasonableness of removing it forcibly
from a person's body is judged by the extent of the surgical intrusion
and the extent of the risks to the subject."96 In adopting this principle,
the Fourth Circuit utilized the test applied in the majority of surgical
search cases; arguably the totality of the circumstances approach.
Since this surgery was not medically necessary to the patient's health,
and involved general anesthesia and a more invasive procedure than
originally thought, Lee's risk of pain, trauma, and injury, was in-
creased. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held it was not surgically rea-
sonable and, therefore, not constitutionally reasonable.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,9 7 the petition-
ers in Winston v. Lee argued that the proposed surgery was constitu-
tionally reasonable. Petitioners state that it is "very common in the
1980's to place patients under general anesthesia." 98 Citing the increas-
ing incidence of outpatient surgical procedures using general anesthe-
sia, petitioners suggested that surgery under general anesthesia has
risen to the routine-procedure status of the Schmerber blood alcohol
test. Stressing the doctor's preference that an uncooperative surgical
candidate be rendered unconscious through general anesthesia, 99 the
state analogized the substantial risk of this major surgical procedure to,
what they termed, the substantial risk involved in "waking up, getting
dressed and eating breakfast in the morning." ' It can be inferred
from this argument that the state believed the district court's concern
over the forced use of general anesthesia to render a person uncon-
scious, cut him open, and probe around in his body was an antiquated
concern, no longer reasonable in the enlightened technology of 1984.
"In the 20th century, with the modern medical advances that have
93. Id. at 901.
94. Id. at 899.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Writ of certiorari was granted April 16, 1984.
98. Supra note 70, at 16.
99. Id. at 16, 17.
100. Id. at 17.
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been made, this surgery is not unreasonable at all."' 1
The respondent referred to petitioners' "marvels of modern sci-
ence'''2 as "claims made without reference to the record or to any
legal, medical, or scientific literature.' 10 3 Referring to the dissent ren-
dered in the court below, the respondent characterized this surgical
search as an assault on the body and dignity of Mr. Lee,104 and urged
the Court not to be the first to authorize a surgical search which would
require general anesthesia. 05
The record of Winston indicates that it would be difficult to satisfy
even the threshold inquiry utilized by several previous surgical search
cases involving bullets; i.e., whether the evidence is relevant, and
"could have been obtained in no other way.' 0 6 Lee did not share the
district court's conviction that there was a clear indication the evidence
would be found,'0 7 nor that it would then meet the relevance test. In
addition to a concern that the bullet might be unidentifiable because of
the effect of bodily fluids upon it, Lee was concerned that there was a
probability the specimen would be useless, because there would be
nothing to compare it with, 08 since the proprietor's gun would not be
capable of refirings.' 0 9 If proven true, these facts suggest the bullet
would not be admissible as relevant evidence even if obtained.
Even assuming the bullet is identifiable, and therefore relevant evi-
dence, Lee asserted this evidence could be obtained and demonstrated
by the use of x-rays and medical testimony, and that he could be iden-
tified through the testimony of the proprietor of the market. This argu-
ment by Lee seems to negate compliance with the requirement that the
evidence could be obtained in no other way. Since a showing of the
evidence's relevance, in addition to a showing that the evidence can be
obtained in no other way, is a threshold requirement which must be
met before further analysis of the factors concerning bullet location
and surgical procedure is undertaken, it appears that this surgical
search would not be considered a reasonable one under the precedents
101. See Reaves, Bullet Battle, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1984, at 28 (quoting petitioners'
attorney Stacy Garrett).
102. Supra note 71, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id.
106. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316.
107. See supra note 53.
108. Supra note 71, at 7.
109. Id.
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of fourth amendment case law.
Even assuming, arguendo, the desired Winston surgical search met
the first inquiry, the location of the bullet imbedded in the muscle tis-
sue, and the extent of the procedure necessitating the use of general
anesthesia, in themselves, fall outside previous parameters of reasona-
ble surgical searches. For the Supreme Court to hold this surgery rea-
sonable would have necessitated a radical extension of the standards set
forth in prior case law, opening the door to a new era resulting in the
further erosion of rights protected by the fourth amendment. Thus, the
Supreme Court's holding is sound in Mr. Lee's case, but the danger to
others' fourth amendment rights continues. Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only. 110 From this, it can be rea-
sonably inferred that at least two members of the Court feel the major-
ity's opinion is lacking a complete resolution, even though the correct
result was reached.
Arguably, the Court applied a 1966 Schmerber balancing ap-
proach"' to a 1985 Orwellian case. The danger in using Schmerber lies
in the unaddressed possibilities of the future. The pending question af-
ter Winston is whether any surgical search requiring general anesthesia
will be fourth-amendment reasonable as soon as some state convinces
the Court it is as routine in, for example, 1990 as the Schmerber blood
test was in 1966. This analysis ignores the vast difference between the
minor intrusion of a needle stick versus a major intrusion several inches
into the chest wall. In fact, the Court states such a minor/major char-
acterization is not controlling in their view." 2
Arguably, Schmerber's case-by-case approach is inadequate.
While the totality-of-the-circumstances and the balancing-the-factors
approaches have served the interests of justice over the last thirty
years, technology has advanced to a point where it can too easily stack
those factors against the individual's interest in the sanctity of his per-
son. The case law must move with the decades. Therefore, arguably,
the Court should have drawn a bright-line standard saying, in effect,
"beyond this point, you shall not go."
V. A Proposed Chalkline
While a totality-of-the-circumstances approach has worked well in
110. Winston, - U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985).
111. Id. at9.
112. Id. at 10-11 n.99.
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the past, Winston v. Lee demonstrated the fact that this test is hard to
apply in the shadows of developing technology. Even while signaling a
need for a more structured framework for the analysis of these delicate
fourth amendment searches, Winston, itself, suggested where the courts
can draw the first line of that framework. While the district court was
hesitant to cite a single factor as controlling its belief that the surgery
involved was unreasonable, 113 it still acknowledged that the use of gen-
eral anesthesia was important to its decision.
General anesthesia is a logical, just and fair place to draw a line
limiting the state's intrusion inside the human body. It is also a suffi-
ciently flexible standard. For example, if the surgery is elective, courts
can draw the line at general anesthesia and hold all procedures requir-
ing it constitutionally unreasonable. If, however, the surgery is neces-
sary to the health of the defendant, such that the surgery would be
required anyway, a court could allow the use of the evidence obtained
from this surgery since the general anesthesia was necessary for the
surgery, not the search.
An unreasonable search is characterized as one violative of the
sanctity, dignity, and privacy of the human body." 4 What could be
more violative of that sanctity than the restraint and control exercised
by rendering one's conscious mind inactive and ransacking through the
body in search of evidence to be used against one, should one survive
the procedure itself? The potential for abuse is vast. For if we justify
bodily searches involving general anesthesia on the basis of our techno-
logical advances, we must inevitably justify a search of one's mind
whenever our technology reaches that level of sophistication-only on
probable cause, of course.
The Framers of the fourth amendment did not have the resources
to foresee the possibilities inherent in the general language of the
amendment they drafted. But our jurisprudence and science fiction
make us better soothsayers. In order to prevent the abuses within our
technological grasp, it makes sense to draw the line at general anesthe-
sia and say, "beyond this point, you shall not go."
VI. Conclusion
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the sanctity of the individual from unreasonable searches and seizures.
113. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 261.
114. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
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The surgical search of the human body is the most intrusive search
possible. While traditionally case law has balanced the totality of the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine the reasonableness
of a surgical search, technology is forcing the courts to structure more
carefully a framework for this delicate fourth amendment analysis in
order to prevent the potential abuses inherent in runaway jurispru-
dence. A special standard is necessary to test a particular surgical
search for constitutional reasonableness. A rational, workable, special
standard is a simple bright-line rule. An intrusion requiring the use of
general anesthesia should be held per se constitutionally unreasonable
absent a special, clear showing that general anesthesia was necessary
for the defendant's health or life, and not necessary for the surgical
search alone. Only by such a bright-line rule can the potential for seri-
ous abuse be curtailed and the further erosion of fourth amendment
rights be halted.
Robin S. Richards
[Vol. 9
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss2/4
Problems of Convicting a Husband for the Rape of
his Wife
I. Introduction ............................... 351
II. History of the Marital Exemption; Myths and
Policies ................................... 353
III. Florida's Sexual Battery Statute and Florida
Cases: Obtaining Convictions for Marital Rape 357
A. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(3) - Life
Felony ............................... 358
B. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(4)(a), (b),
(c)-Felony of the First Degree ......... 360
C. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(5)-
Felony of the Second Degree ............ 364
D. Florida Statutes Section 794.022-Rape
Shield ............................... 365
E. Resistance ............................ 369
IV. Attitudes of Victims, Police, Prosecutors, Judges
and Jurors: Impact on Marital Rape Convictions 370
A. Victim Awareness and Cooperation ....... 371
B. Police Assistance ...................... 374
C. Prosecutor Discretion ................... 375
D. Attitude of the Bench .................. 376
E. The Jury ............................. 379
V. Conclusion ................................ 380
I. Introduction
Society has recognized family violence as a pervasive and serious
problem requiring intervention by the criminal justice system. One
form of family violence is marital rape, which is both brutal and de-
grading. Suprisingly, marital rape has not received much public atten-
tion even though it occurs with alarming frequency. Reportedly, one
out of seven women "who has ever been married, has been raped by a
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husband at least once, and sometimes many times over many years."1
Despite the frequency and seriousness 2 of marital rape, only seven
states have totally abolished the marital rape exemption for husbands.3
1. D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 2 (1982). This statement is based on a ran-
dom sample of 930 women and generalized to the population at large.
2. Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecutions, 7 VER-
MONT L. REV. 33, 46 (1983). "Rape crisis center counselors have claimed that some of
the most seriously injured women, particularly in injuries to vaginal walls, are raped
spouses." Id.
3. The marital exemption has been completely abolished in Florida, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. §
794.011 (1983 and Supp. 1984), (State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review
denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (1984) appeal dismissed, Rider v. Florida, 53 U.S.L.W. 3686
(U.S. March 26, 1985)(No.84-6164); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West
Supp. 1983), Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319, 28-320 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c: 14-5(b)(1982); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1983);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6)(West Supp. 1983-1984).
Thirty-five states have retained the exemption in some instances, depending on
whether spouses have separated, are living apart, have filed a petition for annulment,
divorce or separate maintenance or for third degree sexual abuse, etc.: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming. See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.445(a) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1407.D (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1801, 41-1802, 41-
1803, 41-1804 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53a-65, 53a-67 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763, 764 (1979 &
Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730, 707-731, 707-732 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6107 (1979 & Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-12, 12-13, 12-14,
12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18(c) (Smith Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-4-1(b) (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502, 21-3517, 21-3518 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.010(3)(B) (Bobbs-Merrill 1975 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:41 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 252.2, 253 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (1982); MICH. Comp. LAWS. ANN.
§ 750.5201 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1984);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.010, 566.030 (Vernon
1979 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. §
200.373 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2, 632-A:3, 632-A:5 (Supp. 1983)
(exemption retained in statutory rape and cases of mentally defective victim-wives);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.8 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN §
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In these seven states, however, even though a husband can be prose-
cuted if he rapes his wife, many obstacles to obtaining a conviction
remain.
The purpose of this note is to give practitioners and judges insight
into the problems of obtaining convictions for marital rape. The note
begins with a discussion of the background of the marital rape exemp-
tion for husbands. The historical background aids in understanding the
effect of Florida's Sexual Battery Statute4 and corresponding case law
on convictions. Finally, the note explores the attitudes of victims, po-
lice, prosecutors, judges and juries to determine their respective impact
on convictions for marital rape.
II. History of the Marital Rape Exemption; Myths and
Policies
Many states have embraced as part of their common law and
eventually within their statutes the notion that a husband cannot be
prosecuted for raping his wife. The exemption for husbands is credited
to Sir Matthew Hale, who proposed the idea in a treatise he wrote in
1736. 5 Hale, however, did not base his proposition on case law or any
2907.01L (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 3103, 3121 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN § 39-2-610 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1982),
Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984), Kiser v. Common-
wealth, - Va. -, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 9A.44.010
(Supp. 1984-1985); WYO. STAT. ANN §§ 6-2-301, 6-2-302, 6-2-306, 6-2-307 (1983).
California and West Virginia have a separate statute for marital rape. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (Deerings Supp. 1984) (requires 90 day reporting period); W.VA.
CODE § 61-8B-6 (Supp. 1984) (cohabitors are exempt).
Alabama, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Vermont completely adhere to
the marital exemption. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(4), 13A-6-61 (1975 & Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (1984)(retains common-law definition, requiring car-
nal knowledge); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1983-1984); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 13 § 3252 (Supp. 1984).
The District of Columbia statute is silent as to the exemption. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-2801 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 794 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
5. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 629 (1736)("[T]he
hu[s]band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by him[s]elf upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial con[s]ent and contract the wife hath given up her[s]elf in
this kind unto her hu[s]band, which [s]he cannot retract").
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other cited authority.6 Therefore, the doctrine is without significant le-
gal underpinnings7 and is not technically a part of the common law.
Despite this shaky legal foundation, the exemption for husbands exists
in some form in most jurisdictions today8 and reflects many of the same
myths, fears and policies which prompted Sir Matthew Hale to propose
the exemption in his eighteenth century treatise.
Several myths concerning the relationship of husband and wife
and the role of women have created obstacles in prosecuting a husband
for the rape of his wife.9 The marital exemption is partially based on
the misguided belief that a wife consents to intercourse in marriage and
this consent is irrevocable. 10 Another foundation for the marital exemp-
tion is the old legal fiction that a husband and wife are one person and
the husband is that person." This single-being theory makes it impossi-
ble for a husband to be legally sanctioned for the rape of his wife since
he cannot be prosecuted for raping himself.'2 The exemption also stems
from the antiquated notion that women are property, 3 and that a hus-
band can, therefore, treat his wife any way he pleases. Another myth is
the belief that a woman must actively resist the rape in order for the
act to be considered non-consensual.14 Still another prevalent fallacy is
that if a woman has had prior sexual experience, she has probably con-
sented to the present act of rape.' 5 Finally, there is the suspicion that
women often bring rape charges which are unfounded.'" These myths
have a sometimes subtle, sometimes clear impact on the decision to
report marital rape, police inaction to the reports, discretion of the
6. Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904.
7. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 200, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981).
8. See supra note 3 for a review of the states which cling to the proposition in
various instances.
9. Note, Marital Rape in California: For Better or for Worse, 8 SAN. FERN. V.L.
REV. 239, 242-250 (1980).
10. Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of
Privacy, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 717, 721 (1981).
11. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J.
FAM. L. 565, 569 (1980).
12. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 27 Loy. L. REv. 597, 599 (1981).
13. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1128.
14. Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement
from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 567, 568-70 (1983).
15. See generally Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again- A Legal
Fallacy in Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1976).
16. Note, The Victim of a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 335, 336 (1973).
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prosecutor to prosecute, judges' rulings, and jury decisions.
Many states have introduced rape shield statutes17 in an attempt
to protect all rape victims from the myths which tend to make them the
victims of the criminal justice system as well as the victims of rape.
Unfortunately, rape shield statutes do not always accomplish this goal.
Some states have rape shield statutes which may require victim resis-
tance or corroboration of the rape, or authorize jury instructions which
insinuate the victim may not be telling the truth"8 or permit the admis-
sion of the victim's prior sexual conduct into evidence to prove consent.
These three statutory requirements provide a thin shield. The resistance
requirement is based on the myth that a truly chaste woman would
"resist to the utmost""9 to protect her honor. However, because resis-
tance can be fatal and because the victim's common and automatic
17. The following rape shield statutes deal with the admissibility of evidence of
prior sexual conduct: ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045
(1980); ARK. STAT. ANN § 41-1810.1, .2, .4 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAL. EvID. CODE §
1103 (Deering 1967 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978 & Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86F (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509
(1979); FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1983); GA. CODE ANN § 24-2-3 (1982 & Supp. 1984);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626 R.412 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979 & Supp.
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE Ann. §
35-37-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1984); IowA CODE ANN. R.412 (West Supp. 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 510.145 (Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984); MD. ANN.
CODE. art. 27, § 461A (1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.233, § 21B
(West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5)
(1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-321 to 323 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1981);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A: 84A-32.1 to .2
(West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (PAGE 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ch 18, §
3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp.
1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020. (West Supp. 1984);W.VA. CODE [[ 61-6B-11
(Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) (Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983).
18. See generally Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of
Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973).
19. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 568-70.
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reaction is to freeze rather than fight back,20 states with the resistance
requirement may be promoting more harm than good. The basis for the
corroboration requirement is Sir Matthew Hale's proposition that a
charge of rape is easily made and hard to defend.21 The judge's cau-
tionary instructions to the jury to consider the "weight and quality"22
of the evidence presented by the victim is based on the same rationale.
These instructions tend to plant in the juror's mind the notion that the
victim's credibility should be examined more carefully in a rape case
than in other types of cases.2a Finally, evidence of prior sexual conduct
is sometimes admitted to imply that if "she consented once, she con-
sented again."2 Admission of this evidence in marital rape cases makes
prosecution especially difficult since there will almost always have been
prior consensual sexual relations. The element of consent is perhaps the
most critical issue in a case of rape. Prior sexual conduct and evidence
of general reputation, if admitted, may also impact on the credibility of
the victim. 25
In addition to the many myths, the marital exemption rests on the
fear that women will falsely charge their husbands with rape in retalia-
tion for a perceived wrong.26 This fear creates an apprehension that
removing the exemption will open the floodgates of litigation, and
courts will be unable to handle the onslaught.2 An additional justifica-
tion for the exemption is the belief that the fear and humiliation exper-
ienced by a victim of spousal rape is not as great as the fear and humil-
iation experienced by a victim who is raped by a stranger.2 8
Finally, there are two underlying policy rationales that impact on
the marital exemption and the problems of proof. First is the belief that
states should not interfere with the "sanctity of marriage".29 The argu-
ment is that the state should foster family unity and not aid in divorce,
20. Id. at 576-82.
21. Hale, supra note 5, § 635. See also Note, Rape Reform Legislation and
Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 955, 973 (1983).
22. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1)(1975)(amended in 1983 to delete the cautionary
instruction).
23. Note, supra note 21, at 973.
24. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 127.
25. Id. at 132.
26. Note, supra note 12, at 600. See also Pracher, supra note 10, at 732-37.
27. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 52.
28. Id. at 45-46. See also Harmon, Consent, Harm and Marital Rape, 22 J.
FAM. L. 423, 432 (1983-1984).
29. See Note, supra note 12, at 603.
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since if a wife charges her husband with rape, the marriage will be
likely over with little chance for reconciliation. 30 The second policy be-
hind the exemption is the idea that proving a case of marital rape is
next to impossible, 31 and that, the exemption for husbands is realistic
and should, therefore, continue.
III. Florida's Sexual Battery Statute and Florida Cases: Ob-
taining Convictions for Marital Rape
Florida's present Sexual Battery Statute, section 794 of the Flor-
ida statutes32 was enacted in 1974 and makes no mention of spousal
immunity. Prior to 1974, Florida's rape statute3 reflected the common-
law myths and notions about rape. The earlier statute provided that a
person was guilty of rape if he "unlawfully ravished and carnally"'"
knew another. Since carnal knowledge of one's wife was considered
lawful under the old statute, husbands were exempt from prosecution
for raping their wives.35 One early interpretation of the present statute,
Florida Statute section 794, was that because the marital exemption
was not mentioned, there was still a common law exception for hus-
bands.36 Between 1974 and 1980, there were no reported cases involv-
ing marital rape which tested the present Florida Statutes section 794
to determine if it included a spousal exemption. However, since 1981
two cases have held that there is no interspousal exemption excluding a
husband from prosecution for the sexual battery of his wife.37 Although
the Florida Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have recognized
30. Id. at 602. See also Note, supra note 9, at 246; People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984)(the court rejected this argument as
lacking a rational basis in an equal protection challenge).
31. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48-51; See also People v. Brown, - Colo..,
632 P.2d 1025 (1981)(asserting problems of proof in marital rape which justify statu-
tory exclusion of husbands from prosecution).
32. FLA. STAT. §§ 794.011-.05 (1974).
33. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1973).
34. Id.
35. See Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias
Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 419, 429 (1978).
36. Id.
37. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127 (there is no common-law exemption in a factual
situation where the couple were separated, had filed for a divorce and a restraining
order was issued); Rider, 449 So. 2d. at 904 (holds that there is no interspousal exemp-
tion in a factual situation where the couple was living together and no separation had
occurred.)
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that husbands can be prosecuted for spousal rape,38 Florida Statutes
section 794, nonetheless, inherently retains some of the myths about
rape which may limit convictions. The statute recognizes four levels of
severity, and the punishment reflects the age of the victim and the de-
gree of force used. 39 Subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 794.01140
are particularly relevant to marital rape.4 1
A. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(3)-Life Felony
A husband who is convicted of sexual battery upon his wife under
Florida Statutes section 794.011(3) is guilty of a life felony. 2 Section
794.011(3) requires lack of consent and the use of a deadly weapon, or
the use of actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury. 3
Serious personal injury is defined as "great bodily harm or pain, per-
manent disability, or permanent disfigurement. ' 44 Because of the his-
tory of prior consensual sexual relations in a marriage, the prosecutor
may not be induced to bring charges against a husband unless the se-
verity of violence required by Florida Statutes section 794.011(3) ex-
ists. 45 Police will more likely make an arrest in marital disputes where
there are serious injuries;46 however, since the punishment involved
may be life imprisonment, the jury will examine both the victim and
38. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127; Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904.
39. Note, supra note 35, at 422.
40. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(3), (4), (5) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
41. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (Supp. 1984) will not be discussed since it addresses
sexual battery of a person twelve years old or younger, and is therefore not applicable
to marital rape.
42. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(a) (1983) states:
For a life felony committed prior to Oct 1, 1983, by a term of imprison-
ment for life, or a term of years, not less than 30; and for a life felony
committed on or after Oct 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life, or a
term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.
See also FLA. STAT. 775.083(I)(a) (1983)(indicating there may also be a fine of fifteen
thousand dollars) and FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1983)(providing for imposition of an ex-
tended term based on the accused's prior record).
43. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(3) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
44. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1)(g) (Supp. 1984).
45. L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981). See also News/Sun Sentinel, Sept. 1, 1984, at Al, col. 1
(William Rider was found guilty of raping his wife after he beat her, bound her to the
bed with duct tape, and raped her. She required hospital treatment.).
46. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 26.
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her testimony very closely.' 7 Even in a violent situation, the jury will
usually acquit the accused when he and the victim have had a prior
sexual relationship."8 Therefore, while the existence of physical violence
evidenced by severe physical injury to the victim is likely to result in
police action on the reported incident, and prosecution by prosecutors,49
the jury may still fail to convict the husband either because of the prior
sexual relationship,50 or the severity of the punishment, or both.51
Convictions are also unlikely under the portion of Florida Statute
section 794.011(3) which provides for a life felony for the threatened
use of a deadly weapon without serious personal injury. The jury may
decide that the lack of severe personal injury does not warrant a con-
viction when the penalty is so severe,52 and, therefore, may acquit the
defendant.5 3 As a compromise, even though the attack may meet the
requirements of section 794.011(3), the jury may be inclined to convict
a husband on a lesser included offense or on an alternate charge be-
cause the punishment will be less severe.5 ' In order to be assured of
convicting on a lesser included offense or alternate charge, the prosecu-
tor must object to jury instructions which do not instruct on appropri-
ate lesser included offenses.5  Also, the prosecutor must plead on alter-
native grounds in some instances because some sections of the statute
which provide lesser penalties are not necessarily lesser included of-
fenses, unless they contain all the elements of the more serious of-
fense.5 6 An offense that is not a lesser included offense must be "spelled
out in the accusatory pleading. '57
47. Schwartz & Clear, Towards a New Law on Rape, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 129,
134 (1980).
48. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 251 (1966).
49. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 39.
50. H KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48.
51. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48.
54. Findlay, The Cultural Context of Rape, 60 WOMAN L.J. 199, 205 (1974).
55. See Davenport v. State, 429 So. 2d, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
where the court found that failure "to instruct the jury as requested on battery as an
appropriate lesser included offense of sexual battery, was per se reversible error". Id. at
1353-54.
56. See, e.g., Bragg v. State, 433 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983)("[s]exual battery using slight force is not a necessarily included offense of sexual
battery under subsection (3), when the defendant is charged with the use or threatened
use of a deadly weapon").
57.Id.
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B. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(4)(a), (b), (c)-Felony of
the First Degree
A felony of the first degree58 will result if the husband is convicted
of any of the listed offenses in section 794.011(4). Three subsections of
794.011(4) are relevant to marital sexual battery.59  Section
794.011(4)(a) permits a conviction for sexual battery "[w]hen the vic-
tim is physically helpless to resist."' 0 The phrase "physically helpless to
resist" is defined as sexual battery against a person who is "uncon-
scious, asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to communi-
cate unwillingness to an act."61
According to one theory, however, a husband's intercourse with his
wife who is physically helpless to resist is not the type of violence that
truly represents marital rape.6 2 This permissive-license theory is based
on the idea that in marriage there exists permissive consent to inter-
course, having characteristics of a license. 63 The license is not revoked
until an objection is made."4 In the case of a wife who is sleeping, un-
conscious or physically unable to communicate unwillingness to inter-
course, the permissive-license of consent to sexual relations has not
been revoked. 5 Without revocation there is no sexual battery because
the wife has in effect consented, and sexual battery, of course, requires
a lack of consent by the victim. 6 Permissive-license theorists believe
that reforms such as the "physically helpless to resist"6 7 subsection of
the Florida statute do not apply in marital rape cases and detract from
the seriousness of what they perceive as real marital rape, which is a
violent crime.68 However, under the permissive-license theory, Florida
Statutes section 794.011(4)(a) is applicable in non-marital situations,
58. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b) (1983) which provides for a penalty of im-
prisonment not to exceed thirty years. See also FLA. STAT. § 775.083 (1)(b) (1983)
indicating that a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars may also be required. FLA.
STAT. § 775.084(4)(a)(1) (1983) provides a life sentence for a "habitual offender".
59.FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a), (b), (c) (1983 & Supp. 1984)
60. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984)
61. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(e) (Supp. 1984).
62. Harmon, supra note 28, at 429.
63. Id. at 434.
64. Id. at 435.
65. Id. at 437.
66. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
67. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
68. Harmon, supra note 28, at 429.
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since there is not a permissive license of consent to intercourse.69
Despite the existence of the permissive-license theory, one may ar-
gue that section 794.011(4)(a) does apply in marital rape cases. The
defense of consent in any rape case requires that the consent be "intel-
ligent, knowing, and voluntary. ' 70 One cannot give intelligent, knowing,
and voluntary consent when asleep. Common sense, however, indicates
that intercourse while a wife is sleeping, without more, will not in all
likelihood motivate a jury to convict for this first degree felony. As in-
dicated, juries are reluctant to convict when there is a prior relation-
ship, even with evidence of violence.7 1 For these reasons, the hyperbolic
conclusion is that unless the wife is in a coma and the husband repeat-
edly rapes his wife in the presence of witnesses, a violation of section
794.011 (4)(a) will not likely result in a conviction.
Two other subsections of section 794.011(4) deal with threats of
violence. These subsections proscribe perhaps the most common sexual
batteries between husbands and wives. Subsection 794.011(4)(b) pro-
vides a first degree felony penalty when an "offender coerces the victim
to submit by threatening to use force or violence likely to cause serious
personal injury on the victim and the victim reasonably believes that
the offender has the present ability to execute the threats. ' 72 Subsec-
tion (c) provides the same first degree penalty if the offender threatens
"to retaliate against the victim or any other person, and the victim rea-
sonably believes that the offender has the ability to execute the threats
in the future. '7 3 Retaliation "includes, but is not limited to, threats of
future physical punishment. . .. "74 Studies have shown that more
than one-third of battered women have been raped by their husbands.7 5
"Women may accede to sexual intercourse with their husbands to avoid
being battered. . . . [s]ome husbands regard a wife's refusal of sexual
intercourse as grounds for beating or intimidation. ' 76 Therefore, bat-
tery or the threat of battery against wives by their husbands often in-
69. Id. at 438.
70. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
71. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 251.
72. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
73. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
74. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1)(f) (Supp. 1984).
75. Findelhor & Yllo, Forced Sex in Marriage: A Preliminary Research Report,
28 CRINIE & DELINQ. 459, 460 (1982)(citing studies made by Spektor, Giles-Sims, and
Pagelow).
76. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife; Who[m] Can You Rape?"
The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAm. L.Q. 1, 5 (1981).
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cludes sexual battery."'
Evidence presented by a wife at trial that she suffered from bat-
tered wife syndrome7 8 would be useful to support her claim of sexual
battery under Florida Statutes section 794.011(4), subsections (b) and
(c).11 A spouse who remains in a situation where she has been physi-
cally abused more than once is referred to as a battered wife. 80 The
battering episodes usually run in cycles, with three distinct stages."
The episodes begin with minor battering incidents which then intensify
into more serious violence, and finally into a stage of contrition and
reconciliation, until the cycle begins again.8 2 However, evidence of bat-
tered wife syndrome would be inadmissible if its admission was solely
for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity of the husband
to commit the crime. 3 Nonetheless, such evidence has been admitted
in homicides where the defense was self-defense, to show that the party
had a reasonable and honest belief she was in danger of serious bodily
harm. 4 Because subsections (b) and (c) of Florida Statutes section
794.011(4) require that the "victim reasonably believe that the of-
fender has the ability to execute these threats,"8 5 evidence of battered
wife syndrome would aid the jury in determining the reasonableness
and honesty of her belief. In homicides, self-defense is usually an overt,
77. Id. at 5, 6.
78. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals
for Reform, 14 SFrON HALL L. REV. 74, 82 (1983). Battered wife syndrome is the
term used to describe typical reactions of physically abused women. A battered wife
often does not leave her husband or seek other relief because of a feeling of helpless-
ness, lack of other emotional and economic resources and a fear of retaliation by her
husband.
79. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(b)(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
80. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984)(citing L.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1983).
84. In Kelly, 97 N.J. at 204, 478 A.2d. at 377, the court stated that the expert's
testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible, in a homicide, as relevant to
the honesty and reasonableness of defendant's belief that deadly force was necessary to
protect her against death or serious bodily harm. See Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d
1325, 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), where the court noted that in a homicide,
testimony of a clinical psychologist relating to battered wife syndrome should be al-
lowed if the trial court feels it is sufficiently developed and the expert is qualified. See
also Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied
mem., 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982).
85. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(b), (c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
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aggressive act, undertaken to protect one's self from serious bodily
harm or death.86 In sexual battery, on the other hand, self-defense is
often a passive act of submission, also undertaken to protect one's self
from serious bodily harm. Although the act of self-defense in sexual
battery is often passive, the similarity to the concept of self-protection
indicates that the admission of battered wife syndrome evidence is jus-
tified under Florida's Sexual Battery Statute in marital rape cases. 7
Because many of these wives will use the passive method of self-de-
fense, evidence that she has been battered in the past will show that she
reasonably believed her husband had the ability to carry out his
threats. With the admission of battered wife syndrome evidence, a wife
with a history of being abused may be viewed by the jury as a more
credible witness than a rape victim who did not previously know her
assailant. Evidence of past abuse will reinforce her credibility by prov-
ing to the jury the reasonableness of her fear of future or present retali-
ation, and provide an explanation for her submission to the sexual bat-
tery. Of course, the danger of admitting the evidence is that jurors may
decide the battered wife consented to the violence because she stayed in
the relationship with her husband. Actually, there is an array of socio-
logical reasons the battered wife remains with her husband, but true
consent to the abuse is not one of them.88 In Hawthorne v. State,8 9 for
example, the court ruled that expert testimony regarding battered wife
syndrome was admissible in a first degree homicide where the defense
was self defense. This court reasoned that the testimony was necessary
to inform the jury that staying in the home was reasonable because it is
a common symptom of the syndrome.90 In Borders v. State,91 the court
reversed and remanded a first degree homicide conviction, ruling that
expert testimony on battered wife syndrome is admissible as long as the
trial court finds the expert is qualified and "the subject matter is suffi-
ciently developed so that it can support an expert opinion." 92 In Bor-
ders, the husband and wife often drank alcohol, which led to violent
fights. The husband beat his wife with his fists and sometimes used
weapons such as a frying pan. The fights were often so severe that
86. Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 806.
87. There have not been any Florida cases applying this rationale to sexual bat-
tery as yet.
88. Kelley, 97 N.J. at 194-97, 478 A.2d at 372-73.
89. Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 801.
90. Id. at 807.
91. 433 So. 2d at 1325.
92. Id. at 1327.
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friends and the couple's children would intervene because they feared
that the wife would be killed. On the day of the homicide, the couple
had been drinking and began arguing. The husband punched his wife
in the breast. The wife ordered her husband out of the house, he left
for a short while and then returned. When he returned, a shoving
match occurred. The wife, armed with a kitchen knife, stabbed her
husband, who was dead when authorities arrived. 3 The court asserted
that in a homicide prosecution the defendant should be allowed to in-
troduce a wide array of testimony to support a self-defense theory.94
Arguably, the court should afford the victim of sexual battery the same
latitude. Evidence of battered wife syndrome should be admitted to
show the reasonableness of the wife's beliefs that her husband will
carry out his threats. If evidence of previous wife battering is inadmis-
sible, a wife may be at a greater disadvantage than the victim of a rape
by a stranger. The jury may find that a wife would not reasonably be-
lieve that her own husband would actually carry out such threats, and
therefore the jury may not convict him.
C. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(5)-Felony of the Second
Degree
Florida Statutes section 794.011(5) provides for a penalty of fel-
ony in the second degree95 for sexual battery involving a lower level of
force than required for the first degree felony sections of the statute.
Section 794.011(5) provides a sanction when the offender uses "physi-
cal force and violence not likely to cause serious personal injury."9' 6
With married couples, the use of this level of force97 may not be viewed
as sexual battery by the jury. The jury, as a cross-section of the com-
munity, will reflect common attitudes about rape. Some women do not
consider a coercive act of intercourse as rape even when there is a lack
of mutual consent to the intercourse.9
93. Id. at 1326.
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(c) (1983) provides for a term of imprisonment not
to exceed fifteen years. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(b) (1983) indicates the penalty may
include a fine of up to ten thousand dollars. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)(a)(2) (1983)
notes that habitual offenders may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed
thirty years.
96. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
97. Freeman, supra note 76, at 5.
98. Russell, supra note 1, at 2.
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It is likely that some jurors have themselves experienced this type
of forced intercourse in marriage. If a female juror admits that this
level of force constitutes a sexual battery, she would in many cases be
admitting that she herself has been sexually battered by her own hus-
band. If a male juror admits this level of force constitutes sexual bat-
tery, he would in many cases be admitting that he himself is a rapist. It
is doubtful that either a male or female juror would want to admit this.
Also, jurors who have not experienced this form of sexual battery in
marriage may tend to disbelieve that such conduct occurs in marriage.
Therefore, convictions for sexual battery with this level of force will be
difficult to obtain. Without evidence of great physical force, or admis-
sion of prior wife abuse, the jury may feel the wife consented to the
intercourse. 9 There is generally an abhorrent disbelief that any man
would commit rape, especially against his wife, and therefore the jury
may distrust the wife's complaint. 100
D. Florida Statutes Section 794.022-Rape Shield
Rape shield laws deal with important rules of evidence, which are
intended to protect the victim of rape from becoming a victim of the
criminal justice system. The rape shield portion of the statute was sub-
stantially rewritten and amended in 1983.101
Section 794.022(1)102 was amended to delete the following cau-
tionary instruction to the jury: "The court may instruct the jury with
respect to the weight and quality of the evidence." 0 3 The removal of
the cautionary instruction is an important step in removing judicial
sanction of the notion that many rape claims are unfounded. 0 The
present subsection states, "[t]he testimony of the victim need not be
corroborated." 10 5 Although corroboration is not required under the
statute, courts admit various forms of corroborating evidence, including
99. Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
613, 618 (1976).
100. Id. at 616.
101. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1), (2), (3) (1983)(amending Fla. Stat. § 794.022(1),
(2) (1975)).
102. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1983).
103. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1975) included the instruction in the text of the
statute.
104. J. WIGMORE, ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 924(a) at 459 (1940)(many were falsely charged of rape and convicted).
105. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1983).
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evidence of physical injury, presence of semen, and testimony of wit-
nesses if available: "[T]he fact remains that proof of rape in most cases
is sufficient only when the evidence is corroborated."106
In marital sexual battery there may be little, if any, evidence of
physical injury unless the level of violence is quite severe. The presence
of semen will not be indicative of non-consensual intercourse in the
same degree as in non-marital sexual battery, and it is unlikely that
there will be any corroborating witnesses. The absence of the need for
corroboration, directed by the statute, is therefore helpful. Realisti-
cally, despite the progressiveness of the amended statute, cases of mari-
tal sexual battery will need corroborating evidence to prove that non-
consensual sexual battery occurred.
The greatest barrier to a marital rape conviction is the language of
section 794.022(2), which deals with the admissibility of evidence con-
cerning "specific instances of prior sexual activity between the victim
and any other than the offender. . ". ."10O This barrier stems from the
retention of a disputable myth, that prior specific acts of sexual con-
duct are relevant to the issue of consent.108 This myth is based on the
premise that an unchaste woman will lie,109 and a belief that once a
person has had prior voluntary sexual intercourse, she most likely has
consented in the subsequent instance of rape. 110 The statute forbids the
introduction of evidence of prior sexual activity, unless it establishes a
pattern of conduct which is relevant to consent,111 or tends "to prove
the defendant was not the origin of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or
disease."11 2 The court must first have a hearing in camera to determine
106. Hibey, supra note 18, at 314.
107. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
108. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (1975)(declares all
evidence of prior sexual conduct with persons other than the accused is inadmissible,
unless it shows the source of semen was not the defendant's, or where there is preg-
nancy, or disease). See also J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, Rape and the Limits of
Law Reform, 23 (1982)(the elimination of such evidence in Michigan was due to its
"irrelevance and highly prejudicial and inflammatory nature").
109. Note, supra note 99, at 626.
110. Id. at 624.
111. See McElveen v. State, 415 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982)(three specific incidents of prior sexual activity do not show a pattern of conduct
relevant to the issue of consent). See also Winters v. State, 425 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hodges v. State, 386 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
112. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
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if there is a pattern of conduct relevant to the issue of consent.113 Prior
to the 1983 amendment, the relevance of the pattern of conduct was
supposed to be decided outside the presence of the jury, but in practice
this was rarely done.1 " The requirement of an in camera hearing is an
effort to guard the victim's privacy. The need for an in camera hearing
gives credence to the view that such evidence is usually highly
prejudicial.115
In a marital situation, evidence of prior sexual activity which es-
tablishes a pattern of conduct is admissible in two ways. First, the prior
sexual relationship between the husband and wife is admissible. It is
possible that prior unusual sexual conduct between a husband and wife
will be exposed and used to prove that the act of violence before the
court was a normal part of the couple's relationship, indicating consent
to the present sexual battery. Second, if a married woman established a
pattern of extramarital sexual conduct, this also is admissible. Deviant
extramarital conduct, if it establishes a pattern of conduct indicative of
consent, will be admitted to demonstrate consent to the sexual battery.
However, neither of these types of behaviors necessarily establish con-
sent to the particular act before the court, especially when the act was
performed with violence and force."' The fact that a person has had
prior consensual sexual relations with another person has no bearing on
whether there was consent to the present act. It is outrageous to even
consider that a person consents to violence.
However, in the minds of jurors, extramarital sex, if admitted, is
likely to cause the jurors to develop unconscious hostility toward the
victim." '7 Also, prior consensual activity with the offender may imply,
in the minds of jurors, consent to the present sexual battery." 8 This
emphasis on the victim's behavior, rather than on the offender's, behav-
ior should be eliminated from the statute because it has been shown to
be of little probative value." 9 The admission of prior sexual relations
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1979). See also Note, supra note 35, at 439
n.154.
115. Note, supra note 15, at 159.
116. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 47, at 137 "One does not think to ask the
victim of assault for proof he or she is not a masochist, or provide a life history of all
previous assaults, to establish a pattern that might mitigate the assailant's culpability".
Id.
117. See Note, supra note 15, at 155.
118. Id. at 146.
119. See Note, supra note 35, at 440-41. Note, supra note 16, at 345. See also
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with the defendant, as well as sexual relations with others, if a pattern
of conduct is shown to be relevant to the issue of consent, creates a
difficult evidentiary obstacle for a married woman to overcome.
The two redeeming features of the 1983 amendment to Florida
Statutes section 794.022120 are the requirement of an in camera hear-
ing and the elimination of the cautionary instruction to the jury. With-
out the safeguard of an in camera hearing it is doubtful that a married
woman would ever seek to prosecute her husband for sexual battery
because she knows every detail of their marital history would be over-
heard by courtroom spectators, and possibly even the jury.'21 Also, the
cautionary instruction to the jury, to consider the victim's testimony
with extra care, would discourage victims from bringing charges
against their spouse, because it may promote the feeling that the victim
is also on trial.
The last subsection is a new addition to the statute. 22 Florida
Statutes subsection 794.022(3), delineates a per se rule against the ad-
mission of "reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual con-
duct,"' 2  despite any other provision of law. 124 This addition helps to
ensure that a victim's credibility will not be undermined by inferences
of immorality by general reputation evidence. The exclusion of such
evidence is an attempt to abrogate the common-law myth that unchaste
women are liars. 25 In the marital context, the inadmissibility of repu-
tation evidence will be as important as it will be in non-marital sexual
battery.
It appears that the statute permits the admissibility of specific acts
of prior sexual conduct under the conditions delineated under Florida
supra note 17 for rape shield statutes of other states, in relation to prior sexual
conduct.
120. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
121. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88 (1977).
122. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (1983). The prior statute did not mention reputa-
tion evidence. It was thought that since such evidence was admissible at common law,
it was admissible under the statute. See Note, supra note 35, at 437. See also McEl-
veen, 415 So. 2d at 746.
123. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (1983)("Notwithstanding any other provisions of
law" establishes the per se rule).
124. Previously, the controlling statute was FLA. STAT. § 90.404(l)(b)(l) (1983).
This statute provided for the admission of "evidence of pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait,
." under the sexual battery statute. Id.
125. See Schwartz, supra note 14; Note, supra note 15.
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Statutes section 794.022(2), holding on to the myth that such conduct
is indicative of consent. The husband will invariably raise the issue of
consent, as an affirmative defense, in virtually all cases of marital sex-
ual battery. 26 The retention of the myth that previous sexual relations
indicates consent to the present act is a formidable barrier to convic-
tion. Counteracting the jury's inclination to disbelieve the existence of
rape in marriage, however, is perhaps the most difficult obstacle of
all. 127
E. Resistance
The Florida Sexual Battery Statute does not require resistance.128
However, case law indicates resistance may be an important factor in
the minds of the judges and juries. In State v. Hudson, 29 the offender
grabbed the victim, pulled off her clothes, yanked her out of the car
and threatened to seriously injure her.1 30 The victim testified that she
submitted out of fear for her physical safety. 31 The court hinted that
this was effective resistance. The Florida Second District Court of Ap-
peal held that "questions of consent, force, resistance, and fear, are
particularly within the province of the jury to determine. "132 Appar-
ently, in Florida resistance by the victim is sometimes important to
demonstrate a lack of consent, but the need for resistance to show lack
of consent is unrealistic and dangerous to the life of the victim.133 To
infer that lack of resistance implies consent is a throwback to the myth
that a virtuous woman would "resist to the utmost"1 34 to defend her
honor. "There are many situations in which resistance is not a valid
measure of lack of consent by rape victims. '"135
126. Note, Criminal Law--Sexual Battery-No Interspousal Exception Under
Florida's Sexual Battery Statute-State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d. 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 326, 336 (1982).
127. Pracher, supra note 10, at 732. The same point was made in a telephone
interview with Jayne Weintraub, prosecutor in the case of State v. Rider (Aug. 14,
1984). Weintraub expressed the view that getting the jury to believe a husband can
rape his wife is the most difficult barrier in the prosecution.
128. Note, supra note 35, at 426-29.
129. 397 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 427.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally Schwartz, supra note 14, at 577-82.
134. Id. at 569.
135. Id. at 582.
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Florida recognizes sexual battery as an act of violence, not a sex-
ual act."3 8 Since assault and battery do not require resistance by the
victim, 13 7 the need for resistance in sexual battery must be solely re-
lated to old common-law myths about rape, and should be abolished. In
State v. Rider,'38 for example, the court concluded that "the legislature
by repealing the rape statute and enacting the sexual battery statute,
intended to abrogate any common-law assumptions concerning the
crime of rape."' 39 It is apparent, however, that the common-law myths
regarding prior sexual conduct and resistance continue to exist in Flor-
ida law. Florida courts should consider issuing jury instructions which
advise the jury that lack of resistance is not indicative of consent to
sexual battery. To expect resistance from a wife, when there is, at the
very least, fear of possible violence, which may or may not cause seri-
ous personal injury, is to put a burden on the victim of sexual battery
that is not placed on most other victims of crime. 40 "[T]o impute con-
sent on the part of the victim exceeds the bounds of the law of
consent."''
IV. Attitudes of Victims, Police, Prosecutors, Judges and Ju-
rors: Impact on Marital Rape Convictions
Although Florida Statutes section 794, with its gradations of pun-
ishments reflecting levels of force, provides an adequate framework for
marital rape convictions, a serious impediment within the statute to
successful prosecutions lies with the admissibility of evidence of specific
prior sexual activity. Also, case law, which permits the jury to consider
resistance of the victim, results in inconsistencies that could effectively
bar convictions. However, the major barriers to convictions do not lie
within the statute, or within case law. Non-reporting by victims, police
inaction, prosecutorial discretion, and the attitudes of judges and juries
are the primary obstacles to successful prosecutions and convictions for
marital rape. Even when a statute or case law permits the prosecution
of husbands for marital rape, the problems in obtaining convictions for
marital rape are exacerbated by the attitudes of the participants in the
136. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127.
137. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 46, at 146.
138. 449 So. 2d at 903.
139. Id. at 906.
140. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 583-88.
141. Pracher, supra note 10, at 730.
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judicial process."
A. Victim Awareness and Cooperation
"One of the simplest and most effective ways that a victim can
prevent a wrongdoer from being arrested and prosecuted is to fail to
report the crime ... . It is generally thought that the crime of rape
is the most unreported type of crime in the United States. 44 There are
no precise figures to indicate the number of spouses who do not report
marital rape. One reason marital rape is seldom reported is that most
states do not recognize rape in marriage in all situations,1 45 as a
crime.1 46 In those states where the marital rape exemption has not been
totally abolished, a husband has, in essence, a license to commit the
debilitating and degrading crime of rape against his wife.14 7
There have been few prosecutions 148 in states whose laws permit
husbands to be prosecuted for marital rape, which may indicate that
although the exemption for husbands is removed by statute or case law,
the'attitudes of victims, as well as those in the criminal justice system,
are predominate factors in perpetuating the existence of the marital
exemption. "In the case of marital rape, all the reasons that deter
women from bringing rape charges [in non-marital rape] are exacer-
bated.' 4 9 Marital rape is often only reported when it is accompanied
by other violence. 150 Studies have shown that despite the level of vio-
lence used, some married women do not realize or admit they have
been raped by their husbands.' 5' The attitude of the victim is one of
denial, and inability or refusal to conceive of the violent sexual attack
as rape.
142. Beinen, Rape Reform Legislation in the United States: A Look at Some
Practical Effects, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 139, 140 (1983).
143. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Crimi-
nal Case, 28 VAND. L. REv. 931, 934-35 (1975).
144. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
145. See supra note 3.
146. Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 1088, 1090 (1980).
147. See generally Griffin, In 44 States It's Legal to Rape Your Wife, STUDENT
LAWYER 21, 57 (1980). See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 51.
148. See Beinen supra note 142, at 144 (indicating there were "less than [five]
prosecutions in three years . . . in the entire state [of New Jersey], which has a popu-
lation of nine million"). See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48.
149. Griffin, supra note 147, at 57. See also Note, supra note 9, at 260.
150. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
151. See generally Freeman, supra note 76, at 6-8.
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The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), in its
study of forcible rape, conducted interviews with twenty-nine non-mari-
tal rape victims who did not report the crime,15 2 and listed the reasons
for their failure to report. 153 The reasons spouses do not report rape are
even more complex. Some wives internalize the reason for the rape and
see themselves at fault."" Some are too "ashamed to talk about it,"'aS
and "prefer to keep this humiliating experience private."' 56 Victims of
marital rape may fail to report because of fears of "loneliness, loss of
.. .psychological security and admission of failure. . . ."151 Addition-
ally, wives may not report the rape because of financial inability to live
without the economic assistance of their husbands. 58 In essence, then,
there are three significant barriers to conviction arising from the atti-
tudes of victims of marital rape. First, the victim has the attitude that
if her husband is the offender, it is not rape. Second, even when the
wife perceives the act as rape, other fears result in her not reporting the
crime. Finally, these attitudes and fears, when coupled with the fact
that in some Florida districts eighty percent of victims of domestic vio-
152. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE,
FINAL PROJECT REPORT, 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FORCIBLE RAPE].
153. The table shows an ordered rank of the reasons victims did not report to
police.
Reasons for Not Reporting the Rape to Police.
(N = 29) (Multiple Answers Possible)
RANK REASONS % RESPONSE
1. Fear of Treatment by Police or Procedures 52%
2. Fear of Trial Procedures 34%
3. Fear of Publicity or Embarrassment 34%
4. Didn't Want Family or Friends to Know 34%
5. Lack of Interest by Police 31%
6. Fear of Revenge by Offender 28%
7. Procedures Too Time-Consuming 17%
8. Didn't Want Him Arrested/Punished 14%
9. Probably Couldn't Identify Him 10%
10. Didn't Think Police Would Believe You 3%
11. Lack of Evidence/No Proof 0%
Id. at 15.
154. Freeman, supra note 76, at 7.
155. Id.
156. Griffin, supra note 147, at 57.
157. Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 75, at 462.
158. Note, supra note 9, at 260.
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lence drop the reported charges,159 indicate that victim non-cooperation
is a major hurdle to successful prosecutions for marital rape.
California has had some success in implementing marital rape
laws.160 The reason for this success has more to do with the educational
campaign that occurred when the statute was drafted, than with the
statute itself.1 61 Women's groups, people in the criminal justice sytem,
and citizens in general, were educated as to the existence of marital
rape and its prevalence in society.16 2 Following California's example, a
state seeking to eliminate the marital rape exemption must not only
enact a statute which permits the prosecution of husbands, but must
make an effort to educate its citizens. If this occurs, victims will more
frequently recognize the act as a rape and report it to the police, and
citizens who will become prospective jurors will realize that husbands
can and should be convicted for raping their wives.
Some California cities, as well as cities in other 'west coast states,
have implemented no drop policies which effectively reduce victim non-
cooperation after they report a crime.'1 3 No drop policies have been
used to secure victim cooperation in many kinds of domestic violence
cases. Prosecutors implementing this policy encourage victim coopera-
tion by reassuring the victim that the state is responsible for the prose-
cution and warning the victim that once the charge is filed it will not be
dropped.164 In Anchorage, Alaska, a spouse abuse victim was jailed for
contempt for non-cooperation.10 5 However, most prosecutors have not
taken such drastic measures in the implementation of existing no drop
policies and have substantially reduced victim non-cooperation. 66
Greater victim cooperation will cause police and prosecutors to take
domestic violence seriously and give it the priority it deserves.""1 With
159. See L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 35. In response to a questionnaire, the
district attorney's office in Jacksonville, Florida estimates 80% of victims of spouse
abuse drop the charges. Id.
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1981). See also Schwartz, supra note
2, at 49.
161. This view was expressed in a telephone interview with Laura X, of The
National Clearinghouse on Marital Rape, 2325 Oak St., Berkley, Ca. 94208. (Aug. 5,
1984).
162. Id.
163. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 34-36.
164. Id. at 45.
165. The National Law Journal, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4.
166. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 34.
167. Id. at 33.
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the knowledge that prosecutors will pursue their complaints aggres-
sively and with sensitivity, victims who would not report the rape due
to fear of the treatment they would have received from police and pros-
ecutors, will be encouraged to report the crime, further enhancing the
likelihood of convictions. 168 These three approaches, legislation, educa-
tion, and a no-drop policy, would enhance victim cooperation and lead
to a greater number of convictions.
B. Police Assistance
Police are hesitant to respond to calls relating to marital vio-
lence.169 Their reluctance to respond results from infrequency of prose-
cution and a fear for their own safety due to the extreme violence in
marital disputes.'1 0 When there has been a prior relationship between
the victim and the attacker, police are more likely to deem the charge
of rape as unfounded and fail to act on the complaint.' 7" Police have
wide latitude as to whether action should be taken and are usually
"highly suspicious of rape complaints.1'1
Married women are less likely to seek police intervention than
women who are divorced.173 Also, it has been determined that if a po-
lice officer holds subsequent police investigatory interviews at the police
station, instead of at the victim's current residence, there is a higher
rate of victim attrition.17 4 Therefore, even when married women report
the sexual battery, "[r] egardless of the truth of the charge, most mari-
tal rape complaints will not survive police investigation. 1 7 5 "[M]ost
rape cases are never presented for prosecution; . . .[they] simply die a
bureaucratic death. . .. ,,176 In cases where the victim knows the of-
fender, for example, the possibility of a victim's consent halts further
development of the case beyond the investigatory stage. 71 Attitudes of
police reflect attitudes of society. In marital rape, the police officer will
168. Id. at 34.
169. Note, supra note 9, at 246.
170. Id.
171. Hall, supra note 143, at 940. See also Pracher, supra note 10, at 738.
172. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 31.
173. McLeod, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution of Domestic Assault,
21 CRIMINOLOGY 395, 405 (1983).
174. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 34.
175. Pracher, supra note 10, at 739.
176. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at'46.
177. Id.
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often find the complaint unfounded because of the existence of the pre-
vious consensual sexual relationship, and the fact that the relationship
creates a nearly insurmountable problem of proof. Married women may
report marital rape in cases where violence and physical injury exist.178
The police will investigate and bring the case to the prosecutor when
there is evidence of extreme violence.179 Cases of marital rape not ris-
ing to this level of violence and physical injury may not get beyond the
investigatory phase,180 cutting off the chance of prosecuting the case.
Although attitudes biased against rape victims may in general be
changing,181 in cases of marital rape, a woman may still need to be
"bruised, bloody, and damned near dead 82 .. .for the activity to be
considered not consensual.'' Therefore, even when a victim is willing
to report the sexual battery to the police, she may find police reluctant
to act.
C. Prosecutor Discretion
The prosecutor has great discretion in filing charges.8 4 Prosecu-
tors may be reluctant to file rape charges because of the many difficul-
ties in obtaining convictions. 85 Also, not every prosecutor agrees on
what constitutes rape. 86 In a marital rape, unless there is the use of
force likely to cause serious injury, a prosecutor may feel the jury
would not convict' 8 7 and, therefore, not prosecute.' Frequently in rape
178. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
179. Hall, supra note 143, at 941.
180. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 14.
181. News/Sun Sentinel, Aug. 12, 1984 § A, at 15, col. 1 (Palm Beach Edi-
tion)(citing Lunt, Juvenile Crime in Florida: Myths and Facts, indicating that arrests
for forcible rape in 1983, have increased by 70.9% since 1975).
182. Note, supra note 16, at 347 (quoting a past victim of rape).
183. Id.
184. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 48.
185. Id.
186. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE:
A MANUAL FOR FILING AND TRIAL PROSECUTORS, PROSECUTOR'S VOLUME III 10
(1978).
187. Telephone interview with Jayne Weintraub, prosecutor in the case of State
v. Rider (Aug. 14, 1984). Weintraub indicated a jury is unlikely to convict without
severe force likely to cause serious personal injury.
188. In State v. Rideout, No. 108, 866 (Marion County Or. Cir. Ct. 1978), pros-
ecutor Garry Gortmaker stated in a pretrial remark that "if it had happened in the
bedroom and he didn't beat her up, I'd agree with the other side." Barry, supra note
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cases, a prosecutor will dismiss the case if the victim is reluctant to
fully cooperate at trial."8 9 Also, if a victim of rape does not endorse a
negotiated plea, it influences the prosecutor to reject it. 190 Therefore, it
is evident that victim cooperation and serious victim injury are the
most important factors in influencing the decision of prosecutors to
bring the case to trial.
Unfortunately, it has been found that often prosecutors "uninten-
tionally discourage victims from following through with prosecu-
tion." 191 The victim is made to feel that she is "responsible for the
prosecution of the case and for whatever penalty is ultimately im-
posed,"' 92 despite the fact that rape is a felonious crime against the
state. The prosecutor can promote victim cooperation if the prosecutor
explains that the state is responsible for filing the charge and prosecut-
ing the case, and that the victim will not be allowed to effect a dismis-
sal of the charge, once filed.' 93 Cities that have implemented this policy
in wife battering cases have experienced a greater number of convic-
tions, due to victim cooperation. 94 Therefore, there is a great need for
prosecutors to become more sensitized to the victim's needs in order to
avoid unintentional discouragement. At the present time, prosecutors
may only choose to prosecute a marital rape case where there is ex-
treme force likely to cause serious injury.' However, as more cases
are prosecuted and jurors recognize that marital rape occurs frequently
without extreme violence and severe injury, prosecutors will likely be-
gin to prosecute those cases. Prosecutors can promote victim coopera-
tion with appropriate policies, and as a result enhance conviction rates.
D. Attitude of the Bench
The judge's attitude toward marital rape can impact on the jury's
decision in at least two ways. First, the general demeanor of the judge
may sway the jury, which tends to look upon the judge as the ultimate
authority figure in the courtroom.' 96 The judge may feel that it is im-
146, at 1091.
189. Hall, supra note 143, at 951.
190. Id. at 952.
191. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 33.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 45.
194. Id. at 34.
195. See supra note 187.
196. L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL RE-
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possible to rape one's wife and unconsciously reinforce similarly held
beliefs of jurors.197 Second, the judge's discretion in deciding when cer-
tain evidence is admissible, especially evidence of prior sexual conduct,
influences the outcome of the case.Y98 The judge's role should be to
weigh the evidence according to the rules of evidence, and to admit the
evidence when the probative value outweighs its prejudicial value. 99
There is a belief that in many states, including Florida, judges apply
discretion to the admissibility of evidence that does not conform to stat-
utory provisions.200 In cases where the judge abuses his discretion, and
the jury acquits the defendant, the state is unable to appeal due to the
constitutional ban'of placing the defendant in double jeopardy.2 1
The judge's admission of evidence of rape trauma syndrome0 2 in
cases of marital rape could be enormously helpful in the prosecution of
husbands, especially where there is no evidence of severe physical in-
jury. The acute symptoms of rape trauma syndrome include feelings of
"shock, numbness, bewilderment, fear, terror, disgust, humiliation, vul-
nerability, 'powerlessness, anxiety, and shame. 203 It has been docu-
mented that most rape victims continue to suffer from rape trauma
syndrome at least one year after the rape.20 4 The Kansas Supreme
Court and the Montana Supreme Court recently permitted evidence of
ACTIONS 158-62 (1978). See also J. MARSH, A. GEIST, & N. CAPLAN, supra note 108,
at 58-62.
197. Chappel, Forcible Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 22 CRIME & DE-
LINQ 125, 136 (1976).
198. Note, supra note 15, at 156 (juries are likely to acquit when inflammatory
evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim is admitted).
199. Hibey, supra note 18, at 326.
200. Nicholl, Idaho Code § 18-6105: A Limitation on the Use of Evidence Re-
lating to the Prior Sexual Conduct of the Prosecution in Idaho Rape Trials, 15 IDAHO
L. REV. 323, 342-43 (1979). See also Beinen, supra note 142, at 147-48.
201. Note, supra note 15, at 158.
202. In State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) the
psychiatrist, Dr. Modlin, testified that "[s]ymptoms of rape trauma syndrome include
fear of offender retaliation, fear of being raped again, fear of being home alone, fear of
men in general, fear of being out alone, sleep disturbance, change in eating habits, and
sense of shame." Id. See also Note, Scientific Evidence in Rape Prosecution, 48
UMKC L. REv. 216, 221-22 (1980), where the author indicates his opinion that "most
trial courts . . . would allow the jury to consider the evidence [of rape trauma
syndrome]."
203. Becker, Skinner, Abel, Howell & Bruce, The Effects of Sexual Assault on
Rape and Attempted Rape Victims, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 94, 95 (1983).
204. Id. at 99.
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rape trauma syndrome to be introduced at trial.205 The Kansas Su-
preme Court held that rape trauma syndrome was a sufficiently devel-
oped phenomena which "is generally accepted to be a common reaction
to sexual assault. 206
In Anderson v. State,07 the Florida Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal held that "[tlhe trial court should have excluded the testimony
related to the changes in the victim's behavior pattern following the
[sexual] assault. '20 8 However, the court concluded that the admission
"constituted harmless error"209 and had "no real prejudicial effect; ' 210
the court therefore denied a new trial. 211 The court ignored the exis-
tence of rape trauma syndrome. In ruling that the testimony should
have been excluded, the court relied on a 1919 case 212 which stated
that "[w]hat happened after the criminal act in no wise affected either
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Her giving birth to a dead child,
her sufferings, the impairment of her health, were not material to the
issues involved." '213 However, in Division of Corrections v. Wynn,21 4 the
Florida First District Court of Appeal indicated that the admission of
rape trauma syndrome was an appropriate use of judicial discretion.21 5
Florida courts should acknowledge the significant development of
rape trauma syndrome and battered wife syndrome. Florida judges
could enhance convictions for marital rape if they follow the example
of the Kansas and Montana Supreme Courts and admit evidence of
rape trauma syndrome when the defense is consent. In addition, Flor-
205. Compare Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299 and State v. Liddell,
- Mont. -, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984), with State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227
(Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); and People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)(reject evidence of rape trauma
syndrome). See also Dobson, Survey of Kansas Law: Evidence, 625 U. KAN. L. REV.
662, 663-64 (1984), which raises interesting problems concerning introduction of col-
lateral issues and possible adverse outcomes if a victim does not suffer from rape
trauma syndrome.
206. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
207. 439 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
208. Id. at 962.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Bynum v. State, 76 Fla. 618, 622, 80 So. 572, 573 (1919), rev'd on other
grounds, Hunter v. State, 95 So. 115, 116, 118 (Fla. 1923).
213. Id.
214. 438 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
215. Id. at 448.
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ida courts should admit evidence of battered wife syndrome to show
that the wife had a reasonable belief that her husband's threats of vio-
lence would be carried out. Problems of proving marital rape would
further diminish if Florida judges use their discretionary powers to ex-
clude prior sexual conduct admitting it only when the pattern of sexual
conduct could have no other possible meaning but consent. Finally, if
judges exhibit a courtroom demeanor that is cordial to the anxious vic-
tim, and refrain from any actions or tone which show their own bias to
the jury, convictions for marital rape should increase.21 6
E. The Jury
The most difficult task for a prosecutor in a case of marital rape is
to convince the jury that a husband can actually rape his own wife.217
A 1966 study218 indicates that jurors will most likely not convict a de-
fendant for rape when the defendant and the victim have had prior
sexual relations, even when there is evidence of violence.21 9 The same
study demonstrates that when a victim's character is shown to be tar-
nished, the jury is also apt to acquit the defendant. 20 Recently, ques-
tionnaires were sent to judges in Michigan to assess changes in jury
attitudes under Michigan's Criminal Sexual Conduct Law.221 A major-
ity of the judges thought jurors were less conservative than in the past,
and would more often render guilty verdicts in rape cases.222 The
judges indicated that the change in jury behavior was due to "(1)
changes in public attitudes regarding sexual behavior, (2) public
awareness about rape, and (3) the impact of the women's movement,
." rather than the statute itself. 223 However, many jurors still come
to court with numerous stereotypical notions about rape. 24 One of
216. Miami Herald, Sept. 18, 1984, at BI, B2, col.l. The judge also has a duty
to impose proper sentences which reflect the seriousness of the crime. In Rider, the jury
convicted the husband because "[h]is story didn't hang together." The judge however,
mitigated Rider's possible life sentence to fourteen years, despite the fact Rider was on
parole for second degree murder at the time of the incident. The judge reasoned that
the Riders were "not by any means your typical surburban couple." Id.
217. See supra note 127.
218. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 252-57.
219. Id. at 251.
220. Id. at 249-51.
221. J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, supra note 108, at 56.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS supra note 196, at 168.
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these notions is that a husband cannot rape his wife.225
Therefore, citizens as prospective jurors will need to be educated
that marital rape occurs frequently and that it is a crime.2 6 Jurors
should be aware that victims of marital rape experience, at the very
least, the same trauma and humiliation as other non-marital rape vic-
tims.22 7 When this educational process is complete it will be easier to
convince the jury that it is a crime to rape one's wife.
V. Conclusion
Florida is one of very few states which holds a husband criminally
liable for the rape of his wife, whether they are separated or living
together. The problems of proving marital rape, however, may bar the
successful prosecution of most husbands. The problem in obtaining con-
victions for marital rape is not an acceptable reason for states to retain
the exemption for husbands. "Many types of prosecutions are rare and
difficult-treason, for example-and yet we strongly uphold the need to
keep such laws on the books." '228
One obvious remedy for the problem of obtaining convictions for
marital rape lies in legislative reform which would permit the prosecu-
tion of husbands for marital rape. The reform should include rape
shield laws which eliminate the admissibility of prior sexual activity as
indicative of credibility or consent. Evidence of rape trauma syndrome
should be admitted in cases of marital rape to demonstrate lack of con-
sent to the sexual battery. Evidence of battered wife syndrome should
be admitted to show the victim had reason to fear her husband would
carry out his threats of inflicting bodily harm. However, the most effec-
tive way to enhance prosecutions for marital rape lies in the education
of victims, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. Without changes in
the attitudes of these participants in the criminal justice system, re-
forms in the law, although important statements of public policy, will
not provide relief to the one out of seven wives who are raped by their
husbands. 29
Susan Ruby
225. Pracher, supra note 10, at 731-32. See also Griffin, supra note 147, at 57.
226. D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 2. See also Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 75,
at 461.
227. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 190.
228. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48.
229. D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 2.
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